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Though their history dates back to the middle of the 20th century, public regional 
planning agencies in the United States frequently are characterized as weak and 
disorganized.  Sprawling development is cited as concrete evidence of the failure of 
regional planning agencies to develop and implement a coordinated agenda.  Atlanta is 
often mentioned as a prime example of this phenomenon.  As a result, regional planning 
agencies have received comparatively little scholarly attention for their role in 
metropolitan development.  While much of the everyday work these agencies do has been 
hidden from public view, their work has nevertheless shaped the metropolitan landscape.   
To support this notion, I asked three questions related to the work of Atlanta’s 
public regional planning agency, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC).  First, when 
and through what channels did ARC coordinate planning and development activity?  
Second, how did ARC lend support to the processes behind metropolitan 
 v 
decentralization?  Third, what role did ARC play in the expansion of federal and state 
power over local land development decisions?   
To understand how Atlanta’s regional planning agency operated at this nexus of 
fractious local, state, and federal politics, we must turn our attention away from 
mechanical indicators and toward more subtle issues of procedure.  Drawing from a body 
of archival sources, I examine a historical series of events: the conditions surrounding the 
formation of the planning agency in 1971; the writing of a 1975 regional development 
plan; the coordination of a regional watershed management process in 1980; the genesis 
of the 1989 state law that mandated local comprehensive planning; and the pitched battle 
over air quality and the building of a suburban freeway in 1999.   
Focusing on the work of the Commission reveals how administrative capacity, 
consistent state support, and a regionalist legacy influenced which issues would receive 
attention, how responses to those issues would be crafted, and the character of the 
development that would result.  Examining the work of a single agency over time permits 
a detailed view of how the regional planning process unfolds and the role that regional 









Though possessing a history dating to the early 20th century, regional planning 
agencies in the United States have frequently been characterized as weak and 
disorganized. Vast sprawling suburbs are often cited as concrete evidence of the failure of 
the nation’s regional planning agencies to develop and implement coordinated regional 
development agendas.  Seemingly fractured by the spillover effects and negative 
externalities of unregulated development and uncoordinated local behavior, Atlanta is 
often mentioned as a prime example of this phenomenon.  Addressing the issue in a 1994 
lecture before members of the Urban Land Institute’s Atlanta chapter, the eminent urban 
economist Anthony Downs remarked, “unlimited low-density metropolitan growth takes 
place through an uncoordinated, seemingly almost random set of local public policies and 
individual private actions carried out by separate governments and private parties.”1 And 
so goes the prevailing wisdom about the causes and conditions of sprawl and its 
relationship to regional planning: if only coordination were better, sprawl would be less. 
Perhaps as a result of such thinking, the planning agencies ostensibly in charge of 
regional coordination have received comparatively little attention for their role in 
metropolitan growth and restructuring over the last fifty years.  But paying attention to 
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how ideas and information about regional planning issues are generated and disseminated 
and through what paths polices are interjected into the world suggests that regional 
planning agencies have been much more centrally involved in the development decision 
making process than previously acknowledged.  Even a cursory glance at the public 
record reveals the influence of regional agencies and the policies they champion in the 
way debates about development have been framed, in the way planning technologies 
have been used (e.g. maps and population projections), and in the identities of the 
organizations and individuals that were able to participate. 
While Downs succinctly distills the dominant perspective on the function and 
performance of regional planning agencies, his comments summarily overlook much of 
the planning and coordination that regional agencies actually accomplished.  Which is not 
to say that he is wrong.  Often, disconnect appears between local development patterns 
and regional policies (in many cases a real disconnect).  But this does not mean that the 
work regional agencies do is not important to how and why an urban region grows in a 
particular way, or even why local decisions and regional policies don’t always line up.  
Regional planning agencies have played a particularly key role in the processes that have 
shaped the physical form of seemingly unplanned urban regions like Atlanta. 
To support this contention, I investigate four questions related to the work of 
Atlanta’s regional planning agency, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC).  First, 
when and through what channels did ARC coordinate planning and development 
activity?  Second, how has ARC supported the processes behind metropolitan 
decentralization?  Third, what role has ARC played in the expansion of federal and state 
power over local land development decisions? Four, is the existing framework for 
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characterizing and evaluating ARC (and agencies like it) out of step with the way it 
actually works?  All four questions concern how the agency managed to coordinate 
regional policies across political boundaries and the role it played in building 
metropolitan Atlanta’s sprawling landscape.  
To understand how Atlanta’s regional planning agency functioned, sitting at the 
nexus of fractious local, state, and federal politics, we must turn our attention away from 
simple mechanical indicators and toward language and procedure (discourse) and the 
rules that govern the behavior of public agencies (structure).  Paying close attention to the 
discourse that is part of the work of regional planning agencies, during meetings, 
hearings, reports, special studies, maps, and media, is one way of seeing how the process 
unfolds from the inside.  Training a tighter lens on the organization of the regional 
agencies themselves helps us understand how the structure of an agency (jurisdiction, 
funding, composition, and controls) establishes the kinds of development issues that 
receive attention, and how responses to those issues can be crafted.  Together, discourse 
and structure can exert significant influence over the milieu in which development 
decisions are made, yet are not visible in the easily measurable metrics that planning 
researchers often seek.   
Most studies of regional planning have focused on the fate of policies directed at 
controlling specific development externalities associated with the activities of 
neighboring municipal governments.  Success (or failure) is measured by whether or not 
regional policies are adopted and carried out by local jurisdictions within a relatively 
short time frame.2 But taking a longer view challenges such evaluations.  By looking 
across several decades, I build an argument in support of ARC’s influence of on the 
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shape of Atlanta’s built environment.  Toward this end, my dissertation reconstructs the 
cumulative work of ARC during the period between 1971 and 2002, the years in which 
Atlanta grew from an important but relatively small southern city to a vast global 
metropolis.  Using a variety of archival sources related to the work of the Atlanta 
Regional Commission, I will examine, in order, the creation of the regional agency 
(1971); the preparation of a regional development plan (1975); a regional watershed 
management planning process (1980); the passage of a state law that mandated 
comprehensive planning (1989); and a battle over air quality, transportation planning, and 
the building of a suburban freeway (1999-2001).  The written record of the planning 
process that supported the expansion of Atlanta’s built environment provides an inside 
view of the relationship between the professional bureaucracy and political officials that 
helped structure the pattern of development decision-making.  Thus the case of 
metropolitan Atlanta in the post-1970 period provides an opportunity to focus in depth on 
the role of a single regional planning agency in the transformation of an American city 
into a major metropolis during the last third of the 20th century.3 
Writing regional history necessarily emerges from a theoretical perspective.  In 
the case of Atlanta, much has been made of the socio-economic and political forces that 
have conditioned the development of the region, and most of the scholarship that takes 
post-war Atlanta as a case has come from one of three theoretical frames: regime theory, 
race, and political economy. While it is possible to think of these frames as competing 
explanations, more often than not they blend together in scholarly narrative.  Regime 
theory, as expounded by Clarence Stone’s classic case study of Atlanta, argues that city 
development has been determined by a set of loose but consistent relationships between 
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downtown corporate leaders and key elected officials, relationships that have consistently 
worked to enhance the economic value of the interests of members of the regime, but 
have also made controlling the city’s large, and largely poor, black population a 
preoccupation, using planning and development as tools to achieve this end.  Stone uses 
this lens to explain the unusual geography of processes like urban renewal.4  
Race alone has been cited, most prominently by Ronald Bayor (and recently by 
Kevin Kruse), as the critical factor in both the growth and subsequent decentralization of 
Atlanta and the rise of its early post-War suburbs, and one of several determining factors 
in explaining the shape of the city’s physical landscape, from the location of freeways 
and transit to the kinds of jobs in suburban office parks.5 A geographically sensitive 
version of Marxian political economy, based in the work of David Harvey, has produced 
a few efforts to explain Atlanta’s form as an expression of the growth machine and the 
spatial demands of advanced capitalism.  In this scheme, flows of capital, and the self-
interest of the individuals and organizations responsible for managing capital, have been 
in part diverted in the built environment, a complicated process that dictated the shape of 
urban development from afar.6 
Together, regime, race, and political economy offer good explanations of 
development within the city of Atlanta itself, and to some extent the region as well, 
echoing issues and conflicts documented in other places.7 Yet, restricting attention to race 
and capital comes at the expense of overlooking other metropolitan issues, particularly 
the large public institutions that gradually engaged the task of planning the region’s 
development after the Second World War.  Ignoring the intricate relationships that 
developed between federal, state, and local governments during this period, which both 
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supported and pushed the demographic and economic changes that emerged within urban 
areas, hides the role of public bureaucracies (like ARC) in the transformation of central 
cities into metropolitan regions.  Though the day-to-day operations of public regional 
planning agencies remain somewhat ineffable and remarkably complex, none of the 
major existing literatures addresses the influence or importance of this work in detail.  
Hence while respecting the insights developed in the regime theory, race, and political 
economy literatures, I will explore the evolution of Atlanta’s metropolitan landscape 
from the perspective of an old, stable, publicly-financed regional planning agency.   
 
The Regionalist Legacy 
 Upon its founding, the Atlanta Regional Commission inherited a long legacy of 
regionalist activity.  Ideas about the advantages of creating regional plans to achieve 
urban deconcentration were widely circulated beginning in the late 19th century, ideas 
that influenced several generations of planners, architects, and civil engineers who went 
on to form the intellectual base from which planning spread its ideas and intellectual 
capital over succeeding decades.8 Organized efforts to produce formal regional 
development plans in the United States date to the 1920s.9 One of the first, and certainly 
the most famous, was the Plan of New York, a ten volume, ten-year project funded by the 
Russell Sage Foundation that began in 1921 and included some of the most renowned 
planners and social scientists in the English-speaking world.10 What began as a one-off 
project (though with a horizon of 30 years) evolved into the Regional Plan Association 
(RPA) of New York, a permanent, non-profit planning organization that continues to 
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produce plans for and issue reports about the New York metropolitan area on a periodic 
basis.   
Around the same time, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), a 
loose intellectual organization founded in 1923 by Lewis Mumford, Benton Mackaye, 
and a handful of other prominent planners, also appeared.  Self-described intellectual 
descendents of Patrick Geddes, the Scottish denizen of Edinburgh’s camera obscura and 
proponent of a quasi-scientific form of regional analysis, the RPAA advocated through 
writings and plans and lectures for the transformation of the US into a more 
environmentally conscious, decentralized society centered around coherently planned 
urban regions.  Toward this end, the RPAA emphasized mandatory state planning, 
programs to build low-cost housing, and energy conservation.  The association also 
sharply, and quite publicly, critiqued the Regional Plan of New York.  While at least 
initially they stood in opposition to one another, both the example of the New York 
regional plan and the activities of the members of the RPAA exerted tremendous 
influence on planning thought in the U.S.  Though advocating different versions of urban 
decentralization, the New York plan and its RPAA critics nevertheless demonstrated a 
kind of holistic thinking about urban regions that had never before been so clearly 
expressed.11 The influence of the writings of members of both groups on federal policy 
during the New Deal and World War II lead to an expansion of federal interest in using 
planning and policy analysis as tools for managing the economy and eventually to a new 
era of formalized efforts to introduce coordinated planning into all the nation’s urban 
areas.12   
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As the nation’s population continued to urbanize and the economy shifted back to 
peacetime, gauzy regional plans became popular channels in the late 1940s for politicians 
and businesses to advocate for economic growth and infrastructure development.  Using 
catchy names and splashy graphics, early post-war regional development plans were 
often spearheaded by chambers of commerce and comprised of business elites interested 
in helping their localities capture a share of the growing national wealth.  Though they 
had their beginnings in private organizations, the archetypical arrangement being 
Burnham and Bennett’s 1909 Plan for Chicago (which had been sponsored by the 
Commercial Club of Chicago), these plans were nevertheless public civic activities.13 
Early regional development plans tended to outline a top-down approach, with elaborate 
visualizations of new freeways, futuristic urban transit systems, and spacious suburban 
neighborhoods along the city’s edge.  In addition to the publicity the plans were intended 
to generate, they also accomplished a number of more concrete tasks, including laying 
out the schematics for transportation systems, identifying areas for redevelopment, and 
advocating for large Planned Unit Developments (PUD) and new suburban towns to 
accommodate the anticipated population boom.   
The first publicly (locally) financed regional planning agencies also emerged in 
the years just after World War II.  Though at times assuming different forms, the 
agencies tended to be comprised of a board of local elected officials and a small 
professional staff, often having only modest means of support.  But with the first federal 
mandates for regional planning coming along with the 1954 Housing Act (designed to 
assist with the distribution of federal funds for urban redevelopment projects), almost 
immediately public regional agencies began to shift and expand their focus in anticipation 
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of the coming federal largesse that would be available for infrastructure building.  By the 
time the Federal-Aid Highway Act was signed by President Eisenhower in 1956, publicly 
funded regional planning agencies were a well-established feature of the governing 
environment of cities around the country.14  
The federal law that cemented regional planning agencies as permanent parts of 
the urban development process came by way of the federal Highway Act of 1962.  The 
act rebranded the agencies as Metropolitan Planning Organizations, or MPOs for short, 
and charged them with managing the planning of all new federal-aid highways in regions 
with populations of 50,000 or more.  In most places, an existing public planning agency 
was reconfigured to deal with the transportation program issues that were part of the 
MPO requirement.  While the 1962 Act nominally required planning around other issues, 
i.e. environment and land use, the planning that took place within the early MPOs was 
usually limited to cursory considerations of the impact new highway infrastructure might 
have on the surrounding land, with comparatively little attention given to population 
displacement or longer-term land use and development policy.  As the extent of the urban 
infrastructure spread over the national landscape, the externalities of transportation 
system development became increasingly visible and hard to ignore (even if these 
externalities were unintentional).   
To deal with these consequences, the agencies that began as a part of an effort to 
organize and direct funds into transportation projects were transformed (again) into more 
comprehensive regional planning bodies during the 1960s and 1970s.  The number of 
federal and state policies that touched planning and development issues increased 
manifold during this period.  Beginning in 1964, a series of new policies came on the 
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scene: 1964 Highway Act, 1964 Civil Rights Act, 1966 Historic Preservation Act, 1966 
Metropolitan Development Act, 1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 1969 NEPA, 
1970 Clean Air Act revision, and 1972 Clean Water Act.  These policies were designed 
to address both the externalities of development at the local and metropolitan scale and 
continue a national program of building infrastructure, giving regional planning agencies 
considerable influence and power in the growing government bureaucracy.  As the 
natural environment became part of a more complex science with measurable standards, 
which could be linked to decisions about transportation and land use and received greater 
attention, the idea that planning could and should lead to policies that protect air quality 
and water from the effects of development gained ground.  By the mid-1970s these ideas 
began to reform the core activities of public regional planning agencies.15 The MPO 
finally began to look a little more like the comprehensive agency its nomenclature 
suggested. 
The number of new responsibilities assigned to regional planning agencies made 
regional development plans more difficult to produce.  But requirements associated with 
those tasks also gave new focus to the regional planning process itself, tightening the 
connection between transportation, the environment, and land use patterns.  And 
expansion of federal power created a constellation of programs that, because of overlaps 
and inconsistencies, were becoming the subject of a public debate about the proper 
relationship between federal, state, and local governments.  The terms of this debate 
touched on fundamental beliefs about the way government should work, and would shape 
the context that regional planning agencies like ARC occupied.16 The trouble was how to 
make explicit the connection between social and economic conditions, the natural 
 11 
environment, and the built landscape.  In requirements that environmental and 
transportation policies be explicitly tied together came the need for new techniques to 
measure existing conditions and extend the implications of those conditions into the 
future in a convincing way.  Hence projections of the size of the future population and 
workforce would become intertwined with projections of traffic congestion and air and 
water quality.  Accounting for the density of the relationships at the core of this critical 
nexus demanded a reordering of the regional planning process.  
While, with a few exceptions, parcel-level decision-making authority (zoning and 
building permitting) remained embedded in local jurisdictions (municipalities and 
counties), the growing complexity of the programs regional agencies were responsible for 
gave the agencies greater influence over shaping the broader context in which small-scale 
development decisions would be made.  This expanded power can be seen in the 
changing practices of ARC.  Pushed by both federal and state requirements for the 
contents of regional plans, the Commission began to place transportation and 
environmental infrastructure (roads, sewers, water plants) on more equal footing.  As a 
result of 1970s revisions to the Clean Air Act and rising recognition of the association 
between transportation patterns and urban air quality, the link between transportation and 
environmental policy grew even closer in the 1980s.17 And with the introduction of the 
CAA amendments in 1990 and ISTEA in 1991, the role of regional agencies in 
coordinating transportation and environmental planning became even more important 
during the 1990s.18 
Thought it may appear otherwise, the combination of politics and policies that 
supported mass suburbanization in the second half of the 20th century were not the result 
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of a malicious, national master plan.19 Government action, through fits and starts, ended 
up creating a set of conditions highly favorable to home ownership, and once adequate 
resources were available to a wide enough cross-section of the population, households 
that were able took advantage of what was clearly a good deal, moving en masse out of 
central cities and toward outposts along an ever-expanding suburban fringe.  I mention 
this simply to further underscore the idea that planning at the regional scale has been 
forged by a complex set of interactions attended to by an array of actors.  No single event 
or decision exerted a definitive influence on the direction the region took.  And from a 
cursory glance, the procession of land development certainly looks like the result of a 
chaotic process (as Downs noted).  Yet there is an order and logic to metropolitan 
development that reveals itself slowly, and only by stringing major planning events 
together can the total effect of regional coordination be witnessed, and how that 
coordination has been supported and managed by regional planning agencies.  Focusing 
on the long-term work of a regional agency deeply rooted in a particularly place provides 
us with the chance to see in detail how the process unfolds, and the influence regional 
planning institutions exert on the sprawling suburban metropolis. 
Both regional planning agencies and the plans they produce tend to be viewed as 
ends-focused, though the complexity of their activities and the manifold connections they 
maintain suggest a means-focus might be more appropriate.  Looking at the details of the 
structure of major regional planning activities helps answer questions about what a plan 
is, how planning should be understood (a measure of the value of the activity), and 
whether we should re-evaluate our perception of regional plans and regional agencies.  
Viewing these agencies as integral parts of an on-going planning discourse based in a set 
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of institutional relationships reveals metropolitan Atlanta’s landscape to be not the result 
of uncoordinated or random events, but rather the product of a loose regional vision 
(embodied by ARC) that guided the behavior of the public agencies and private actors 
responsible for setting the development trajectory of the region, resulting in the massive 
(but manicured) sprawl for which it is now known.20 
 At a more concrete level, the process of regional planning in Atlanta unfolded in 
the course of meetings, conversations, news reports, conferences, and public hearings, as 
well as through an array of written materials, reports, plans, and maps, all of which have 
organized a series of intricate, at times overlapping, events.  The details of the regional 
planning process, contained in the organization and timing of meetings, the contents of 
staff reports, and the gathering and cleaning of data, provides insight into the fluid and 
complicated relationship between levels of government and private citizens; how a vision 
of regional development was expressed; and how the image of a seamless, low-density 
urban area was conceptualized and then realized.  In Atlanta we find a story of region, 
rather than simply a story of a city and suburbs, and a story of a regional planning 
agency, not just to a story of capitalism, racism, and power elites.  
That said, the role of the Atlanta Regional Commission in the development 
process can be theorized from two directions.  Michel Foucault wrote extensively on the 
means by which power is embedded in modern institutions, writings that cannot easily be 
summarized in a few sentences.  But in the course of interviews, he often did just that, 
summarizing his thinking for the sake of clarification.  And so in a 1977 interview, 
Foucault suggested that one of his primary interests had been excavating and contesting 
the common definition of power as simply a repressive (‘No!’) force, arguing instead that 
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power “needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body.”21 Foucault recognized that power might be particularly visible in the 
activities of spatially bound agencies, though he stopped short of fully developing this 
insight.  From a different direction, Henri Lefebvre wrote about the ways power was 
expressed in the fundamental social and economic relationships at the core of the modern 
metropolis, which he argued were ultimately grounded by a process of urbanization.22 
Urbanization, which Lefebvre defined as the process of extending both the urban fabric 
and the urban economy across the countryside, is the process by which urban life comes 
to dominate everywhere.  With this domination comes a necessary reordering of space, 
which Lefebvre understood as a process whereby the particular spaces of the city and the 
country become part of a new global space.23  Lefebvre’s notion of a global space forms a 
geographic side of Foucault’s notion of a network of power.  
Both ideas can be connected to observations of the techniques institutions use to 
manage their jurisdictions.  ARC stands as an example of a spatially-bound agency 
through which a broad power network runs, and that learned to use available tools to 
maintain its position in the network.  The Commission was a central player in the 
regional network of organizations, governments, and individuals that oversaw land 
development.  Its power was expressed in its managing the flow of land development 
information across jurisdictional lines, its position in-between different levels of 
government, and the support it received from larger political entities.  As a result of its 
diffuse power, ARC emerged as one of several key institutions spreading both planning 
and urbanization, first to Atlanta area jurisdictions, then across the entire state.  It is in 
this sense that I borrow from Foucault and Lefebvre a way of framing the administrative 
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work of the Atlanta Regional Commission and its hand in planning and coordinating the 




Planning Metropolitan Atlanta 
In the early-1950s, as Atlanta appeared poised to grow well beyond its city limits, 
consolidation and growth boundaries looked like useful development policies.  The 
region’s first two comprehensive regional plans codified this, 1952’s Up… Ahead and 
1954’s Now…For Tomorrow, both produced by the nascent Metropolitan Planning 
Commission (MPC).  Both plans presented a vision of the future spatial development of 
the region that emphasized cooperation across jurisdictions.  Early planning documents 
stressed the importance of two seemingly contradictory notions, a distinct regional 
identity that includes both central city and outlying areas, and a spatial limit to the 
region’s growth.  Over the four-year period during which the two regional plans were 
produced, two issues were identified that would emerge again and again over the next 
half century; both were partly in debt to Lewis Mumford’s vision of what regional 
planning should achieve and partly in debt to the empirical techniques developed in the 
1929 Regional Plan of New York.  The first was the opportunity presented by a program 
of publicly planned population decentralization.  The second was the problem of 
haphazard development of residential subdivisions in outlying districts.  While there was 
general consensus that the region would grow outward, partly due to the fact that it has 
no topographic barriers, there was also a belief that material limits to sprawl existed. 
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Regional planning in Atlanta in the 1950s emphasized such limitations: a rudimentary 
growth boundary, future urban service areas, targeted redevelopment districts, a 
circumferential railroad, and an undeveloped green belt, ideas borrowed from Howard’s 
Garden City, the Greenbelt towns during the New Deal, and the first Regional Plan of 
New York.24 
By 1959, ideas about regional planning began to shift.  During the process of 
putting the recently enacted Federal Aid Highway Act into concrete form, two studies by 
the MPC emphasized through detailed plans the need for building an entire series of 
limited access expressways to improve central city access.25 In the early 1960s, the push 
to build new infrastructure to aid central city access became even more pronounced, 
while the idea of an urban boundary had all but disappeared.  The tension in this strategy 
was captured in a 1962 publication, Atlanta Silhouettes, produced by the Atlanta 
Regional Metropolitan Planning Commission (ARMPC), the successor organization to 
the MPC, that juxtaposed the old central city as the beating heart of the region to the 
exploitability of the abundant vacant land just outside the city as an exploitable resource.  
Population and employment trends were projected further outward even while access to 
the central business district was presented as the lynchpin of the region’s sustainability.  
This document would serve an important role in later regional planning efforts.  In 1972, 
when new regional population forecasts were being prepared, Silhouettes became an 
important reference, ensuring a continuity of process whereby new projections were 
created and fit within an old policy framework.26 
As the shift to encouraging urban dispersal unfolded, regional plans came to focus 
on transportation and environmental infrastructure, mirroring trends at the federal level.  
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The Atlanta Regional Commission  (ARC) was created by act of the Georgia General 
Assembly in 1971, as successor to ARMPC, to unite transportation, environmental, and 
land use planning functions.  In the years following, ARC, in conjunction with the 
Georgia Department of Transportation, coordinated the completion of the freeway 
transportation system in the five counties that comprised metro Atlanta, undertook an 
array of planning support activities, including overseeing the distribution of funds for 
water management made available by the 1972 Clean Water Act, aiding the development 
of the new regional rail transit system, and helping lead a campaign to control the 
region’s primary surface water supply.  
An important part of ARC’s responsibility for orchestrating regional planning 
activities was producing periodic regional development plans (RDP).  The product of a 
three-year process that brought together a variety of local elected officials, planners, and 
representatives from state agencies and the federal government, the 1975 RDP represents 
one of first major activities of the ARC.   This crucial RDP was written during the height 
of the expansion of federal transportation and environmental regulations and the plan 
turned out to be one of the agency’s defining projects.  The process marshaled an array of 
studies, public meetings, reports, press releases, and newsletters, and involved bringing 
different groups to the same table, providing an official forum for discussing planning 
concepts, filtering information to journalists, disseminating ideas to area planners, and 
writing policies.  The resulting document, divided into substantive chapters, was 
supposed to crystallize the region’s development vision for the following ten years.  
Urging both maintaining the old CBD as the primary activity center and providing space 
for new conservation-style suburban developments, the plan used an activity allocation 
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model that projected jobs and population growth toward the edges of the region, outlining 
in the process a vision for low-density sprawl.  This vision was fleshed out in a series of 
policies and forecasts, many of which would reappear over the coming years. 
With the adoption of the Chattahoochee River Management Plan in 1973, ARC 
opened another theater in its effort to guide the development of the region.  Designed to 
guide development along a 48-mile stretch of the river north of Atlanta (the region’s main 
surface water source), the river corridor plan proved to be another tool ARC could use to 
establish its authority over the region’s development patterns.  Because the river held 
such a vital role in the region’s water supply (and wastewater disposal), federal, state, and 
local leaders had long recognized the likelihood that local governments were not on their 
own in a position to manage the resource effectively.  Though initially resisted by a few 
local politicians, the legitimacy of the Chattahoochee plan and the Commission’s 
authority to intervene in decisions about development along the river were firmly 
established after ARC threatened to sue one of its constituent governments during a 
dispute over the issuing of land development permits to a landowner within the river 
corridor.  When a legal fight between Georgia, Alabama, and Florida over who would 
control access to the resources of the Chattahoochee appeared to be in the offing, federal 
interest in the region’s water supply was further piqued, leading to the initiation of the 
Atlanta Study, a larger and more sustained effort to catalogue and plan for the region’s 
long-term water supply.  The Atlanta Study would unfold over a five-year period, brining 
about a massive data-gathering effort and giving rise to new ideas about regional water 
planning and the necessity of establishing a state-backed regional water authority.   
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By the time the pieces of legislation that would together form the Georgia 
Planning Act (GPA) were signed by Governor Joe Frank Harris in 1989, metro Atlanta 
had experienced three decades of rapid growth.  With roots in legislation passed all the 
way back in 1957 that first granted municipalities and counties legal grounds to adopt 
comprehensive development plans, and in debited to an idea Jimmy Carter introduced at 
the end of his single, reform-minded gubernatorial term, the GPA represented the 
culmination of a process that began fifteen years ago to establish a new legal framework 
for regional and local comprehensive development planning.  The act sought several 
ends: increased protection for rivers and wetlands, mandatory local planning, and a 
system of reservoirs for water supply.  The perception of serious environmental 
externalities from rapid growth in metropolitan Atlanta and requirements from the federal 
government to control surface water degradation helped propel passage of the GPA.  
Over time, ARC had been devising and testing the ancestors to the state’s planning 
requirements in metro Atlanta before they were rolled out to the rest of the state.  Upon 
being signed into law, the legislation instantly expanded the state’s involvement in land 
use and environmental issues, and put forth new regulations on development practices. 
In 1990 the federal Clean Air Act was significantly revised, and with the passage 
of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) in 1991, new requirements 
for demonstrating how regional transportation plans would contribute to the improvement 
of urban air quality turned dirty air into a powerful regulatory issue.  As EPA debated and 
organized its enforcement techniques during the early 1990s, the pressure increased for 
planning agencies in regions where ambient air quality that did not meet pre-set standards 
to produce plans that showed how future conformance to the standards would be 
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achieved.27 EPA’s new air quality standards swept Atlanta and Georgia up into the rank 
of places in which stern enforcement was likely to be necessary. 
In early 1996, after the state failed to submit an acceptable air quality mitigation 
plan, EPA ruled that all the counties in metro Atlanta that were currently out of federal 
air quality compliance would have a portion of their federal funds for transportation 
planning and construction suspended if the state and ARC did not come up with a plan 
that clearly demonstrated how the region would reduce vehicle emissions.  In early 1997, 
before a revised air quality plan could be submitted to EPA, a lawsuit filed by a 
consortium of environmental groups challenged the good intentions of the regional 
transportation planning process in Atlanta, alleging that ARC and the state had attempted 
to circumvent the penalties the region was facing by grandfathering several major road 
projects into the federal funding pipeline before the EPA deadline put federal money out 
of reach (assuming the state would be unable to develop an acceptable mitigation plan in 
time).  After rather lengthy legal wrangling, the two sides reached an out-of-court 
settlement, agreeing that only a few of the road projects in the funding pipeline should be 
grandfathered.  The bulk would be removed from the region’s transportation plans.  
Though negotiations between the federal government, ARC, and the state continued in an 
attempt to come up with an acceptable air quality plan, and EPA extended the final 
deadline several times, a conforming plan failed to materialize.  Hence in 1998, EPA 
suspended all federal funds for transportation projects that did not show a positive 
contribute to air quality improvement until ARC and the state could devise an acceptable 
plan.  The agency otherwise remained lenient, finally accepting an interim transportation 
plan in 1999, which meant a re-opening of the funding pipeline on the promise that a 
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permanent plan would be shortly forthcoming.  The high profile publicity generated by 
the loss of federal transportation money and the environmental lawsuits together 
generated a visible regional planning crisis.  Issues of congestion and air quality, which 
had been part of the planning discourse for fifty years, had finally garnered the undivided 
attention of the planning community.28 
With the election of Roy Barnes in 1998, a centrist Democrat from suburban 
Cobb County, Atlanta’s air quality crisis moved to the center of the state’s political stage.  
Promising to confront the rapidly expanding development issues bearing down on metro 
Atlanta, which many believed would inhibit Georgia’s economic competitiveness, Barnes 
immediately set about creating a new regional planning agency.  Basing legislation on an 
idea for a regional ‘super agency’ that had been bounced around the state legislature for 
twenty five years, Barnes orchestrated passage of the bill that created the Georgia 
Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA) during the 1999 session of the General 
Assembly, an effort that became the centerpiece of his first year in office.  An ostensibly 
powerful body, GRTA was born with the purpose of reinforcing the coordination of 
transportation and land use planning across jurisdictions in metro Atlanta.  Its regulatory 
functions and funding were mostly oriented toward transportation issues, but it also had 
power over land use decisions, the ability to raise bonds to fund transportation planning 
activities (including the operation of local transit systems), and the power of eminent 
domain.  
After generating such widespread and genuine excitement with GRTA and its 
hopeful new powers to finally kick the habit of road building, Barnes surprised many of 
his supporters when two years later he began publicly advocating for building a massive 
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new suburban freeway across the northern reaches of the region.  Though Barnes’ 
advocacy was initially largely symbolic, coming as it did on the heals of the 
transportation funding controversy and the public’s apparent growing frustration with 
seemingly unchecked development, his support of building a new freeway turned into a 
flashpoint.29  
Not without its own history, the idea of a 200-hundred mile long a suburban loop 
freeway had been discussed at a number of junctures, having periodically emerged as a 
major regional issue since the early 1970s.  Planned as both a developmental highway 
and a way to direct truck traffic away from the center of the region, the proposed road 
had a diameter that stretched more than 30 miles from the central city, but had failed to 
materialize because of funding shortfalls and political volatility.  But as suburbs north of 
the city grew through the 1980s, several large subregional employment and shopping 
nodes developed in the triangle formed by I-75, I-85, and I-285, attracting commuters 
from all directions, but particularly those making cross-town, suburb-to-suburb trips.  
With an increase in east-west travel, traffic congestion in the northern suburbs was 
becoming a much bigger issue, especially as the region’s air quality continued to decline.  
In 1994, an effort jointly managed by ARC and the Georgia Department of 
Transportation to re-introduce the Outer Loop resulted in a contentious debate within the 
planning community about the damage such a road might do to the region’s air quality.  
After several years, a lawsuit, and much hand wringing, ARC and the state adopted a 
transportation plan in 1997 that excluded funding for the entire Loop, but did provide 
funds to continue studying the future demand for a particular northern section of the road.  
In 1999, in the aftermath of the air quality lawsuits, a revised transportation plan, 
 23 
excluding any part of the Outer Loop altogether, was adopted as part of a deal with the 
federal government to re-open the flow of road building money to the region.  The battled 
that ensued as a result of Barnes’ maneuvering included a tangle of issues that cut to heart 
of the relationship between the bureaucratic and political sides of regional planning.  An 
array of environmental and planning organizations proposed various measures that 
included putting the brakes on sprawl by tightening development regulations, changing 
the way regional planning gets done, and making huge new investments in mass transit.   
 
The National Context 
Deciding where to build the infrastructure that supports land development is 
among the most important and politically charged moments in the planning process.  
Such decisions result from the interaction and conflict of a range of different 
stakeholders, which comprise the practice and politics of planning.  The decisions 
necessarily work through a complex of policies and regulations formed at a variety of 
different political scales: federal, state, district, regional, county, municipal.  In many 
respects, planning decisions tend to be viewed as the domain of local politics (cities, 
townships, or counties), and prior to the New Deal and World War II this was largely 
true. Transportation and environmental planning were regulated at the local, or state 
level, and the federal government played a quiet role. 
But the end of World War II ushered in several major demographic shifts and a 
change in the role federal institutions would play in shaping metropolitan regions.  As 
whites began to move from central cities and small towns to suburbs, blacks migrated 
from the rural south to industrial cities in the north, corporations quietly decentralized 
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their operations, and Sunbelt cities began to grow rapidly, the urban landscape started 
down a seemingly inexorable path of change.  Experiences under the New Deal and 
wartime economy spurred a dramatically expanded level of involvement in planning by 
the federal government.  Through a series of new policies, the federal role in actively 
planning the urban landscape became more expansive.  The design and construction of 
the interstate highway system opened huge tracts of land to development while generous 
federally insured loans (and new construction techniques) made new single-family homes 
affordable to a wide cross-section of society.  Fertility rates climbed and advances in 
automobile production techniques made car ownership cheap.  These factors together 
accelerated the dissolution of physical connections between individual residence, 
neighborhood, and workplace, providing a great swath of middle-income workers with 
the means to move themselves out of dense central cities and into comparatively spacious 
suburban subdivisions.30 
At the same time, pushed by federal funding and aggressive state-level 
development policies, the Sunbelt states started down a long trajectory of growth.31 
Located at the confluence of three major arteries of the Interstate Highway System, 
Atlanta emerged as one of the leading destinations for population migration and job 
growth.  While the central city experienced a certain level of white out-migration and 
black in-migration between 1950 and 1970, mimicking the patterns of decline and racial 
segregation in northern industrial cities like Detroit and Cleveland, during the same 
period, fueled by a robust local economy and mild climate, the pace of metro Atlanta’s 
population growth accelerated much like other urban places in the Sunbelt, stretching into 
a broad suburban metropolis built around an economic base of service and distribution.32   
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New layers of regulation began to emerge in the mid-1960s.  A series of policies 
were instituted that required states and municipalities to devise much more complex and 
regionally oriented transportation plans in order to qualify for federal funds.  
Transportation planning was, for the first time, required to engage the general public, 
address civil rights, provide for the relocation of individuals displaced by road building, 
assess the environmental impacts of development, and coordinate land use with 
transportation activities.  Though not always pursued with vigor, these changes tweaked 
existing channels of local control over the planning process, and introduced a new 
bureaucracy that would restructure regional planning and the urban landscape over the 
next three decades.  As the corollary requirements for transportation planning grew, 
environmental and land use policy, previously on the backburner of local government, 
increasingly fell under federal oversight.  
By the early 1970s, even deeper changes in federal and state policy and in the 
U.S. economy encouraged what might be called a second wave of suburbanization.  The 
migration of blacks to the north slowed and then reversed, international immigration 
expanded, the economy suffered a major reshuffling, and the full effect of federal civil 
rights legislation began to be felt.33 New requirements for metropolitan-level planning 
introduced a wave of new infrastructure funds.  The shifting federal involvement in 
planning was significant, not only because it took on many issues that previously had 
been decided at the local level, but also because the policies were aimed explicitly at the 
interrelationship of transportation and the environment.  Awareness of the negative 
externalities associated with suburban development began at the local level, made its way 
into federal policy, and then in a newly codified form flowed back down to state, 
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regional, and local planning institutions for implementation.  In other words, a new 
constellation of policies was created that directly influenced the structure and 
organization of the built environment.34  
Unlike urbanization in the early post-war years, changes in federal policy in the 
1970s did little to help central cities recapture lost population.  As a result, Atlanta’s 
growth occurred largely in unincorporated sections of its suburban/exurban fringe.35 
During the period between 1970 and 2002, the Atlanta region grew from about 1.6 
million people spread over 7 counties to 4.3 million people in 28 counties.36 Migrants 
who originated in metropolitan counties in the Northeast and Midwest and smaller towns 
in the South drove the early years of this growth, but around 1990 the volume of 
international immigrants increased as thousands of newcomers began arriving from Latin 
America and South and East Asia.  Like most domestic migrants, the majority of 
immigrants settled outside the central city boundaries, resulting in a patchwork pattern of 
ethnic pockets scattered across the region, which continues to complicate the old black-
white divide.37 
These events together signaled the transformation of cities and their suburbs into 
broad metropolitan regions, and helped push the boundaries of the urban fringe almost 
exponentially further into the hinterlands.  What began as decentralization had turned into 
deconcentration.  In the early post-war years (between 1946 and 1970), most suburbs 
remained relatively compact; people still went to the CBD to work and shop.  Public 
transit systems were transferred from private hands to public authorities and several new 
regional rail systems appeared.  But after 1970, trends that originated in the earliest days 
after World War II accelerated.  The size of the average housing unit began to expand 
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while the average number of people per household shrank, the percent of work trips made 
on mass transit declined precipitously, and the average distance between work and home 
grew.  The horizontal expansion of urban areas was almost completely decoupled from 
the pressure of population growth, with dramatic results in the built environment.  
As Atlanta’s population grew, it demonstrated this process vividly.  Up until 
about 1970, growth outside the city was largely adjacent to the city limits, the product of 
city residents moving to newly open suburban subdivisions.  But by the mid-1970s, 
population growth beyond the inner suburbs began to accelerate rapidly.  That the 
region’s population tripled in just over three decades is an astonishing rate of growth in 
any context.  Yet what is perhaps more telling is how the share of regional growth shifted 
dramatically away from the urban core.  In 1960, the city of Atlanta contained ½ the 
regional population and Fulton and Dekalb counties together accounted for 80%; even by 
1970 the city still accounted for one third of the region’s total, and Fulton and Dekalb just 
shy of three quarters.  But by 2002, the city held less than 1/10 of the region’s population 
and the Fulton/Dekalb share had fallen to 36%.  In 1900, the population density of what 
could be defined as metro Atlanta was nearly 6000 persons per square mile.  By 1960, 
this density had dropped by half, to around 3000 persons per square mile.  It continued to 
decline over the following decades, falling to 600 persons per square mile by 2000. 
 
Looking Forward 
Between the early 1970s and early 1990s, government support for comprehensive 
planning expanded dramatically.  By the late 1980s, regulation of the built environment 
was more clearly articulated than ever before.38 But despite new regulations, 
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technologically savvy tools, a more sophisticated planning discourse, and regional 
institutions equipped with better resources, the urban landscape continued to bleed into 
the countryside.  Atlanta’s horizontal march across the landscape grew more rapid and 
voracious.  By virtue of this growth, researchers have often charged that regional 
planning is weak and in need of significant reform.39  Typical solutions call for bigger, 
more powerful regional agencies to take the place of ineffective COGs and MPOs.  
Again, Anthony Downs on the subject, “[c]reating regional governance arrangements that 
can influence key land-use and transportation decisions over all the counties in the 
Atlanta region is absolutely essential to solving the region’s pressing growth-related and 
social problems.”40  
Despite what Downs’ says, sophisticated regional institutions already existed, 
agencies which had long been a key part of the coordination of actors and institutions 
involved in the process of carving out places in the undifferentiated space of the 
metropolis.  Without limiting geography, the shape of metropolitan Atlanta is a clear 
manifestation of this regulatory framework.  The processes that established ARC, 
implemented the GPA, created GRTA, and then later defeated the Northern Arc, 
demonstrate the cumulative nature of transportation and environmental policies, and belie 
the image of a disconnected, balkanized collection of independent political fiefdoms.  Yet 
each policy arena possessed an alter-ego, which emerged in due time.  Environmental 
policies encouraged land conservation, water protection, and neighborhood preservation.  
But these regulations also encouraged and accommodated a far-flung single-family 
housing stock built around a system of cul-de-sacs, setbacks, and stream buffers.  
Regional transportation plans focused on reducing congestion and improving air quality 
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by expanding roads and building a commuter-oriented mass transit system.  But good 
roads allowed the urban-rural fringe to push further away from the central city and the 
transit system was chained to an outdated hub-and-spoke heavy rail, resulting in a 
commuting shed that reaches north to touch Tennessee and west into Alabama.  The 
realization of this vision changed Atlanta’s metropolitan politics, effectively rending the 
old central city – suburb dichotomy, creating in its place a suburban/metropolitan 
landscape.41   
Exploring the nature of the relationships that created this vision raises several 
important issues about how regional planning works in growing urban regions.  First, the 
landscape is the result of an on-going negotiation between bureaucratic institutions 
(planning agencies) and political actors (politicians, developers, residents), a point 
important to understanding how the metropolis is created and sustained over time.42 The 
balance in the negotiation often hinges on the power of administration that regional 
planning agencies have obtained by virtue of their position between public regulation and 
private development.  Second, there is more to regional coordination than meets the eye.  
The impact of regional projects evades easy evaluation in part because connections 
between environmental and transportation policies and resulting land use patterns are 
negotiated between different levels of government, and expressed in a set of intricate 
institutional relationships.  Metro Atlanta reflects a multi-scalar coordination of policy 
and ideas that goes on behind the scenes.  Third, the legacy of regional planning exerts a 
strong influence on the character of regional agencies.  Regional agencies tend to draw 
both from their specific context as well as the broader regionalist tradition dating from 
the early 20th century.  Treating regional planning as a product of the spillover effects and 
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negative externalities of local development decisions fails to comprehend regional 
agencies as historically contingent organizations.  Fourth, state support remains crucial 
for regional planning agencies to become active (and at times aggressive) participants in 
the development decisions that profoundly influence metropolitan form.  But state 
support does not guarantee enlightened regional planning.  Looking carefully at the work 
of regional planning institutions and the activities they are involved with over time 
provides a richer, more instructive view of how development policies are actually devised 
and implemented, and why regional planning does not necessarily mean less sprawl. 
The last 30 years of regional planning reflect significant changes in the politics of 
urban development and the ways that region-wide coordination of land use and 
transportation planning gets expressed.  The vision behind this landscape remained 
surprisingly coherent, which contradicts the common charge that metropolitan areas have 
experienced excessive political fragmentation.  Since 1970, low-density suburbs and 
exurbs have expanded at a rapid pace, but largely because they have been planned to do 
so.  As these suburbs absorbed people and jobs, the center of urban political power 
shifted from central cities to wider metropolitan regions.  As the low-density, auto-
centered landscape grew ubiquitous, conservation and environmental movements became 
more assertive about attributing ecological damage to suburban development practices, 
while homeowners became more sensitive to the congestion brought by population and 
economic growth. Popular accounts of the experience of congestion and a sharpened 
sense of social isolation resulting from the expansion of low density suburban places 
added fuel to this discussion.  Yet challenges brought by suburban homeowners were 
fraught with contradictory demands.  The very existence of low-density, single-family 
 31 
subdivisions was predicated on the kind of growth politics being questioned.  Thus 
challenges to the prevailing politics of planning have been about who controls the 
process, not about changing the physical form of the landscape.43 
The years (1946-1970) leading up to the creation and implementation most of 
these regulations have been well documented, but the post-implementation effect of the 
confluence of so many new regulations remains unclear.  I argue that many of the 
externalities that were to be controlled and mitigated by the expanded regulatory 
framework got worse, not better.  Emphasizing comprehensive transportation and 
environmental planning, the new regulations assisted a transformation of both regional 
planning discourse and the institutions that support it, ultimately encouraging urban 
deconcentration and accelerating sprawl.  By examining the records and materials left 
behind from the on-going process of regional planning in metropolitan Atlanta, I 
reconstruct a past that will aid planners and policy makers in their ability to better 
understand the present relationship between planning policy and the political struggles 
that pervade the metropolis.  Reconsidering how regional coordination is defined and 
works shines a different light on the process of suburbanization, highlighting how the 
public institutions carrying out regional planning have worked to produce a landscape at 
odds with their stated aim.  Which raises questions about what model an institution like 
ARC represents.  Given the mounting problems associated with sprawling metropolitan 
development, understanding how and why a particular vision of regional cooperation 






If Atlanta is a model of regional planning, what kind of model is it?  In many 
respects, Atlanta’s regionalist legacy is almost completely at odds with the regionalism of 
a place like Portland or Minneapolis, the two cities most often identified with regional 
planning.  While coordination among local governments was made possible by the 
relationship between ARC’s political board and planning staff, the support of state 
government, and the relative lack of local government fragmentation, the ends to which 
that coordination was put bore little relation to the natural resource protection imperative 
in Portland or the attempts at a more equitable redistribution of property tax funds in 
Minneapolis.44 In spite of conditions favorable for a progressive regionalism, Atlanta 
appears to have pursued something else.  This directly implicates the Atlanta Regional 
Commission. Hence we must ask toward what end, and for whom, was Atlanta’s regional 
planning agency working?  Answering this question demands a careful look at what ARC 
actually did over the course of its thirty years.  That is where I begin. 
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In voting to create the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) in 1971, the Georgia 
General Assembly responded to the combined pressure of changes in federal law and 
local politics by bestowing the new regional agency with the responsibility of managing 
local interactions with federal transportation and environmental policy.  ARC replaced 
four existing, overlapping organizations as part of an effort to consolidate and improve 
the level of coordination across political jurisdictions in the face of anticipated population 
and employment growth.1 The realization of this growth had been the product of 
Atlanta’s history of self-promotion campaigns, beginning not long after the end of 
Reconstruction and continuing all the way to the present.2 The rise of the ARC marks an 
important moment in the development of the region, reflecting the confluence of major 
changes in state government and the intervention of a number of new federal policies 
aimed at exerting more control over local and regional land development practices.  
While continuing in the tradition of Atlanta’s publicly-supported regional planning 
agencies, which had been in continuous operation since 1947, the ARC was larger and 
more sophisticated than any of the bodies it replaced, and represented a leap forward in 
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terms of the general task of convening local governments around a common table in order 
to make regional decisions.3 By looking back at the events that lead to the creation of the 
commission, we can see how the early structuring of the agency enabled it to later 
become a powerful agent in the region’s development.  While originating at the federal 
level, the channels by which transportation, land use, and environmental policies were 
implemented were a product of the interaction of local, state, and federal politics.  The 
regional agencies, which formed at this confluence of levels of government, were 
responsible for seeing those policies carried out and subsequently assumed an important 
role in the process, albeit in a sometimes less than visible way.  Thus how those agencies 
were written into existence, what kinds of activities they would house and support, the 
information they would generate and disseminate, and means they would use to create 
and implement policies takes on heightened importance.  The case of ARC demonstrates 
the quiet power of convening and managing the regional discourse regarding planning 
and development. 
The importance of the structure and shape of this conversation was reflected in a 
1977 interview with Walter Douglas, a transportation engineer who was involved in the 
planning of Atlanta’s regional mass transit authority (MARTA).  Douglas noted the fact 
that much of Atlanta’s growth came after more stringent federal and state transportation, 
environmental, and intergovernmental regulations had been put into place.  Contrasting it 
with San Francisco (which had only recently completed its own new regional mass transit 
system), he said that “Atlanta does not have the geography or topography to police its 
growth in that way,” a comment that alludes to the fact that regulations, in lieu of 
geography or economy or history, would lead to a distinctly different kind of 
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metropolitan region, one in which planning and infrastructure policies were the key 
factors in shaping the region.4 The idea that the form of metropolitan Atlanta is the 
product of how policies are devised and implemented provides an important touchstone 
for thinking about why the structure of the planning agencies working to shape the region 
actually matters.   
Understanding the motivation behind the creation of the ARC helps us see how 
regional planning was reconfigured nationally in the 1960s into a permanent fixture, and 
how regional planning agencies negotiated their power to play a significant role in the 
reorganization of cities and suburbs into metropolitan regions.  ARC owes its existence to 
the coming together of a number of different policy imperatives and represents one step 
in the long-term expansion of governmental regulation of the urban landscape.5 Such 
expansion also reflects the role of planning as a distinct profession, and its vantage in 
helping both devise and implement complex systems of regulations that governed the 
development of the built environment.  The tasks delegated to and assumed by the ARC 
reflected a growing national concern over how the relationships of different levels of 
government interacted.6 The late 1960s were an era of expanding national government, 
characterized by civil rights, transportation, and environmental legislation.  These 
legislative fronts had to be coordinated in some way.  One solution was building of a 
system of regional agencies that could synthesize and filter federal policies for local 
consumption.  This was the role ARC assumed in metropolitan Atlanta.  
Behind the requirements involved in the transportation and housing acts of the 
1960s, two federal commissions exerted considerable influence on the federal policies, 
state laws, and local actions that would reshape regional planning agencies from the early 
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1970s onward: the National Commission on Urban Problems (popularly know as the 
Douglas Commission) and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs 
(ACIR).  While the commissions operated independently, their work and 
recommendations often dovetailed.  The ideas each presented, and the research each 
sponsored, recognized the deep transformations that were unfolding in metropolitan areas 
across the country.  Both groups were bipartisan by design and drew on the expertise of 
academics and practitioners and the real world experience of electoral politics.  And both 
commissions emphasized the role of regional coordination across political scales and 
boundaries as a key to maintaining the health and viability of the country’s urban areas. 
With the publication of the report, Building the American City, in 1969 by the 
National Commission on Urban Problems chaired by Senator Paul Douglas, a high-
profile focus was directed to some of the nuts and bolts problems confronting urban 
America.  While central cities were withering, and in many cases literally still smoldering 
from two years of civil unrest, suburbs were mushrooming.  As significant as the 
movement of population from central cities to suburbs was the accompanying 
multiplication of new municipalities.  As the report noted, by 1969, metropolitan regions 
had an average of 91 local governments per MSA.  This astounding number of 
overlapping boundaries carved the political landscape into thousands of tiny pieces, the 
majority of which had 2,500 people or less.  On its face, the idea of such small local 
government presents a kind of Tocquevillian idyll of civic life, whereby government is 
close and direct and accessible.  But because so many of those small townships also 
managed to obtain the right to regulate land development within their borders, the task of 
coordinating so many development decisions became almost impossible.  The jagged 
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political landscape allowed small jurisdictions to use their land regulation power to 
prohibit multi-family housing units and mandate minimum single-family lot sizes, setting 
up conditions that tacitly excluded certain demographic groups, identified by race (non-
white) and class (low-income), from living within their borders.  Of course, these groups 
were often one and the same.  This locked the doors to spatial mobility for a large number 
of people, and, in effect, locked the doors of economic and social uplift as well.7 But the 
report also made a number of suggestions for reducing metropolitan inequality, which 
included revising and expanding the public metropolitan planning agencies that had been 
built in the 1960s in response to federal policies.  These suggestions helped spur activity 
that lead to scrapping the collection of agencies that preceded ARC. 
 Pre-dating the Douglas Commission’s efforts to define the mechanics behind 
visible urban problems, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR) was created to provide expert analysis of the myriad issues related to urban 
governance.  One of its many substantive concerns was the issue of regional 
coordination.  While the work of Senator Douglas’s group was widely publicized, the 
ACIR operated largely outside the public eye.  Nevertheless, its work formed an 
important backdrop to the reorganization and expansion of regional planning agencies in 
the early 1970s.  Passed into existence in 1959 by the 86th Congress at the urging of 
President Eisenhower and Senator Robert Taft, ACIR entered a world of dramatically 
expanding federal intervention and increasing confusion about the boundaries of 
responsibility, and thus was charged with researching and recommending solutions to a 
number of problems of interaction between different levels of government that had 
become more pronounced as the power of the reach of the federal government had 
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grown.8  Comprised of a twenty-six member, bipartisan group of senators, 
representatives, governors, mayors, county officials, presidential cabinet members, and 
private citizens, along with a professional staff, the commission fulfilled a unique role in 
the federal government, doing the critical intellectual legwork that led to a variety of 
programs and policies that would be enacted during the 1960s and 1970s.9 ACIR 
published a series of reports during the 1960s that influenced both the work of the 
Douglas Commission and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act signed into law by 
President Johnson in 1968.  And by tackling issues related to special planning districts, 
metropolitan disparity, taxation, federal grant-in-aid programs, and urban infrastructure 
(transportation and water/sewer), later ACIR reports crystallized a number of issues 
related to regional planning and coordination that would unfold during the 1970s.10 
By the time a reorganization of Atlanta’s regional planning agencies was in order, 
the influence of the reports of both the Douglas Commission and ACIR was unavoidable.  
While the recommendations of national commissions carried considerable political 
weight, issues specific to local conditions also shaped the structure of Atlanta’s new 
agency.  Thus the flesh of the agency was also the product of state and local politics.  
That certain tasks mandated by the federal government were finally carried out was 
important, but the representatives from the urban counties that the agency would 
ultimately govern made a number of crucial decisions about how the agency should 
initially look and feel.11 These decisions were as crucial as any others in determining how 
ARC would fulfill its directive. 
Concerted effort by a few key individuals helped secure a more highly centralized 
body than what federal laws required.  The level of behind the scenes coordination that 
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went into the creation of the Atlanta Regional Commission spoke to the existence of a 
cohesive bureaucratic corps, which had an easy and relatively open relationship with a 
collection of local and state politicians, all of who shared certain goals for the 
development of the region.  The cadre of professional planners and administrators that set 
up the commission went on to guide it through its first years, establishing a durable 
pattern that would influence the cast of characters who revolved through its doors. 
 
Origins of Metropolitan Atlanta 
Like many cities, Atlanta possesses no obvious natural boundaries, which has 
been said often over the years.  Without an ocean or mountains or swamp to block its 
way, Atlanta has grown since its mid 19th century founding into a vast sprawling carpet 
of low-density urbanization.  Yet most of the horizontal spread of the region happened in 
the years after 1970, when the influence of planning and the federal bureaucracy was 
reaching a crescendo.  Money for planning and building critical infrastructure flowed 
abundantly from federal coffers.  To some extent, the planning and building of 
infrastructure was a function of the amount of money available.  But in Atlanta the shape 
of the regional infrastructure was also a product of the relatively quiet work of a 
succession of public regional planning agencies. 
 In 1837, long before there was anything resembling a metropolis, the city 
(founded as Terminus) that sits at the core of the region came to life, when the state 
authorized a new railroad, named, appropriately, the Western and Atlantic of the State of 
Georgia, that would connect the Midwest to the Southern Piedmont, carving a path along 
a prominent north-south ridge that was then known as Peachtree Trail.  Burned to the 
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ground in 1864 during Sherman’s March to the Sea, Atlanta reemerged with a new decree 
when local boosters convinced the Georgia legislature to relocate the state capital from 
Milledgeville in 1868.  And by the end of the 19th century, Henry Grady, editor of the 
Atlanta Constitution, was wandering the country on the city’s behalf, loudly proclaiming 
the birth of a ‘New South’, reassuring everyone that white supremacy was alive and well, 
and throwing open the doors for any and all investment.12 By the turn of the 20th century, 
the city of Atlanta had a population just under 90,000; what could be called the Atlanta 
region had not more than 150,000.  Georgia at the time was an agricultural place, but 
Atlanta was developing an industrial and transportation oriented economic base that 
would, over the next century, come to less and less resemble the state from which it 
sprung, and would eventually begin remolding the state in its image.  When Asa Candler 
bought the formula for manufacturing Coca-Cola and brought it to Atlanta, the city was 
busy expanding its role as a regional distribution center, a factor that would serve the soft 
drink maker well.13 By the time of the stock market crash in 1929, the city had grown to 
270,000 people on the basis of an economy of manufacturing, distribution, and services. 
 Yet through the 1930s, Atlanta scarcely resembled a major metropolitan region on 
the brink.  Tough an important distribution point, Atlanta was part of a constellation of 
inland southeastern cities of modest stature, Birmingham, Nashville, and Charlotte, no 
place more dominant than another, all minor compared to the region’s primate coastal 
cities, New Orleans, Baltimore, and Washington.  Its population was concentrated inside 
the city limits, and growth occurred via annexation as much as birth or migration.  The 
larger towns surrounding the city, Marietta and Decatur, though connected by streetcar, 
were still distinctly separate entities, and much of the hinterland in the unincorporated 
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counties beyond was either given over to cultivation or lay fallow.  Many of the old 
central neighborhoods remained close to their mill village roots, and large swaths of land 
in the outer reaches of the city were rural.  The legacy of immigration, seen in the 
tapestry of ethnic neighborhoods and social networks in cities like Milwaukee, 
Cleveland, and Chicago, scarcely existed in Atlanta.  Migration to the city had been 
mostly intra-regional and intra-state, whites and blacks coming from little Georgia towns 
with names like Tiger, Hahira, and Buena Vista.   
 By the end of World War II, Atlanta got a big step up from the decision by the 
federal government to make the city its southeastern regional headquarters, which 
brought the Malaria Control lab (which became the Centers for Disease Control), a 
federal reserve bank, the Court of Appeals for the eleventh circuit, and the regional 
headquarters for a range of other branches of the growing federal bureaucracy.  The 
federal offices provided a strong and stable economic sector, one that would later play a 
significant role in securing a black middle class and bolstering the region’s ability to 
attract investment in other sectors.14 The city made its final annexation in 1950, bringing 
in a large, and largely white, sparsely settled area of land known as Buckhead, which 
solidified an urban white majority for another twenty years.  The end of the war also 
brought an influx of newcomers.  Single-family neighborhoods of inexpensive, 900 
square foot cottages and ranchers began filling in the rural spaces in the western and 
southern extents of the city, spilling over into adjacent unincorporated areas in Fulton, 
Clayton, Dekalb, and Cobb counties, and small nearby towns like Smyrna, College Park, 
Forest Park, Chamblee, and East Point.  Long, spindly commercial/industrial corridors 
reached out to the new residential areas.  Characterized by modest, low-rise shopping 
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malls, interspersed with warehouses and small factories, and broad surface parking lots 
and setbacks of one hundred feet or more from the street, thoroughfares like Memorial 
Drive, Jonesboro Road, and Marietta Boulevard not only carried commuters to and from 
work, they became retail and employment destinations in their own right, slowly 
replacing both older neighborhood clusters and the original central business districts in 
Atlanta, Decatur, and Marietta, creating a pattern that would be repeated again and again 
as the region grew outward.  When the first segments of the Downtown Connector, the 
spine of the region’s future freeway system, were laid down in 1949, Atlanta was at the 
beginning of a long march into the countryside, though the looming onslaught of 
development could only have been predicted by the most wild-eyed boosters.  But an 
inkling of the future shape of the region would soon become visible, finding expression 
in the activities of a series of regional planning agencies that would assume an important 
role in shaping the region’s physical visage. 
 
MPC and ARMPC 
In the years just after the end of World War II, regional planning agencies began 
to appear in most major cities.  Buoyed by the optimism of returning soldiers and the 
potential for economic growth, these agencies were more often than not promotional 
mouthpieces of chambers of commerce and business groups.  Yet they also performed 
tasks with long-term effects, most visibly writing and publicizing plans for 
superhighways and high-speed trains that would connect the old central business district 
to a future of spacious suburbs, green lawns, and good health.15 The legacy of this kind of 
regional planning in the U.S. derives from the work of the Regional Plan Association of 
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New York and the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) and especially the 
influential writings of Lewis Mumford, who advocated urban decentralization as a key 
part of the long term health of American cities.16 Atlanta first embraced the idea of 
regional planning agencies when local legislators were able to negotiate a bill through the 
Georgia General Assembly that established the nation’s first publicly supported regional 
agency, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC).  Though charged with the task of 
making “a master plan for the orderly growth of the district,” the MPC was given little 
formal authority to coerce its member jurisdictions into recognizing its master plans and 
should “act in an advisory capacity only”. Funded by Fulton and Dekalb counties and the 
city of Atlanta, money for the MPC was not guaranteed or established by legislation, but 
depended on annual negotiation between the agency and its constituents.  Membership on 
the commission board was actually tilted toward citizens appointed by the Fulton and 
Dekalb commission chairs and Atlanta’s mayor.  Despite these hurdles, MPC went on to 
publish two relatively significant planning documents, in 1952 and 1954, which 
envisioned the future Atlanta as a relatively low-density region.17  
 MPC was not intended to be a regulatory or legislative body, but rather a proto 
research organization engaged in a “continuous evaluation of key metropolitan factors” 
that would provide a sound basis for understanding how the region changed.  The first 
regional agency was designed to make sure that development decisions were founded “on 
data and projections resulting from this ongoing process,” an idea that would have 
implications for the ARC 20 years later.18 By 1952 the staff of the MPC had undertaken 
three years of inventory and analysis, and produced the first regional development plan 
for Atlanta, entitled Up… Ahead.  Explicitly limiting the outward growth of the region, 
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Up… Ahead suggested a planned population and geographic limit for the two-county 
metropolitan area, restricted to places adjacent to the central city and hemmed in by a 
circumferential greenbelt, an obvious reference to the London Greenbelt (an idea 
popularized in the early 1950s) and, more historically, Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City.19 
The plan reflected the popularity of urban renewal as a technique for neighborhood 
stabilization.  Maps produced as part of the ’52 plan categorized land according to 
development potential: development areas, mature areas, and renewal areas.  Future 
growth would be pushed to outlying development areas, established neighborhoods 
would be preserved, and “older, centrally located neighborhoods which have so decline 
that far-reaching programs of rehabilitation and redevelopment will be required before 
they can be maintained as good close-in neighborhoods.”20 Renewal, of course, largely 
would be directed toward the low-income, majority black neighborhoods that by 1950 
had begun to brush up against the central business district on three sides.  The idea of 
classifying the region into development or preservation areas was retained as the plan 
went through an update in 1954, an adjustment ordered to reflect the political reality that 
unlimited growth was to be the preferred future scenario (not artificially limited by 
planning policies).  This was in part a response to the faith in the goodness of growth that 
flowed through the 1950s, but also a response to the perceived need to provide adequate 
space for the swelling middle-class, which could not be accomplished by imposing 
planned limits.  The new plan, Now… For Tomorrow, thus presented the first version of 
what would become a standard part of regional planning, whereby continuous population 
and employment growth would be assumed and actively projected, the only question 
being where future growth would occur.  Significantly, both the 1952 and 1954 plans 
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contained descriptions of a spoke and hub style limited access freeway system and a 
parallel heavy rail transit system.  The routes of the proposed highways (based on a 1946 
highway plan produced by a consultant) proved remarkably prescient over the coming 
decades: as the interstate highways and rapid transit systems took form, they closely 
followed the lines first mapped in the early-1950s.  Thus while lacking the delegated 
power to enforce transportation or land use plans, the ideas produced by the MPC were 
often repeated and broadly disseminated, and resurfaced repeatedly in coming years, 
providing a useful touchstone for later efforts to expand or transform subsequent planning 
agencies. 
 Modern planning regulations, beyond simple zoning, were beginning to be 
developed by jurisdictions in the region while the MPC was at work.  The regional 
agency helped arrange a number of municipal planning studies for member jurisdictions, 
and actively cataloged development regulations as they were adopted and implemented.  
The counties in the region all had zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations by the 
late 1950s, but long-rang land use planning was somewhat less systematic.  Records of 
county level comprehensive planning are relatively scarce.  For example, Douglas 
County paid for a comprehensive land use plan in 1958, before the county was a member 
of the regional agency, but the plan was apparently not updated on a regular basis. Larger 
cities within the region, Decatur, College Park, East Point, and Marietta, tended to be 
more organized, and had all undertaken longer-range planning studies by the mid-1950s, 
to complement existing zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations.  But jurisdictions 
outside the city of Atlanta employed few professional planning staff, relying instead on 
assistance from the MPC and the smattering of local consultants in business at the time.  
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This vacuum of planning knowledge gave the MPC more authority than it might have 
otherwise had.21 
Through the 1950s, Atlanta’s population grew steadily.  Fueled by in-migration 
from rural counties and small towns around Georgia and surrounding states, the city grew 
to 487,000 residents by 1960.  The greater region, redefined as Fulton, Dekalb, Cobb, 
Gwinnett, and Clayton counties, reached the one million mark by 1960, though a vast 
majority of this population was contained in the city and two core counties (Fulton and 
Dekalb) over which the MPC had jurisdiction.  The city was 38% black, the region 14%.  
The white ethnic neighborhoods seemingly common to industrial cities in the Midwest 
and Northeast were uncommon, though Atlanta did have relatively large white working 
class neighborhoods, which comprised most of the southern and western sides of the 
city.22 Blacks were scattered around the region, with particular concentrations in city 
neighborhoods just south and west of the central business district, with other population 
clusters scattered throughout the more rural reaches of the region, reflections of older 
land settlement patterns characteristic of the Piedmont region of the south.23 Atlanta was 
by most standards a relatively small, compact region.  Eighty percent of the five county 
population in 1960 lived in either Fulton or Dekalb counties, and much of this population 
was relatively well served by transit. 
By 1960, decentralization had clearly begun, but was not always quite visible to 
the average observer.  The freeways that would speed cars to new subdivisions were still 
under construction, the population density was relatively low, and most outlying areas, 
even within Fulton and Dekalb, lacked the basic infrastructure necessary for significant 
development.  Employment in the region was still dominated by the central business 
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district and nearby industrial corridors, which saw impressive growth during the 1950s, 
their positions not evidently threatened by outlying office and industrial parks.  The 
region’s first shopping mall, Lenox Square, did not open until 1959, and the airport that 
would later become a major contributor to the transportation sector of the economy (and 
the world’s busiest) was not much more than a municipal airstrip.  In the 1950s, the 
region’s largest protestant congregations, First Baptist and First Methodist of Atlanta 
(with a combined membership numbering over 10,000) sat near the center of the city, 
drawing their flock from across the region and commanding wide influence. 
 Responding to the perception of imminent population and employment growth in 
Cobb, Clayton, and Gwinnett counties, the General Assembly voted to abolish and 
replace the MPC in 1960 by a new and much larger organization, the Atlanta Region 
Metropolitan Planning Commission (ARMPC).  Legislation to create ARMPC was 
introduced in the Georgia House of Representatives during the 1960 session via a bill 
jointly sponsored by a tight-knit group of representatives from Clayton County, Cobb 
County, Dekalb County.  It passed by a unanimous vote in the House and Senate, and 
was signed into law by the Governor in the spring of 1960.  ARMPC emerged during a 
period of state government organization, just as the highway division was ascending to a 
position of great power by virtue of its being endowed with a permanent trust fund of 
revenues from the gasoline excise tax.24 ARMPC was intended to be a much larger and 
more powerful agency than MPC, maintaining the same core tasks but gradually moving 
into other facets of regional development.  Brought from New York, Glenn Bennett was 
appointed director of the new agency, and was backed by an expanded staff of land use 
and transportation planners.  Producing regional development plans, population estimates 
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and forecasts, disseminating planning information, and coordinating transportation 
planning all fell under ARMPC’s purview.  Importantly, the expansion of the regional 
agency aligned the planning district boundaries with those of the new Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), an area determined by the Office of Management 
and Budget.  This was intended to allow the regional planning agency to keep pace with 
evolving federal planning requirements concerning urban transportation infrastructure, 
and provided the agency a conveniently powerful role in brokering the flow of 
information and money among member jurisdictions.  By 1964, ARMPC had already 
begun contemplating future expansions, realizing that growth would eventually stretch 
beyond the five county area, and that the inability to expand might harm the agency’s 
legitimacy.25 Federally determined metropolitan areas attempted to identify coherent 
urban centers for purposes of demographic data gathering, analysis, policy making, and 
the distribution of funds.  During the 1960s, federal legislation increasingly used these 
boundaries to reinforce regional thinking and problem solving.  Nevertheless, ARMPC 
predated much of the regionalist legislation, and came into existence without significant 
federal incentive.26 
 Like the MPC, ARMPC had limited explicit, formal regulatory powers granted by 
the state.  The power to zone land remained in the hands of local jurisdictions, 
membership in the agency remained voluntary, and it had no formal powers of plan 
review.27 Like the MPC, ARMPC set about writing a series of regional plans and 
engaging in an array of planning activities that would have a broad impact on the shape 
of the region.  But ARMPC also carefully extended its reach, which set an important 
precedent for the work the Atlanta Regional Commission would later undertake.  The 
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first outcome of this effort, in 1961, was a detailed report on a four line, hub-and-spoke 
mass transit system that would span all five counties in the region.  A refined version of 
the plan was published in 1962, by which time the state legislature had been prompted to 
begin the process of changing the state constitution to allow the creation of a publicly-
supported, regional transit authority that could then plan, fund, and build a new transit 
system (this was completed by the General Assembly in 1965).  The birth of 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Agency (MARTA) represented an important outcome 
of the long-term efforts of ARMPC.28 While events leading to the creation of MARTA 
were underway, the agency produced two modest regional development plans (1962 and 
1968), both essentially revisions of the 1954 MPC plan which projected where in the 
region growth would occur.  As a result of new federal transportation planning 
requirements, ARMPC also initiated a review process for local government applications 
for federal funds to buy and build infrastructure, a task new to regional planning agencies 
but one that would later form an important component of ARC’s power to coordinate 
development.29 In 1965, ARMPC, in conjunction with a few other agencies, wrote and 
adopted an airport systems plan, which established a significant new activity that 
influenced the long-term consolidation of commercial air service in a single, large airport 
(a factor that influenced employment growth during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s).30 
 Despite ARMPC’s attempt to consolidate its power, by the late-1960s pressures 
from different federal policies had begun to pull the agency apart.  Though it remained 
the largest regional agency, its influence slowly eroded.  A new transportation 
coordinating body, the Atlanta Area Transportation Study, and a new council of local 
governments (Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments), came on line in 
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1965.  Though ARMPC was ostensibly in charge of both agencies, the channels of 
communication between them were often clogged.  By 1970, the situation was troubled 
enough that the state legislature, at the urging of a group of regionally-minded planners, 
administrators, and politicians, agreed to intervene again, acting to pull the plug on all 
three agencies simultaneously, and create a single new commission in their stead. 
Though master plans for a system of limited access expressways appeared in 
1946, these roads had not been planned by a single agency, but instead were the 
orchestration of a loose affiliation of the MPC, the state highway division, and the federal 
Bureau of Public Roads.31 But the 1962 Federal Highway Act and 1964 Urban Mass 
Transportation Act necessitated changes to create and support an on-going, better-
coordinated transportation planning process under the guidance of a single agency.  In 
order to bring the region’s transportation planning activities into compliance with federal 
standards, a new organization was needed that reflected the changed scope of 
transportation planning.  The result was the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS), 
an agency designed to consolidate and balance the transportation planning process while 
expanding the number and kind of issues that were considered germane.  Under the 
“direction of the AATS policy committee organized in 1967,” the goal of the new agency 
was to shift “from the originally highway-oriented planning effort to urban mass 
transit.”32 Though AATS was closely connected to ARMPC (which provided staff and 
office space) its existence and organization sent a mixed message.  The study signaled a 
consolidation of transportation planning in the region, under the umbrella of a single, 
collaborative organization, but also the fragmentation of an existing regional planning 
body, driven to a great extent by the changing demands of federal regulation.33 Yet the 
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more robust, independent AATS helped direct attention to the looming problem of 
getting a mass transit system built, providing support to efforts to establish the public 
transit agency that would become MARTA.34 
 ARMPC’s role in the creation of MACLOG (Metropolitan Atlanta Council of 
Local Goverments) in 1964 represents another attempt to enhance the reach of regional 
planning. Councils of Government have been popular methods of organizing regional 
planning efforts, though more often than not have been widely criticized.35 Though 
comparatively short lived, MACLOG was designed to be an open forum for local elected 
officials to discuss issues of mutual interest.  It was built on the idea that the central part 
of a successful regional planning agency is a forum for the councils of local governments 
to come together and coordinate activities. This idea proved to be precedent for the 
structure of the ARC. 
 During the 1960s, longer-range planning by counties and municipalities within 
the region was becoming more widespread.  Continuing trends from the 1950s, most 
Atlanta area jurisdictions adopted more comprehensive, up-to-date zoning ordinances and 
development regulations by the end of the decade, and a number had already created, or 
were in the process of creating, long-range development plans.36 The presence of 
planners on local municipal staffs increased, and as ARMPC’s activities expanded so did 
the level of its involvement in local planning practice.  The information dissemination 
function worked to provide a consistent message that planning for the region would be a 
high priority, and offered a degree of expertise that could be drawn from when the need 
arose.  With changing federal requirements for regional planning, with nominal new 
attention being paid to the way land use and transportation interacted, and more money 
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available from programs administered by HUD, USDOT, and UMTA, setting up and 
modernizing local planning regulations assumed greater importance.  Yet regulations like 
housing codes were still lacking in most parts of the region, and efforts to enforce the 
codes that did exist were scattered at best.  It would not be until the 1970s, and the rise of 
ARC, that all municipalities and counties in the region would have a complete set of 
development regulations.37 
 Population and employment growth in the region continued through the 1960s.  
By the end of the decade, the five-county region contained 1,390,000 people and 620,000 
jobs, a significant increase over 1960.  Growth was beginning to spread to areas outside 
the five counties, and the population of the central city actually began to decline (though 
only gradually), amid significant racial churning.  By 1970, the city’s population had 
become 51% black, and on the cusp of a major transfer of political power from the old 
white establishment to the old black establishment.38 Black migration to the city had 
continued apace during the decade, while middle-class whites were leaving the city and 
new white arrivals to the region were setting up house in the suburbs without 
transitioning through city neighborhoods first.  The relative concentration of population 
within the old core, the city and Fulton and Dekalb counties, was beginning to wane, as 
more residential subdivisions sprouted in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Clayton, though most new 
population growth remained within the purview of ARMPC.  Employment growth in all 
parts of the region was strong, but the declining share of new jobs located in the central 
business district portended its fate of declining significance.  By 1970, the Atlanta CBD 
held only 15 percent of total regional employment.  Major employment clusters had 
emerged in Northeast Atlanta, Northwest Atlanta, Buckhead, and Northwest Dekalb, 
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areas that formed a belt along the recently completed I-285 perimeter highway.  Though 
jobs were beginning to grow toward the edges of the urban core, employment remained 
strong in places like Southwest Atlanta, Southeast Atlanta, College Park, Hapeville, and 
Chamblee, where the manufacturing was well represented.  Of course, mimicking the 
national decline of manufacturing, many of those jobs would disappear in the 1970s and 
1980s, replaced with white-collar jobs in further-flung suburban office parks and low-
level service jobs spread across the region. The massive suburbanization of employment, 
to places like far northern Fulton County and Northwestern Gwinnett, had yet to happen 
by 1970, though the signs were clearly pointing in that direction. 
Much of the transportation infrastructure that was planned by the MPC in the 
1950s was completed under the joint aegis of ARMPC, AATS, and the Georgia 
Department of Transportation during the 1960s.  The stage had been quietly set for a 
massive transformation of the region.  The opening of the urban segments of the three 
interstate highways that converged just south of Five Points, the center of the CBD and 
the confluence of five major intra-regional transportation routes, as well as the perimeter 
highway that formed a 60-mile asphalt band around the city, all happened between 1960 
and 1970.39 The fact that drivers had the ability to move quickly within and around the 
perimeter meant these new roads held significant implications for the way the region 
would grow over the next three decades.  A new airport, just eight miles south of 
downtown, contributed to the relative accessibility and attractiveness of the region, 
though did not by itself suggest where future growth would or should occur.  MARTA 
was created in 1965, and succeeded in taking over all mass transit responsibilities from 
the private Atlanta Transit System.  The agency also ostensibly assumed power over 
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future transit decisions for the four counties that voted by referendum to join (Cobb was 
the lone outlier, though the county was nevertheless given a non-voting seat on the 
agency’s governing board).40 A series of new regional shopping districts were planned 
and developed between 1960 and 1970, most taking advantage of the accessibility 
provided by new the expressways.  As retail sales shifted from old downtown stores to 
newer outlying facilities, downtown Atlanta’s dominance (real and perceived) declined, 
despite it being by far the most accessible point by automobile in the entire region.  
Efforts to improve traffic flow and provide cheap and convenient parking had made the 
central business district easy to drive to, but did little stem the decline of patronage.  The 
attention the Civil Rights movement put on discriminatory practices by retailers did little 
to help.  By the early 1980s, the exodus of retail businesses from the central business 
district was well underway.  Five Points, once called the Times Square of the South, had 
begun to feel abandoned and derelict by the early 1970s.  
The combined activities of the MPC, ARMPC, AATS, and MACLOG quietly 
continued a long-term process of regionally planned decentralization.  Both embedded 
within and independent of the local jurisdictions they were designed to influence, these 
organizations worked quietly, behind the scenes, generating and disseminating 
information, organizing area studies, bringing local politicians together to discuss 
planning issues, and providing illustrations of how development patterns should look in 
the coming years, which helped local jurisdictions develop the modern planning 
regulations that would come to play a significant role in the way the metropolitan 
landscape was development to accommodate population and employment growth.  Yet, 
both the MPC and ARMPC were also largely confined to purely advisory roles, with no 
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guaranteed funding or plan review responsibilities.  The long-term importance of 
environmental regulation or general land use control was only beginning to capture the 
attention of a wider audience.41 With the role of the federal government in transportation 
planning changing rapidly during the late 1950s and 1960s, these agencies had come to 
occupy an increasingly strategic place.  In close cooperation with the state highway 
department, they were given responsibility for devising plans for where to build new 
roads and highways, in the process channeling significant financial resources from the 
federal coffers into concrete projects.  Each task, each small activity, contributed in some 
way to the orchestration of the massive undertaking of building a region.  With the rise of 
more comprehensive environmental legislation, particularly NEPA in 1969, the Clean 
Water Act in 1972, and the Clean Air Act in 1977, the range of tasks assigned to regional 
planning agencies expanded considerably, though with an expansion of tasks came an up 
tick in the overall complexity of managing the demands of different masters. 
 
Resolving an Impasse 
Under pressure to resolve the 
confusion created by overlapping regional 
agencies, the American Society of 
Planning Officials was contracted by 
ARMPC in 1966 to study the existing 
condition of regional planning in 
metropolitan Atlanta and offer 
Figure 2.1: Regional Planning Boundaries 
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recommendations for improving the process and its outputs.  The report made clear some 
of the problems currently plaguing ARMPC, particularly the indefinite character of its 
relationships to the AATS and MACLOG.  Suggestions revolved around communication 
channels between the agencies.  ARMPC was encouraged to retain for itself 
responsibility for coordinating regional planning, expand its role in providing 
professional staff to the other agencies, and continue to manage the dissemination of 
planning information throughout the region.  APSO recommended a reorganization of the 
ARMPC board into a set of standing committees to make decision-making more 
effective.  Dividing the organization among three committees would in theory increase its 
capacity to influence development and planning within its jurisdictions.  Creating 
technical advisory subcommittees that included “specially qualified outsiders and top 
government officials” for each major committee was suggested as a way to make the 
studies ARMPC sponsors more authoritative.  Increasing the size of ARMPC by adding 
members from the highway and economic development departments and making 
membership in the agency mandatory for the existing governments were other key 
suggestions to strengthen ARMPC’s foundation.   
In terms of its capacity as a policy-making organization, APSO concluded that 
ARMPC needed to produce more concise policy statements, summarize them for wider 
distribution to organizations and governments in the region, and place priority on figuring 
out new channels for getting its policies implemented by member jurisdictions.  Research 
capacity was highlighted as ARMPC’s greatest potential strength, and the agency should 
work harder to establish itself “as a central headquarters for research and information on 
development problems and opportunities within the region.” At the same time, APSO 
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recommended a decrease in the amount of time the agency spends on annual population 
and housing estimates, one of its longest-standing activities.  In terms of plan review, 
ARMPC should communicate the criteria it uses to evaluate proposals and encourage 
local governments to collaborate more closely before and during the formal review.  The 
APSO report recommended regularly scheduled workshops to educate public officials 
about key planning ideas, more interaction with the local media, and more intensive 
outreach to the public by commissioners (attending meetings, giving presentations, etc.).  
Providing technical assistance had been one of the hallmarks of both MPC and ARMPC, 
but APSO nevertheless recommended a significant reconfiguration of how such support 
should be delivered, shifting from direct contracts for service to more indirect, capacity-
building tactics: model ordinances, personnel advice, and area studies.  Finally, suggested 
revisions to the agency’s internal structure would have staff divided into four sections, 
each dealing with one key substantive area: regional planning, research, 
intergovernmental affairs, and transportation.42 
While the founding of ARC was, at the point of the report’s publication, still four 
years away, the recommendations APSO laid out had many of the structural features that 
found their way into ARC.  What the report revealed, aside from specific issues regarding 
organization and activity, was the beginning of a concerted effort to centralize regional 
planning within the confines of a single agency, an effort that was influenced by the 
evolution of planning as an autonomous profession.  The imprint the maturing intellectual 
heart of planning left on the legacy of the ARC would unfold over time.  By 1971, the 
role of the regional planning agency was set to expand dramatically, driven partly by 
federal and state policy, but partly by the ability of planning to assert a clear professional 
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identify, marked by well-formulated ideas about how urban development should be 
structured, the kinds of information that could be considered valid, and a predilection 
toward certain methodological practices.  What role this expansion in power would lead 
the agency to play was far from pre-determined, but the structures set up at its founding 
would persist through its life. 
The Georgia General Assembly debated a number of bills and resolutions in the 
1969 and 1970 sessions that addressed the need for an expanded and more regulatory 
form of regional development planning.  Responding to federal regulations, especially the 
1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, and demographic changes in metropolitan 
Atlanta, a contingent of house representatives proposed city-county consolidation 
resolutions (Atlanta - Fulton and Decatur – Dekalb) and a bill to create a new state-level 
Department of Community Affairs that would oversee planning and community 
development issues both within and across county and municipal boundaries.  Though 
Georgia had a set of Area Planning and Development Commissions (created in 196?) to 
help with inter-jurisdictional coordination, state involvement in these commissions was 
perceived to be rather hands off.  The existing State Planning and Programming Bureau, 
which ostensibly should have been involved in these commissions, was not “properly 
structured to carry out the functions and responsibilities of an effective community affairs 
agency” nor was it “properly structured to carry out its [own] functions and 
responsibilities under the present law which created the Bureau.” Hence, many legislators 
and administrators perceived that state involvement in planning and intergovernmental 
coordination was hampered by poor organizational design.  Lead by Elliott Levitas, 
Gerald Horton, Harold Clarke, Robert Farrar, Sidney Marcus, and Howard Atherton, 
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representatives from Cobb, Fulton, and Dekalb counties, the legislators pushing these 
resolutions reflected a growing consensus that Georgia had been transformed from a state 
dominated by rural, agricultural interests to one dominated by Atlanta.  In 1969, a report 
to the General Assembly (House Resolution 364) that mandated additional research 
regarding the need for a new state planning bureau, encapsulated the issue in the first 
paragraph, noting that in 1960 Georgia had become an urban majority state, and 
“estimates indicate that the urbanization of the State is continuing.” This resolution 
reappeared as a bill in the 1970 session that would create a new Bureau of State Planning 
and Community Affairs.  Issues emerging as the urbanization process continued revealed 
“a serious gap between the intensity of the problems facing local governments and 
communities and the state’s willingness to address itself to those problems.” The passage 
of the bill establishing the Bureau of State Planning and Community Affairs, signed by 
the tiresome segregationist Lester Maddox, set the stage for a modern agency better 
equipped to deal with the urban crisis.  The new bureau was “created to establish policy 
and direction concerning state planning and programming and community affairs for the 
development of the State’s physical, economic, and human resources and to perform such 
other functions as may be provided by law.” A policy board comprised of the Governor, 
select members of the House and Senate, and members of the Georgia Municipal 
Association and County Commissioners Association would govern the overall direction 
and operation of the bureau, while a permanent staff would be responsible for day-to-day 
issues.  Among specific activities, the Bureau was instructed to produce a State Biennial 
Development Program, which would “guide State programs and operations in order that 
such programs and operations shall make maximum contributions” to the development of 
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the state.  The Governor, along with his annual budget proposal, would submit the 
program to the General Assembly for its approval.  Among its regular responsibilities, the 
Bureau would serve as a liaison between local, state, and federal governments, watching 
over the money flow and any social and economic problems thereby arising.  Deeper into 
Act 1066, the responsibility for planning devolved to the Area Planning and 
Development Commissions, whose boundaries the Bureau was responsible for 
establishing.  The area commissions were designed to carry out much of the work of the 
Bureau, including commenting on local applications for state or federal funds, creating 
six-year capital improvement schedules, and preparing long-range forecasts of future 
development.  This structure provided a direct connection between local planning 
activities and the state government, though in an unobtrusive way that left room for 
considerable local leeway. 
 The publication of the APSO report and the debate in the General Assembly 
provided significant fuel to an extended discussion of the fate of ARMPC, AATS, and 
MACLOG.43 Part of the problem, something the report alluded to but did not say directly, 
was that the federal government had unfavorably evaluated the regional planning process 
in Atlanta.  In short, USDOT and UMTA, based on requirements included in the 1962 
Highway Act and 1964 Urban Mass Transit Act, determined that the existing framework 
for regional planning was inadequate and in need of significant revision.  Atlanta, it 
appeared, did not possess “a continuing, comprehensive, and coordinated transportation 
planning process under unified direction.” The transportation coordinator within ARMPC 
was supposed to direct the staff from GDOT who had been assigned to the AATS and 
TCC.  Apparently, the ARMPC transportation person lacked control over the day-to-day 
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activities of the professional planning staff (who played a key role in feeding information 
to the board).  The failure of the first MARTA referendum in 1968 was cited as evidence 
that the transportation staff was neither listening to community priorities nor to each 
other.  The fact that this staff arrangement never worked meant that there was “no 
centralized direction over the transportation planning process in Metropolitan Atlanta.” 
Without revision, the region’s ability to receive federal transportation money would be 
compromised.  James Aldredge, who turned out to be rather forward thinking member of 
the ARMPC board from Fulton County, lead a small, informal group of local elected 
officials (current ARMPC board members) and planners/public administrators that 
developed a reorganization plan for the agency that formed the basis of legislation 
introduced by Horton, Atherton, Thomason, and Marcus into the General Assembly in 
the 1970 session.  The planning agency, as proposed in the bill, would remedy the 
region’s transportation planning problem, putting all transportation related planning 
activities under the control of ARMPC’s transportation coordinator by virtue of signed 
agreements between the governments and agencies involved in the process.  The 
reorganization plan included most of the recommendations outlined in the APSO report, 
but also offered an expanded role for citizen representation on the planning board, based 
on a set of new, equal sized districts that cut across normal political boundaries, and 
power to review local zoning decisions.44  
This version of the legislation failed, being perceived as handing too much control 
to non-elected officials and for giving final zoning authority to an intergovernmental 
commission.  Lack of support from most of the mayors and commissioners in the region 
doomed its chances of passage.  In an effort to prepare for another push in the 1971 
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session, Thomason, Atherton, Horton, Marcus, 5this time joined by Farrar and Cook, 
introduced a resolution to create a “Metropolitan Regional Council Study Committee,” 
comprised of six members of the House, to complete a “thorough study of metropolitan 
problems and the coordination of possible solutions through intergovernmental 
cooperation.” This set up the introduction of a revised version of the bill, and also gave 
the potential new bill official standing in the Assembly.45 The significance of the defeat 
of the first version of the bill should not go unnoticed, because it included room for 
strong citizen representation and regional oversight of zoning, powers that would have 
more apparently contradicted Atlanta’s reputation as a growth-at-any-cost place.  
Picking up after the defeat, Dan Sweat, Harry West, and Don Mendonsa, public 
administrators/planners from Dekalb and Fulton, took the legislation back to the drawing 
table, working harder to convince local elected officials of the importance of a new 
regional agency and revising the bill to respond to their concerns.  Holding a series of 
meetings with affected local governments and members of the legislature to explain and 
modify the reorganization plan made cooperation possible.  Demonstrating “unanimity 
among the local governments” and coordinating regional acceptance of the Aldredge plan 
with the introduction of the Horton-Atherton legislation increased the chances of the bill 
gaining support in the General Assembly.  In its new guise, the balance of power on the 
commission board would give elected officials one more seat than citizen members and 
zoning would no longer be part of the new commission’s authority.  Horton, Atherton, 
Thomason, Hamilton, Marcus reintroduced House Bill 84, a new version of the failed 
bill, in the 1971 session.46 As the second Horton-Atherton bill creating the agency that 
would become the Atlanta Regional Commission worked its way through the General 
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Assembly in the spring of 1971, ARMPC continued its internal reevaluation of the state 
of regional planning in Atlanta.  Drawing on connections between the present agency and 
its forebears provided useful coherence to the history of regional planning.  The work 
ARMPC did in the 1960s was characterized as a “piece-by-piece approach to detailing 
the regional plans (1962 & 1968) built on the assumption that the basic objectives defined 
during the ‘fifties were essentially unchanged.” Staff concluded that the 1970s should 
begin with a reexamination of this practice, because the “crisis response and piecemeal 
problem solving” of the 1960s could no longer suffice.  Hence the staff advocated the 
agency to “again take the same type of comprehensive look at the region at it did in the 
fifties.” The importance of the 1952 and 1954 regional development plans should not be 
understated.  Ideas developed there reappeared in the early 1970s, again in the 1980s, and 
again in the 1990s, albeit tempered by experience.47   
 Just as House Bill 84 (which would later be signed into law as Act 5) was being 
voted in the General Assembly, ARMPC staff was busy distributing a model “Regional 
Policy Development Process” that would guide the work of the new regional agency, thus 
setting the stage for a new organization that would provide the kind of 
comprehensiveness that was perceived to be missing from ARMPC.  To a great extent, 
the proposed process had all the trappings of the kind of rational thinking that had long 
been close to the heart of planning as an intellectual discipline.  While challenges to this 
way of thinking were being mounted from within the ranks of the academy, the 
dominance of the rational-comprehensive model in practice was virtually unchallenged.48 
Given this, the staff suggestions for the way the new agency should go about its tasks 
centered on the notion of a set of long-range goals that should guide the overall 
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development trajectory of the region.  More specific functional goals should follow 
which categorized issues the agency would focus on, i.e. transportation, water/sewer 
infrastructure, open space, land use, etc.  After functional goals should come policy 
standards, “unbiased and quantifiable comparisons of alternative plan proposals.”  These 
standards would beget more specific plans, which offer technical activities and short-
range policies that could accomplish small pieces of the long-range goals.  ARMPC staff 
valued this course because of its systematic sequencing of steps for moving from a broad 
plan down to specific actions.  A series of technical studies and reports would bolster 
each of the major substantive issues the agency would address.  Without saying as much, 
staff had suggested a process structure that reflected the intellectual bias of the dominant 
planning theory of the day.  Conveying this structure to the politicians who would 
actually cast the votes to make the new agency a reality proved to be a critical point in 
determining what role the new agency would have in the development of the region.  
Cloaking this structure in a systematic-seeming analysis essentially prohibited competing 
versions of the regional agency from appearing.49 
 The act that passed the General Assembly abolished ARMPC, AATS, and 
MACLOG when it created a new, much larger agency (now officially called a 
‘commission’).  The legislation successfully consolidated functions previously divided 
among a number of different organizations, but in a more far reaching way than the 
APSO report had recommended four years earlier.  The importance of having a range of 
regional agencies under one roof should not be underestimated. Responding to both the 
1968 Federal Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and the 1969 Act 1066 passed by the 
Georgia General Assembly, which divided the entire state into 13 area planning districts, 
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Act 5 designated a “single official metropolitan agency for comprehensive research, 
studies, advice and review… land use and transportation planning, law enforcement 
planning, health planning, social welfare planning, planning for parks and recreation, 
water and sewer planning and similar purposes.” Hence the new commission would also 
take over regional law enforcement planning, public health planning, and human service 
planning.  Following the boundaries of the SMSA, the commission would be guided by a 
governing board comprised of the chairman of the commission of each member county, 
one mayor elected by all the mayors of municipalities within each county, the mayor of 
the city of Atlanta, a member of the Atlanta Board of Aldermen, and eleven citizens, each 
representing a specially drawn district.  These districts were shaped to encourage 
“sharing, where by districts are shared by two or more political subdivisions.”  Member 
governments would suggest citizen representatives to the board for approval, a fact that 
ultimately proved to be both bane and benefit.  A career executive director would be 
hired by the board and would be the key interface between the professional staff and the 
board.  As part of its normal operation, the commission was expected to file an annual 
report to the Department of Community Affairs outlining the commission’s budget, 
expenditures, comprehensive planning activities, summaries of area studies, lists of 
applications for federal funds, local plans reviewed, and recommendations for new 
legislation.  The founding legislation required the agency to “prepare and adopt, after 
appropriate study and such public hearings as may be necessary, comprehensive 
development guides for the Area.” It gave the commission authority to review any plan 
by a local government under its purview if the board determined that the plan would have 
an “area-wide effect, a multi-community effect, or to have a substantial effect on area 
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development”, which was defined as “any plan, proposal, or project which involves 
financing by two or more governments including any of the municipalities of the areas or 
which involves utility or transportation facilities that extend into two or more 
jurisdictions.” The review process also included so-called A-95 reviews of applications 
for federal funding made by any of the municipalities or counties within the 
commission’s jurisdiction.  Research and study of a wide variety of planning and 
development issues formed an important part of the tasks given the new commission, no 
doubt inherited from the regional agencies that came before.  Financing the commission 
came from mandatory yearly contributions by each member county and the City of 
Atlanta.  The formula used population estimates calculated as part of the commission’s 
research activities.  Gwinnett, Cobb, and Clayton would contribute thirty cents for each 
person.  The city of Atlanta would contribute eighteen cents per person.  Because Atlanta 
sits astride Fulton and Dekalb counties, both counties were required to contribute twelve 
cents for each person living in the portion of the City in the county and thirty cents for 
each person living outside the City.  The counties and the city were required to provide 
the commission an annual $2,000 bonus, in addition to the standard contribution.50 
Provision was made for future increases based on inflation.  
 The introduction of House Bill 84 in the 1971 session of the Georgia General 
Assembly was spearheaded by a broad legislative delegation from metro Atlanta, many 
of who had been involved in earlier efforts to pass regional planning legislation, 
including Atherton from Cobb County, Johnson, Hamilton and Marcus from the city of 
Atlanta, and Thomason from Dekalb County.  It passed the House relatively easily, 
having received a positive recommendation from the Local Government Committee.  But 
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its fate in the Senate turned out to be more contentious.  A number of amendments and 
amendments to amendments were proposed and voted on during the debate.  The center 
of the apparent controversy over the bill was the relationship of municipalities and the 
General Assembly in terms of determining membership in the new commission.  The 
House version of the bill did not include language that would allow municipalities to 
remove themselves from the authority of the regional commission, and voting in the 
Senate on amendments addressing this relationship was close.  One amendment was 
introduced that would have required the General Assembly to remove any governing 
authority, county or municipality, from the commission if a local resolution requesting 
removal was passed.  Upon the failure of the first amendment, a second was introduced, 
and passed, that limited removal from the commission to counties only, though boards of 
commissioners retained the power to pass a local act requesting removal.  An attempt to 
modify the second amendment by eliminating the possibility of a local act requesting 
removal from the commission, and thereby reserving total authority for deciding 
commission membership to the General Assembly, failed.  Just before the final up and 
down vote on the bill, a representative from Fulton County proposed a failing amendment 
that would have changed the balance of membership on the new commission by giving 
the larger counties, and ostensibly more urbanized, proportionally more representation.  
Nevertheless, the final version of the bill that passed both chambers of the Assembly 
contained much of the authority that the framers had intended.  Removing zoning 
oversight, while important, was an intended concession.  More important were the 
victories, which were numerous.  Having membership determined by the state, mandatory 
funding based on population, the oversight of area plan reviews, responsibility for 
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comprehensive transportation planning, and consolidating all regional responsibility 
under one roof represented substantial new bases of power from which the commission 
could grow, given the proper leadership. 
Dan Sweat, hired to be the first executive director of the new commission, played 
a significant role in the early days of ARC, building a foundation for the agency and 
beginning the rather arduous task of establishing its role in the development politics of 
the region.  Through the 1960s, Sweat had served in public positions close to the region’s 
political elites, first from his position as Assistant Administrator of Dekalb County, and 
later as executive assistant for Mayors Ivan Allen (1960-1968) and Sam Massell (1968-
1972).  Spending his career as an appointed agent, Sweat was able to wield a powerful, 
albeit quiet, influence on the discourse surrounding the new agency, and then later as 
director the day-to-day operation of the agency itself.  By setting up the new commission 
as a comprehensive regional planning agency, which would include land use, 
transportation, water, sewer, Sweat helped reinforce the legitimacy of the infant agency, 
extending its reach in ways that ARMPC had been unable to.  At the time of his 
appointment as executive director of ARC, Sweat was the chief administrative officer of 
the city of Atlanta, having served as a liaison to ARMPC and been deeply involved in the 
committee that came up with the reorganization plan.  Earlier, Sweat had been a key 
player in events that engendered regional planning and coordination in metro Atlanta.  
Through the 1960s, Dekalb County was one of the fastest growing counties in the U.S., 
adding employment and population at a dramatic pace.  Because it shared a long border 
and a portion of the city of Atlanta with Fulton, Dekalb passed from suburban to urban 
quickly, absorbing both white and black migration from the city and countryside, and 
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later a significant share of international immigration.  Most of the growth in Dekalb 
happened in unincorporated places.  The county government began to assume 
responsibility for providing water and sewer infrastructure, which effectively remade the 
county into a full-scale urban service provider, much like a city.  Working through public 
utilities, using water, sewer, and road infrastructure to set aside industrial and commercial 
districts, as well as brokering the opening of undeveloped sections in the southern part of 
the county for increased black and white suburbanization, Sweat helped Dekalb plan its 
growth, setting something of a precedent that other counties in the region would later 
follow, at the same time setting himself up as a key player in local regionalist 
conversations.51  
Sweat did not operate in a vacuum.  The individuals that helped push the 
legislation creating the new regional commission involved a collection of public 
administrators and state assemblymen who worked together on regional issues with a 
level of foresight and ambition of substantial force.  Though a number of federal 
regulations during the late 1960s required prescribed demonstrations of regional 
collaboration, transportation most prominently, the deeper collaboration that happened 
during the formation of the ARC was in part stimulated by the voluntary effort of “a set 
of professional public administrators who worked together” on the ground, conversing 
about day to day issues.52 At the time, finding new ways to coordinate at the regional 
level, mostly via city-county mergers, was a national issue for public administrators and 
planners, who were plugged into professional communication channels that allowed 
information flow from agency to agency.  Moreover, clearly defined networks between 
the local professional staff and elected officials provided a means for feeding ideas into 
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the political system responsible for moving new legislation forward, affording the 
professional staff influence over the form the new commission would take.53  Sweat 
reflected on this in an interview near the end of his life, noting that by having “all these 
agencies under one control,” the new commission represented the fruition of the work of 
an old cadre of public administrators and allied elected officials.  The agency of this 
particular group of individuals mattered.  As Sweat described them, they came from the 
ranks of local governments of historically meager means, which only functioned because 
the administrators figured out how to “wire [the government] together with baling wire 
and scotch tape.”54 This kind of statement alludes to a bootstrap mentality among the 
professional bureaucrats in the region, characterized by a tenacity that would end up 
paying significant dividends. 
Like its predecessor agencies, the new commission lacked explicit authority to 
enforce laws related to development or to operate transportation systems or fulfill other 
typical municipal functions (specifically zoning), though it was given the ability to 
establish contracts with both the state and member municipalities to provide professional 
services of an unspecified nature.55 Despite the inability to control local zoning, the 
things the agency could do held promise.  The basic framework of the commission 
provided a remarkably durable foundation.56 Its size, breadth of function, and relationship 
with the state, reflected in the mandatory nature of its jurisdiction and funding, gave ARC 
long-term security and stability.  County or municipal membership was not optional, nor 
was the contribution of money toward the commission’s budget.  With authority derived 
from the A-95 review process, the commission would be able to monitor the flow of 
federal infrastructure funds into the region.  Ultimately, each of these factors had a long-
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term effect on the way ARC carved out its role in the planning and development process 
and can be related back to the agency’s ability to sustain and reinforce itself. 
Perhaps as much as its organizational structure, the role Dan Sweat played in the 
early days of the ARC, the first two years of the organization’s life, and the four years of 
negotiations and discussions that lead to its creation, left a permanent imprint on the way 
the commission would function in the coming decades.  Sweat was both a public 
administrator and an effective political operator, serving most of his career at the pleasure 
of political bodies.  He straddled the old central city regime and the new regional 
commission, bridging the downtown businesses that governed Atlanta between the end of 
the Second World War and the late 1960s and the rise of the large public agencies that 
would guide the region beginning in the early 1970s. 
After Charlie Brown, representing the Fulton County Commission, called the 
other commission chairs together to initiate the new agency, they worked quickly to hire 
a consultant to help put together operational policies and procedures, selected citizen 
members, decide on a name, and elect Ernest Barret, Commission Chair of Cobb County 
and a long-time champion of what would be termed “regional statesmanship,” chairman 
of the fledging agency.  The new Commission voted to hire Sweat as executive director 
shortly thereafter.  During the years under the leadership of Sweat, funding for the 
commission grew rapidly.  Recalling ARC’s early financial condition, Sweat remarked in 
1996 that “[m]oney was not a problem.  Money – we had money running out of our ears.” 
One of the first regional planning agencies in the country to have a guaranteed funding 
stream, ARC hired 135 employees over the course of its first two years in operation.  
Between the beginning of 1972, when the commission opened for business, and the end 
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of 1973, when Sweat resigned, the annual budget grew from $1,711,000 to $2,862,000, a 
two-fold increase.  By 1975, the budget had reached $4.7 million.57  
 
The Bureaucratic State 
Jimmy Carter, who would later become President of the United States, was 
elected Governor of Georgia in the fall of 1970.  While not portentous on its surface, 
Carter’s assumption of the chief executive position ushered in a period of substantial 
change in state government, change that touched ARC by reshaping the political context 
into which it was born.  Most directly, Carter signed Act 5 in 1971, which brought ARC 
to life, but more importantly he helped modernize and consolidate the state bureaucracy, 
compressing a complicated and vast set of patronage-based political fiefdoms into a more 
professional public instrument.  As Carl Sanders had before him, Carter understood the 
significance of institutional structure, as well as the art of public relations, and how much 
the Governor could influence the way public agencies operate.58  
In his inaugural address to the General Assembly, Carter sought to characterize 
his upcoming term by bluntly declaring that civil rights and fairness would be embedded 
in the business of the state.  Carter had recognized the changes to the legal underpinning 
of Georgia’s political system created by the federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s, 
and knew that changing the rules by which government decisions are made would 
confront, and hopefully bury, the ugly legacy of discrimination59 But Carter’s emphasis 
on civil rights was also intended as an acknowledgment of the changing demographic 
dimensions of the Democratic party’s base of political power, an effort that extended to 
appointing more blacks to positions of power in state government than any governor 
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before.  Though less newsworthy than his public remarks on civil rights, Carter’s agenda 
of organizational reform, directed toward transforming the state’s handling of 
conservation, budgeting, and the judiciary, had far reaching effects.  He oversaw the 
creation of the Georgia Heritage Trust and the Metropolitan River Protection Act, and the 
reorganization of the Departments of Transportation and Natural Resources, 
accomplishments with implications for later efforts to strengthen the hand of planning in 
regulating development, which would prove important to ARC’s viability.  All of this 
change came amid a period of political tumult in the state, as the last of the old 
demagogic segregationists, Lester Maddox, left the Governor’s mansion in 1971, and the 
Arthur Anderson consulting firm was brought in to offer advice on modernizing the 
state’s bureaucracy.60 Yet the full effect of Carter’s effort would only be fully realized in 
future policies.  Carter’s reorganization responded to shifting requirements emanating 
from the federal government, but by streamlining and professionalizing state agencies 
responsible for carrying out federal policies, he helped create an environment that 
fostered a stronger regulatory stance by the state concerning issues that had previously 
been the domain of counties and municipalities, and in many instances ignored. 
The transformation of metropolitan Atlanta represented the leading edge of 
change, the place where much of the attention of the reorganized state and new federal 
policies would be focused.  Results of the 1970 census showed that the five county 
metropolitan area had grown to 1.4 million people.  In response, the federal Office of 
Management and Budget expanded the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to seven 
counties in 1973, and the state legislature promptly brought Douglas and Rockdale into 
ARC’s fold.61 The idea that metropolitan Atlanta would have 3,000,000 people by the 
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dawn of the 21st century spread widely during the early 1970s, coming on the heals of the 
Census.62 Media hullabaloo over this growth came from different directions, presenting a 
mixed message of the old boosterish vision of the future metropolis and doomsayers’ 
prognostications over the ecological inability of the region to house so much projected 
future growth.  The city of Atlanta was by then majority black and on the cusp of electing 
its first black mayor.  Though its total population had declined, the city could be more 
accurately characterized by the intensity of its racial churning.  With the end of de jure 
segregation, working class neighborhoods that stretched through the southern and 
western extents of the city were rapidly flipping from all white to all black.  The public 
school system turned as quickly.63 At the same time that the city’s black population was 
growing, the white population in the counties ringing the city was beginning to surge.  
Between 1950 and 1970, the five counties surrounding Atlanta added 670,000 new 
residents, the vast majority of them white, which translated into a dramatic decrease in 
the overall proportion of blacks in the suburbs.  As suburban counties grew, the relative 
concentration of the region’s population was begin to fall.  In 1970, the share of the total 
regional population living within Fulton and Dekalb counties still amounted to nearly 
75%, but that number would drop rapidly in the coming years. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, development along the perimeter freeway (I-285), 
the last segment of the regional interstate highway system to be completed, had begun to 
accelerate.  The completion of the highway served as a catalyst.  Three regional malls, 
Northlake, Perimeter, and Cumberland, spread in an arc along the northern side of the 
circumferential highway, opened in 1971 and 1972, beachheads for what would become 
major employment and retail nodes.  The region’s first large-scale mixed housing 
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subdivisions, constructed as planned unit developments (PUD), began popping up during 
the same period.  Combining detached single-family houses, condominiums, and 
apartment buildings, these new PUDs were the size of small towns, and though sitting in 
unincorporated parts of suburban counties required municipal levels of service.  Such 
major housing developments helped propel population growth in suburbs, which was 
driven much less by out-migration from the city than the decision of in-migrants from 
other parts of the state and region to move straight to the suburbs, bypassing the older 
circuit of city-neighborhood-to-suburban-subdivision progression.  At the same time, a 
commercial and office construction boom was accelerating in the central city, fueled by a 
lingering urban renewal mentality and the work of CAP, which remained intent on 
maintaining the central business district as an attractive place for middle-class whites to 
shop.64 Major mixed-use developments in the central business district and Midtown, 
including such iconic structures as Colony Square and Peachtree Center, were under 
construction by late 1971, and proposals for a number of other large buildings had been 
approved.65 
ARC’s entrance into the rapidly growing metropolitan area and an expanding 
state bureaucracy was both beneficial and challenging.  Various factions in Atlanta’s 
business and political circles had been hungry for growth for a long time, as had the state, 
which usually meant paying little mind to the externalities that growth produced.  The 
regional agencies that preceded ARC were simple in their design, intended to support the 
desired growth, and ended up helping shape Atlanta into a low-density, regional city, a 
collection of roughly equal sized political jurisdictions whereby the population of the 
urban core and surrounding suburbs stood in balance.  The hand of the federal 
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government in shaping the region was obvious, particularly in the limited access 
freeways funded by the 1956 Highway Act (and subsequent updates).  But freeways by 
themselves do not create sprawl or decentralization.  The freeway system in Atlanta was 
essentially complete by the late 1960s, yet development patterns remained constrained.  
Suburban growth had begun, but development in the central city had not vanished.  The 
kind of abandon and demolition seen in places like Detroit, St. Louis, and Camden never 
appeared.  Population in the central city declined, but not more than 15 %, and large 
sections of the city remained stable.66 
Regional planning agencies do not by themselves create or inhibit the growth that 
brought new jobs and people to the region, but they have a hand in shaping where and 
how this growth gets allocated because of their position in the chain of command.  As 
key through put organizations, they pass information and money to and from different 
levels of government, like conduit.  The structure of such an organization, who it serves, 
how political geography is represented, sources of funding, and the tasks the for which 
the agency is responsible are important, and stretch beyond simple regulatory powers.  In 
the case of metropolitan Atlanta, the structure of the regional planning agencies, 
beginning with MPC and ending with ARC, present an unfolding story of steadily 
increasing sophistication, size, and complexity.  Membership in MPC was limited to two 
counties, and though publicly supported, the agency was required to negotiate its budget 
annually with its members.  Staff was small and put most of their time into writing two 
long-range plans.  When ARMPC arrived in 1960, both geographic scope and 
professional staff expanded, as did funding.  But the work the agency did remained 
limited, and by 1964 ARMPC had effectively fragmented into three overlapping and 
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competing agencies.  With the founding of ARC, these regional functions were 
consolidated, membership and funding became mandatory, and new day-to-day 
regulatory powers emerged as a key part of the agency.  But beyond the details of what 
the agencies actually did, the successive iterations reflected a particular combination of 
local politics, state involvement, and federal interest in planning and development.  The 
evolution of the agencies also reflected the changing social and economic character of 
cities and suburbs, the increasingly intricate ties between them, and the shift in discourse 
from city to region.  Moreover, each iteration of the regional agency reflected the growth 
of planning as a distinct professional activity, with an identifiable intellectual perspective 
on the character of urban places and ways that those places should be designed and built.  
Ideas about regionalism were branches of an old strain of planning thought, but until the 
migration of individuals trained in planning into different branches of the public 
bureaucracy, those ideas remained relatively obscure.   
While regional planning in metropolitan Atlanta has not always been particularly 
visible, the role of the agencies responsible for planning has been significant, largely 
because of the way those agencies have been structured.67 Where one activity started and 
stopped, and what factors lay behind, became increasingly difficult to discern.  The work 
of the agencies could scarcely be disentangled from the context in which they existed, the 
boundaries between them consistently blurred.  In the day-to-day, the characteristics of 
the organization would dictate how the agencies performed their assigned activities.  As a 
result, much of the internal discussion and debate, particularly leading up to the creation 
of ARC, centered on details of organizational structure.  Along with growing more 
sophisticated and larger, the progression from MPC to ARC included a steady expansion 
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of power and scope.  What began as a purely advisory and visioning agency was turned 
into a regulatory and policy making body.  The agency that resulted would be governed 
by a board comprised of county commissioners and citizens appointed from districts that 
were drawn to purposely counter the inertia of existing political boundaries, but the 
number of elected members would be one more than the number of appointed members.  
Each member was given a single vote.  The board would set broad policy for the 
commission and serve as a political liaison with local governments.  It would conjure 
camaraderie and inter-political conversation among its members.  Yet professional staff 
would perform most functions, including generating information that would be provided 
to the board in support of its policymaking activities.  The ordering of staff divisions 
within the agency reflected an attempt to create a framework that would outlast 
individual administrators and encourage substantive coordination among staff, as did a 
provision that gave the commission authority to take up additional planning activities as 
the need arose. 
The mingling of organizational issues with substantive activities can be seen in 
both the requisite duties conferred by a litany of federal planning laws and three locally 
derived functions expressly written into the ARC legislation.  These local functions 
propelled the agency beyond minimum federal planning requirements: area plan reviews, 
federal funding application reviews, and data collection/analysis.  The first was the 
review of plans with area-wide implications (a determination that ARC itself made).  
Area plan reviews were devised in order to give ARC formal entrée into cross-
jurisdictional debates, both for municipal and county plans as well as plans produced by 
utilities or other public commissions.  If a planning project was deemed an area-wide 
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plan, it would be submitted to ARC, which would alert other public agencies that might 
be affected (neighboring counties or municipalities, utilities, water/sewer providers, 
GDOT) and give them time to formally comment on the plan.  If any plan or proposal 
was judged inconsistent with regional plans or policies or any affected public agencies, a 
conference would be called to attempt to resolve the conflict.  If a resolution could be 
found, the plan would be returned to the submitting jurisdiction and the project could 
proceed.  If no resolution emerged, the ARC Board would pass a resolution transmitting 
the board’s official position along with staff comments to the submitting jurisdiction.   
The second was the responsibility for reviewing and commenting on local 
applications for state or federal financial assistance (according to requirements 
established by individual federal granting agencies). In Act 1066 (1970) and Act 5 
(1971), ARC was designated the single contact point between federal and state funding 
agencies and local governments (in accordance with the requirements outlined in OMB 
Circular A-95).  Any application for money had to pass through the commission, which 
read the application, compared it to the goals of existing regional plans and policies, and 
then made official comments as to the application’s merit.  In the case of applications for 
federal money, the commission’s comments served as the official comments of the state.  
ARC then forwarded a record of this review process to the respective federal or state 
granting agency.   
Third was a set of more general tasks, defined as a “continuous program of 
research, study, and planning” that could include land use, transportation, solid waste, 
parks and open space, law enforcement, and health, among others.  Other important tasks, 
including making population estimates and forecasts, providing a forum for cross-
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boundary discussions by public officials, and opening channels for information 
dissemination were the result of the state law that created the Bureau of Planning and 
Community Affairs and the Area Planning and Development Commissions.  The sum 
total of these activities, federal transportation planning, area plan reviews, special 
planning studies, and population/employment forecasts, formed a base from which the 
agency expanded.  Much like branches of a tree, other major activities ARC assumed 
during its first decade of its life, economic development, housing, and law enforcement 
planning for example, all had their roots in this initial set of tasks.  
Membership and funding were inextricably linked from the birth of the 
commission, forming a tight relationship, influencing and influenced by the 
organizational structure and the substantive tasks central to the agency.  The nexus 
between the two was extremely important to the new commission’s long-term viability.  
Too little funding can limit an agency’s effectiveness, while too much can encourage 
inefficiency and lack of focus.  Voluntary membership can be used as a carrot to 
encourage participation, but can lead to abandonment in moments of conflict.68  
Between 1947 and 1960, the provision of funding was steady but subject to year-
to-year changes in terms of amount.  MPC was required to negotiate a yearly budget with 
the participating counties.  With ARMPC, contribution levels from member governments 
were set by the state. Membership in both regional agencies was only encouraged by the 
state, not mandatory, though participation by jurisdictions, at least on paper, remained 
consistently high.  Nevertheless, in the 1971 legislation, membership in the new regional 
commission was formally mandated, and annual financial contributions were established, 
calculated according to a per person rate.  Local government funding would be based on 
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annual population estimates, which ARC was responsible for calculating, and would not 
be subject to negotiation.  Federal money supporting regional planning was abundant 
during the 1970s, funds that could be used to bolster ARC’s operations but also money 
ARC was given to distribute to its member governments.   
Different fund origins created tension over the policy directions the commission 
would take.  On one hand baseline funding for the agency was local, which set up certain 
expectations among local governments, while on the other hand the majority of the 
money flowing through the commission came from the federal government, with its own 
set of requirements (each federal program and policymaking body had stipulations – 
often different – attached to the money it distributed).  As Harry West remarked in 1983, 
“ARC has many different masters.” Whatever the effect of having different pots of 
money simultaneously available, the stability of the arrangement of mandatory 
membership and funding stands without question, and persisted long after Reagan’s 
rollback of federal support for regional planning in the early 1980s.   
The federal Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 and the creation of the 
Bureau of State Planning and Community Affairs in 1970 opened new avenues for 
regulating regional development.  The hand the state took in regional and local affairs 
reflected the governing transformation that happened during the early 1970s, when state 
agencies became more aggressive in identifying and managing resources that belong to 
the state.  The shift brought about by these policy changes was at least one reminder of 
the coming end of Atlanta’s three decades of regime politics, as the diffuse network 
between elected officials and influential downtown businessmen ceased to be the single 
explanation for the shape of development in the city, and the city ceased to be the 
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determining incorporated entity in the region.69 Replacing the old arrangement was a 
larger and more powerful collection of public agencies than had been known in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  A professional bureaucratic corps staffed the new agencies, and it had a mind 
for using political channels to pursue its own ends.   
In metropolitan Atlanta, Dan Sweat and his cadre of contemporaries symbolized 
the new bureaucrat, trained public administrators/planners who operated in the seam 
between bureaucratic and political channels to ensure ends as close to a professional ideal 
as possible: more coordinated regional planning, a strong central business district, and 
protection of environmentally fragile resources.70 The rise of these agencies was typified 
by the founding of the Atlanta Regional Commission in 1971.  The work the commission 
would do over the course of the next three decades was influenced by the legacy of its 
forebears, its structure (tasks, membership, funding), and the relationship of the staff to 
the political process.  These factors would be reflected in the subtle way the commission 
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Founded in 1971 as a response to changing federal policies, state politics, and 
local concern, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) represented an attempt by the 
Georgia legislature to counteract perceived political fragmentation in the state’s primate 
metropolitan region.  The ARC not only consolidated responsibility for a variety of 
planning activities under one roof, but also helped channel the growing array of federal 
and state development policies through an explicitly regional prism.  Though the 
Commission grew out of a lineage of regional organizations, it represented a break from 
its predecessors, in terms of size and budget, as well as magnitude of responsibilities.1 
Because of these changes, the function and role of regional planning bodies like ARC in 
the post-1970 regulatory context has been significant, though the details of the legacy of 
these organizations remain unexplored.   
At its inception, the state legislature handed ARC responsibility for preparing 
region-wide development plans and monitoring development activity for the counties that 
formed the Atlanta metropolitan area.  Federal regulations dictated that the 
responsibilities of the agency should also include reviewing local transportation and 
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environmental plans connected to the expenditure of federal funds.  The result was the 
creation of a metropolitan governing infrastructure, both physical and political, that 
connected city and suburb in a sticky web that allowed ostensible political differences to 
coexist within a context of tacit coordination.  Perhaps as important as the substantive 
areas over which ARC assumed jurisdiction was its capacity to gather and disseminate a 
steady flow of information related to planning and development, through meetings, 
seminars, training sessions, reviews, and publications.  The quasi-research function had 
been part of Atlanta’s first regional planning agencies, but never to the degree realized in 
ARC.2 Moreover, a stable collection of participants in the process ensured that 
discussions among politicians and planners were focused on a consistent set of regional 
topics, establishing a predictable context and conduit for key planning ideas to be 
disseminated and contested.  In this respect, regional planning played a critical role in the 
production of metropolitan Atlanta’s sprawling landscape.   
 
The Seventies 
The beginning of the 1970s engendered a stereotypically boosterish fascination 
within the local media of recounting Atlanta’s startling growth during the 1960s, and 
equally enthusiastic declarations of what the coming decade would bring in the way of 
new development.  In early January 1970, just as the state legislative session was getting 
underway, a Sunday edition of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution ran a special section 
dedicated to reminiscing the history of the region from its origins as a small railroad 
crossing to its then-present status as a major regional distribution center.  Though 
Atlanta’s two daily papers had long been downtown institutions, allied with the interests 
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of the old elites of the central business district, their perspective on the character of the 
region was beginning to change.3 Debates in the 1968, 1969, and 1970 legislative 
sessions of the General Assembly had turned a spotlight on the issue of how metropolitan 
Atlanta was changing, both economically and demographically, and what this meant for 
the balance in political power between traditional urban and rural rivals, when confronted 
with an emerging suburban voting block.  It was widely recognized that redistricting 
based on the results of the decennial census would produce significant changes in the 
power of the metropolitan caucus in both branches of the Assembly, and with it the 
relative weight greater Atlanta would carry in state government.   
Somewhat independently both the Journal and Constitution realized this in the 
way they presented the discourse in the recent legislative sessions, and both grabbed onto 
the idea that not only was Georgia now essentially an urban state, dominated by urban 
concerns, but that its primate city, Atlanta, had become a metropolitan region where the 
distinctions between city and suburb were growing both sharper and blurrier.  The 
migration of middle and working class whites out of the central city and into new, single-
family subdivisions behind suburban county lines coupled with the migration of lower 
income blacks into the southern and western quarters of the city was producing the kind 
of urban spatial inequality identified in reports issued by Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Affairs, the Kerner Commission, and the Douglas Commission.  In 
spite of this churning the total population of city barely budged, and the region’s growing 
labor market remained centered in the city (if not in the old CBD), meaning that the 
whites who left, and the growing number moving into the region from other places, 
would still be returning to the city everyday to go to work.  The bottom line was that 
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Atlanta remained the place of employment and recreation for a majority of suburbanites.  
Thus the Journal and Constitution could remind readers that amid political bluster about 
suburban rebellion, “there remains a spirit of cooperation between Atlanta and its sister 
cities… [because] Atlanta’s problems are their problems, for they are, in a sense, Atlanta 
itself.” Nowhere was this cooperation more visible in the early 1970s than in the circle of 
legislators and public administrators involved with planning and development.4  
Among metro Atlanta planners, politicians, and developers, widespread 
preoccupation with the changes washing over the region animated discussions about how 
the demographic transformation of the region would be translated into the built 
environment.  The implications of these changes for the professional bureaucracy at the 
heart of the ARC signaled modification of the issues that should be included plans, and 
how those plans should be constructed.  The financial impact of these changes on the 
economics of land development pushed the stakes of local and state politics higher.  
Hence the regional discussion turned to deciding how future development should be 
framed in order to be both palatable and profitable.  The topics included and excluded in 
this discussion provide insight into how planning for the region would be structured.  The 
new Atlanta Regional Commission seized on the importance of shaping this discussion 
and was able to commandeer the regional planning process by first establishing itself as 
the central information agency for the region, a base from which to build later 
expansions.  
Accordingly, one the first two major tasks the newly formed Atlanta Regional 
Commission undertook was writing a regional development plan (RDP).  Recalling the 
optimistic plans of the 1950s, particularly the Metropolitan Planning Commission’s 1952 
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plan, Now…For Tomorrow, the dawn of the 1970s brought with it a sense of a need for a 
rebirth of grand, comprehensive visions, guided by the availability of state-of-the-art data 
analysis techniques and broad thinking.5 Along with the watershed plan undertaken to 
protect the Chattahoochee River from excessive encroachment, the process of writing the 
new RDP was one of the tools the commission used to position itself as the new center of 
regional planning activity.  By virtue of the scope of the new plan, which involved a 
lengthy process of data collection, analysis, and policy development, the process of 
writing the new RDP proved to be a platform for publishing and disseminating reports 
describing and analyzing the region in detail.  As the regional planning process flowed 
forth, with ARC controlling a strategic vantage point between local governments on one 
side and the state and federal governments on the other, the realization of the power of 
managing the flow of information became a key step in the commission’s evolution.  In 
these early days, ARC signaled its transition from the more timid demeanor of its 
predecessors (MPC and ARMPC) to a more aggressive, professional agency. 
 
Organizing a New Regional Plan 
In early 1972, ARC officially began work on its new Regional Development Plan 
(RDP), which was expected to be completed and adopted by the beginning of 1976.  The 
plan was positioned as a “benchmark in an ongoing planning process,” and presented as a 
major investment in the tradition of regional planning in Atlanta, dating to the early plans 
of the MPC in 1952 and 1954.  Conceived as a general document that would guide the 
development of the region over a twenty-five year horizon, the format and flow of the ’75 
RDP reflected many of the duties charged to ARC upon its creation in 1971 (which 
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reflected the procedural recommendations provided by the 1967 APSO report that laid 
out a strategy for reformulating the agency).  As directed by Act 5 (1971), ARC intended 
to produce a plan that met the requirement of creating periodic development guides for 
the region.  The new RDP was intended to be useful for around 10 years, but to be 
updated earlier if need arose.  The resulting document would be divided up based on the 
substantive areas over which ARC had jurisdiction: land use, transportation, 
environment, social services, and aging. Thus in a single, unwieldy effort ARC attempted 
to integrate the basic concerns of the specialized agencies that it had absorbed in 1971, 
meshing the demands of local and state governments with the array of federal 
transportation and environmental regulations that were to be included in the regional 
planning process.6  
Though the subjects necessarily included in the plan spanned a broad range, the 
crux of the RDP and the planning process ended up focusing on environmental and 
transportation policies with clear infrastructure implications. 7 Land use, social services, 
and aging were pushed to the outside edge of the core concern of the document.  At least 
some of the plan’s focus on infrastructure could be attributed to requirements that RDP 
policies be in sync with other, often parallel planning activities supported by federal 
funds, namely those concerned with roads/transit and water/sewer. As a result, the plan 
was written in broad terms, vague, open enough to allow local municipalities flexibility 
in adopting and implementing different policies as they saw fit.  Yet this proved to be a 
key characteristic of the plan and the ARC itself: it allowed for regional coordination 
without dictating local behavior directly. 
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The Regional Development Plan that emerged resulted from a process that 
involved a complex set of interactions. Though the document (‘the plan’) itself was 
significant, the activities behind its production turned out to be critically important to the 
way the plan was perceived and the effect its policies would have. On its face, the 1975 
RDP looks simple and reads coherently.  But the plan sits atop a process that involved 
significant action on the part of the growing bureaucratic staff, and a rather vast 
collection of stakeholders: local planners, politicians, developers, businesses, and citizens 
among them.  In total, this process produced over 100 studies, reports, papers, public 
meetings and hearings, each reflecting an amalgam of demands from different directions, 
detailing small pieces of the plan, including data, land use, transportation, housing, 
openspace, watersheds, social services, and airports.  Guiding this trove of studies from 
afar were the hands of local, state, and federal governments, visible in the topics the 
studies covered but also in the analytic methods deployed.  Policies originating at 
different governmental levels and within different regulatory agencies required different 
kinds of data, used different measures of performance, and measured compliance using 
different standards.  Stakeholder concerns and expectations varied depending on point of 
view.  The combination of these influences shaped the resulting plan in ways obscured 
from view, particularly the complicit but convoluted relationship between the 
bureaucratic staff and the political bodies responsible for formally endorsing the 
legitimacy of the plan.   
Yet among this myriad of background activities produced by the regional 
planning process, population and employment projections achieved a level of influence 
beyond any other.  Among all the issues that emerged in the 1975 RDP, projections were 
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discussed and contested by almost everyone involved.  During the three years over which 
the process unfolded, population and employment projections became a central and 
highly contested issue, assuming a level of independent power that influenced the overall 
shape of the process.  To say simply that population projections were the primary factors 
in the RDP process would be misrepresenting the complexity of regional planning.  Yet 
in the case of Atlanta, the power stemming from gathering and organizing a vast body of 
information and projecting that information into the future influenced the overall shape of 
the planning process, structuring the discourse and conversation that surrounded the 
specific development policies that resulted.   
In the context of planning the metropolitan landscape, where policy directives 
from different directions were converging simultaneously, the idea that projections could 
rise to the top of the process is perhaps not surprising.  The specifics of the Atlanta case, 
the changing standards of professional planning, the transformation of federal policy, and 
the character of local implementation combined to reinforce the role projections played.  
As publicly financed metropolitan planning efforts expanded across the country during 
the 1970s, motivated by the availability of federal funding, regulatory intervention, and 
increased computing capacity, the role of projections and forecasts in the planning 
process grew considerably.  In time, population and employment projections became 
among the first activities a municipality or regional agency undertook in the process of 
planning future development.   
In ARC’s attempt to create data-driven plans and policies, using a numbers-don’t-
lie calculus, projections were treated as the outcome of a rational process.  In the course 
of writing the RDP, the output numbers were used for a variety of purposes, but none 
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more important than as justification for reviewing and selecting one development policy 
over another. Though required as part of the planning process, that the projections 
influenced decisions about development policy reflects both how the rational-
comprehensive process of planning actually worked.8  In some sense, planners came to 
depend on the veracity of small area projections for validation of the existence of the 
process itself.9 
When it was created, ARC was directed to produce annual estimates of the 
region’s population and employment, an activity of importance to the state and the 
agency.  Compiling and analyzing population and employment data was important 
because of its direct link to financial resources.  Many federal programs tied the 
distribution of funds to both the state’s total population and the portion of its population 
located in large urban areas, like metro Atlanta.  Moreover, each ARC member county 
was required to make annual fiscal contributions to the agency based on a specified rate 
per person (which was calculated  based on annual population estimates).  Slotted into the 
commission’s research division, the process of doing projections and estimates was 
conceived as a technical activity, and largely existed within the domain of professional 
staff functions.  
By the time ARC came along, large-scale urban models, capable of processing 
ever-larger quantities of social and spatial data, had been part of regional planning in the 
US for almost two decades.10 The models, using mathematical representations of urban 
processes of varying degrees of sophistication, gathered data from a number of different 
sources as inputs, and then processed the information with predefined algorithms.  The 
output was a set of growth forecasts.  These forecasts showed the future distribution of 
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population and employment by census tract, and also what future traffic and land use 
patterns might look like as well, if certain development policies were assumed.  While the 
urban allocation models reduced the complexity of the metropolitan region to a 
comparatively small set of variables, their utility (and popularity) lay in their ability to 
project the distribution of population and employment at defined intervals of years, far 
into the future, with an air of objectivity.  With the availability of federal money to 
support such technical tasks reaching new highs, ARC used a large-scale model 
extensively in the 1975 RDP process.11 Not only did the model provide a beneficial air of 
objectivity, the legwork of gathering and cleaning data, adapting a projection model to 
the local conditions, calibrating the model, calculating projections, and turning the 
outputs into useable information (all part of the process of prepping the model) helped 
establish ARC’s role in the production of key regional information.  No other agency in 
the region, aside from the state, possessed the resources to do such work.  With its urban 
model, ARC effectively monopolized the market for regional data analysis, which turned 
out to be a strategic position.  As a result of the stature afforded the data analysis function 
in general, and the estimates and forecasts more specifically, a certain technical 
sophistication adhered to the heart of the agency.   
In part, ARC’s initial orientation toward producing quantitative measures of 
regional issues was necessitated by the federal and state policies that framed the work the 
Commission did, but another part was the prevailing professional sense of how the 
regional planning process should be rationalized, a result of the standards of planning 
education of the day and the co-evolution of regional planning agencies and large-scale 
urban models.12 Urban models were first developed and tested by regional agencies like 
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ARC, which gave them a foothold in the regional planning process that would grow over 
time.  Continuous advances in computing power made working with large data sets 
easier.  New techniques for projecting and forecasting economic and population change 
soon followed.  With technical prowess came a level of assumed veracity, an impression 
that had to be managed carefully to be effective and sustained.  Thus the quantitative 
character of the work of ARC and its projections set a course for how thinking about 
growth and development would be structured in metro Atlanta over the subsequent 
decades.   
 
Setting ARC’s Long Term Agenda  
During the 1975 RDP process, the first under the aegis of the new agency, ARC 
was a young organization operating in a challenging political climate.  Though the 
Commission inherited a lineage of public planning, the validity of its existence, in part 
perhaps due to the publicity surrounding its creation, was often debated.  As legislation 
creating the agency was making its through the General Assembly, questions about the 
legality of a dramatically expanded regional agency had been raised repeatedly, by 
legislators, county commissions, and a few citizens.  Did it have a constitutional right to 
exist?  Was the agency a super-government that would eventually supplant local elected 
commissions? Though both the Atlanta Journal and Constitution supported ARC, both 
papers frequently referred to it as an umbrella government, an awkward choice of phrase 
that likely exacerbated local suspicion.13 But ARC and its backers decided to attack this 
as a publicity, rather than legitimacy, problem.  By expanding citizen involvement in the 
work of the commission, the assumption was that questions about its status would be 
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effectively answered without having to explain in great detail what the Commission 
would actually do.   
In crafting its response, the agency engaged a rather lengthy outreach process 
during 1972 and 1973, publishing a monthly newsletter publicizing its work, and holding 
a number of open public forums around the metro area to answer constituent questions 
(citizens and elected officials) face to face.  The responses during these events varied, 
though turnouts were dreadfully low.  One sparsely attended forum held in Marietta (the 
seat of Cobb County) in the early winter of 1973 illustrates at least some of the responses 
the Commission received from the general public, as well as the kind of resistance ARC 
sometime faced from a few vocal members of its constituent governments.  After 
introductory remarks concerning the origin of the legislation that helped create the 
commission, the agency was attacked by a few vocal members of the crowd as being a 
front for an effort to create a Marxist government.  Another resident claimed that the 
concerns of Cobb County were entirely separate from the rest of the region, and therefore 
the agency had no authority under which to act.14 Though common and easy fodder for 
the media, these reactions can be read as being as much of a function of the newness of 
the agency, and a general misunderstanding of what role it would be playing in the 
region, than as a broader grassroots rejection of its existence.  
Metropolitan Atlanta was undergoing significant change during the early 1970s, 
adding population and employment at a rapid pace, though, provoked in part by the oil 
crisis, its future seemed increasingly volatile.  The reality that an economic slowdown 
was percolating throughout the region by the end of 1973 confronted the expectation, 
long held dearly by Atlanta’s leaders, that growth would continue unabated, as it always 
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had, never mind the national economy.  After all, the region had weathered previous 
economic slowdowns quite ably, hardly showing the signs of distress so apparent in other 
places.  While new development had boomed during the first three years of the decade, 
punctuated by the completion of several new regional shopping centers, prospects for the 
middle 1970s appeared much less certain.  Observers and forecasters straddled a line 
between unequivocally predicting a continuation of the boom and exhibiting caution.  
The contribution these prognosticians make to the general perception of future 
economic conditions counts for quite a lot in the business of land development.  The 
value of pontificating on future development was enough that Atlanta’s two most 
prominent developers, Tom Cousins and John Portman, weighed in on the discussion in 
an opposing pair of op-eds in a Sunday edition of the Journal-Constitution in late 1974.  
Providing some insight into the thinking of developers across the region, both men 
emphasized the necessity of maintaining the vitality of downtown Atlanta, helping 
middle-income families move back into the central city, and improving transportation.  
Responsible for developing several of Atlanta’s most significant projects (the Omni, 
Colony Square, Peachtree Center, among others), Cousins and Portman expressed 
guarded optimism in the region’s ability to continue growing, despite the economic 
downturn.15 
 In part, apprehension over the region’s economic future was driven by shifts in the 
distribution of population.  The city of Atlanta had become majority black in 1970, and 
was on the cusp of electing its first black mayor, events that encouraged rampant 
speculation about the impact demographic changes would have on the future 
development of the region.  Research Atlanta, a non-profit, business-friendly socio-
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economic research organization bankrolled by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, had 
complied a report detailing the region’s demographic changes during the 1960s and early 
1970s, noting that while outlying areas, unincorporated parts of Dekalb, Cobb, Clayton, 
and Gwinnett had seen significant population growth, the city itself, for the first time, had 
not.  Moreover, the central city increasingly appeared to be home to only the very rich 
and the very poor, a situation many observers assumed would hold potentially 
destabilizing consequences.  Other agencies, like Central Atlanta Progress (CAP), a 
private, non-profit planning organization supported by downtown businesses, under the 
direction of Dan Sweat after he resigned as director of ARC, weighed in on the potential 
negative effects of the on-going demographic transition of the city.16 Middle class whites 
were vanishing, and the middle class black households that replaced them typically had 
access to a smaller array of financial resources.17 Since the economic vitality of the 
downtown office and commercial submarket was assumed to be connected to the fortunes 
of the white middle class, and downtown was assumed to be an important determinant of 
the region’s overall health, the changing racial makeup of the city alarmed many of the 
organizations involved with development and planning.  Questions lingered as to what 
role downtown Atlanta would play in the metropolitan economy, especially considering 
its decline as a regional shopping center.18 Even more damaging was the perception that 
downtown was becoming dangerous to the average worker or visitor. 
Related to the discussion of demographic change was the old conversation about 
how the metropolitan region should be governed (which played prominently in the 
legislation that created ARC).  Form of governance remained important because it 
realized so many assumptions about the relationships between municipal bodies, and had 
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long been a topic of hand wringing among politicians, planners, developers, and the 
public.  A legacy of the regionalist thinking of the 1920s, a key issue in Atlanta had for 
many years revolved around the power of the city to annex unincorporated areas adjacent 
to its borders without a referendum among the people living there.  The Plan of 
Improvement, negotiated in 1951, established parameters for the official relationship 
between the city and Fulton County concerning the provision of essential public services, 
but beyond being a simple contract for services between the city and county, the 
document outlined a path to a future city-county consolidation, which would form the 
basis for a decidedly more regional government.19 Annexation of adjacent unincorporated 
areas by the city or consolidation of the city and county government structures would 
offer incremental advances in levels of coordination.  Even more radical proposals, also 
legacies of the debates that swirled around the creation of ARC, advocated the creation of 
a full-scale regional government that would supercede existing county and municipal 
jurisdiction.  These ideas were not the work of organizations on the fringes of the region, 
but rather business groups, mainstream non-profits, elected municipal councils, and 
members of the state legislature.  In 1974, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce president Ivan 
Allen III (scion of one of Atlanta’s elite families) publicly advocated for local 
government consolidation.  In late 1975, the Chamber attempted its own form of region 
building by putting into place a series of suburban branch offices to establish a 
collaborative relationship between the concerns of central city and suburban business 
interests.  Initially resisted by the local chambers of commerce, this regionalist beachhead 
eventually morphed into a powerful metropolitan-wide business advocacy group.20   
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But the idea of transforming the politics of planning and development in the 
Atlanta region reached beyond chambers of commerce, local politicians, and bureaucrats.  
State wide electoral politics also played a significant role in giving rise to this discourse.  
Efforts to reorganize and modernize state government begun by Jimmy Carter (and 
carried forward by succeeding Governors George Busbee, Joe Frank Harris, and Roy 
Barnes) helped create a context that reflected and supported the rising power of the state 
and the importance of regional institutions like ARC.  The growth of metropolitan 
Atlanta foretold that the region would assume considerably more power over both its own 
fate as well as the greater fortune of the state.  The requirements for distributing federal 
money required increasingly intensive involvement by the state bureaucracy, which 
necessitated an expansion of the state’s role in allocating the money set aside for 
infrastructure.  In short, the financial stakes for controlling the political reins of the state 
were high, provoking a fight that would be played out in the committees and 
subcommittees of the General Assembly, as well as imprinting the work of ARC and its 
effort to produce a new plan for the region.   
Carter’s struggle to modernize state government unfolded against the backdrop of 
a longer-term negotiation between the old rural legislative forces and a rising urban 
caucus that had been emboldened by significant reapportionment gains in the General 
Assembly, first in 1960 and again the 1970.  While reapportionment helped the urban 
caucus prevent the passage of laws with obvious detriment to the region, the power of 
rural legislators remained substantial, often presenting roadblocks to the free passage of 
legislation that would obviously benefit Atlanta.21 This tension was especially apparent in 
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the areas of transportation funding and environmental policy, issues of utmost importance 
to the rapidly urbanizing counties surrounding Atlanta and the RDP process.  
Environmental quality, embodied in the newly created Department of Natural 
Resources, represented perhaps Carter’s most ambitious push, but one that would not be 
fully realized until the middle of the 1980s.  Though the proper extent of environmental 
regulation was often debated, the basic thrust was toward a much greater role for state 
agencies concerned with the natural environment.  For instance, the Clean Water Act in 
1972 opened a massive spigot of money for wastewater infrastructure so that 
municipalities could improve the quality of urban water bodies (through secondary 
sewage treatment systems), but the act mandated state involvement in planning and 
construction new facilities.22 Mirroring the debate in the U.S. Congress about national 
land use policy, Carter used his reorganization program to set a path toward more 
aggressive state-level development planning, building a commission to “recommend an 
over all growth policy” for the entire State.  Comprised of a cross section of elected and 
appointed officials, the commission included several individuals who would become key 
participants in the successful effort to introduce statewide growth management legislation 
in the 1980s.23 In fact, the condition of Georgia’s surface waters (a long-simmering issue) 
sparked a number of new policy fronts that connected transportation, land development, 
and water quality, ultimately providing grounds for intensified efforts to legislate 
mandatory comprehensive planning in cities and counties that had previously known no 
such thing.  Carter’s interest in opening a conversation about planning at the state level 
was related to his broader support of the interests of metropolitan Atlanta and recognition 
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of the fact that Georgia had become, seemingly overnight, a state thoroughly dominated 
by urban concerns.   
The social, economic, and political context into which ARC’s first RDP was 
thrust provides clues as to how participants in the planning process conceived their 
efforts, why the plan would take a particular form, and why the relationship of population 
projections and development policy was so significant.  
 
Population Projections and the RDP 
In many respects, the confluence of forecasted growth and planning policy was 
crystallized in the first sentence on the first page of Framework for the Future, a policy 
document published by ARC in early 1975 that laid out the results of the population and 
employment forecasts that would form the core of the final version of the regional 
development plan that would be published a few months later.  Together the RDP and 
Framework became both primary and secondary means of disseminating the projections 
and inscribing them throughout the planning process.  The projections reported were 
based on the overall assumption that “an additional 2 million people will live in the 7-
county Atlanta Region in year 2000.”  
Beginning in early 1972, the first of several iterations of the population and 
employment forecasts was developed using a then state-of-the-art computerized regional 
activity allocation model (named EMPIRIC).  While large-scale urban models were 
widely known among planners, the details of how the models work remained confusing 
and still required explication for the many non-experts involved in the planning process.  
These details were laid out in 1972, in the Study Design for Development and Application 
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of EMPIRIC Activity Allocation Model, and the first projections from the model were 
published in 1974.  After a six-month period of comment and debate, revised numbers 
were published in early 1975.  After several more months of discussion, ARC officially 
adopted the revised outputs in late 1975, just before publication of the RDP.  The 
projections presented a clear case of the region’s expected growth and the direction that 
growth would take over the coming three decades.   
Afforded a prominent place in the final version of the RDP, reference to the 
forecasts appeared early and often in both the planning process and the plan itself.24 
The relationship of EMPIRIC and its output to planning policies emerged out of a 
context in which the idea of planning was considered more important than plans or 
policies themselves.  As early as 1954, the metropolitan planning agency that preceded 
ARC had begun to abandon the idea of writing plans that restricted growth, and instead to 
engage what was often called a continuous planning process that hinged on rudimentary 
forecasts of future development.  While little more than a germ in the mid-1950s, the idea 
that growth projections could serve as a framework for effective regional development 
planning expanded dramatically during the 1960s.25 In the case of Atlanta, the extensive 
effort put into creating population and employment forecasts in anticipation of the 1975 
RDP was to some extent an extension of an earlier forecasting project.   
The most concrete evidence of the emergence of a model-based planning process 
appeared in 1962 in Atlanta Silhouettes, a publication that had been prepared by the 
regional planning agency (ARMPC) that predated ARC.  Silhouettes attempted to provide 
a detailed numeric compendium of what the region would look like twenty-five years into 
the future.  Widely distributed among local governments and development agencies, 
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these projections were a vivid demonstration (using the local context) of the practice of 
using detailed data to model the connection between existing conditions and anticipated 
future conditions to guide the development of intermediate planning policy.  In other 
words, past trends could be used to construct a believable future, which would lead to 
policies that responded to those expectations.  These early projections played an 
important role during the period leading up to the founding of ARC, and were mentioned 
frequently during the preparation of the new model.26   
The idea driving the use of activity allocation models, considered objective 
applications of technology to the problems of regional planning, was to replace some of 
the art that had characterized earlier regional planning efforts with a numerical 
foundation.  During a period when the application of quantitative social science methods 
to social problems was popular, large-scale urban models offered the possibility of a 
more scientific ground for the planning process, one founded on hard data, derived from 
real conditions, and that held out the promise of impartiality.27 Though relatively 
sophisticated for its day, the EMPIRIC allocation model did more or less what other 
models did: quantified changes in population and employment and tied them to changes 
in the geographic area dedicated to different land uses.  Descriptions of the EMPIRIC 
model emphasized its technical ability to inform three necessary planning tasks: 1) 
forecasting population, employment and land use; 2) assessing the impact of policy 
decisions; 3) coordinating analysis of alternative policy decisions.  By simultaneously 
taking into account transportation infrastructure, water/sewer improvements, zoning 
regulations, and the amount of developable land, the model calculated a rudimentary 
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measure of population carrying capacity for different areas within the region based on the 
mixture of land uses likely to prevail in the future.  
EMPIRIC projected population and employment figures for the years 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 by dividing the metropolitan area into 290 districts and 34 superdistricts 
(aggregations of districts).  Depending on location and population density, the districts 
were based on both 1970 census tracts and traffic analysis zone boundaries (subsections 
of census tracts).  The baseline data used in the model came from 1961 and 1970, and 
included total population (Census), total employment (Census), existing land use (ARC), 
and the number of new housing and demolition permits (Counties) issued by jurisdictions 
within the region.  Once outputs were produced for the districts and superdistricts, each 
district was categorized according to four broad development categories (core, mature 
developed, rapidly developing, and satellite), which were meant to be more general, more 
easily understandable, descriptions of the future built environment of the region.  The 
categories were determined by the existing mixture of land use types (e.g. single family 
residential, industrial, commercial, etc.), anticipated levels of growth, and the expected 
mixture of future land use.  Each district would be assigned to one category and each 
category was expected to receive a certain density level of future development.  The 
subarea projection outputs were also aggregated by development categories, allowing for 
a broadly painted picture of the future urban landscape of the region.28  
A key factor of the EMPIRIC model was the way it chained forecasts based on 
previous years.  How a particular sub-area of the region had grown in the past, 
represented by both the landscape category it was assigned to and past population and 
employment trends, was a strong determinate of how the model would show the 
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distribution of population in the future.  Using a share of growth technique, the model 
first projected changes in the total population and employment of each superdistrict as a 
share of the projected growth of the region as a whole (which was derived from 
projections of the state’s growth).  The numbers then were disaggregated into districts.   
The share of total projection technique was used in part because of its relative 
simplicity, but in the case of metro Atlanta it tended to produce uneven results.  Subareas 
that had grown a little faster than the region as a whole showed tremendous gains through 
year 2000, while those that had grown a little slower showed significant decline during 
the same period.  While the projection assumptions were loosely guided by a few key 
development regulations, the model’s cognizance of the details of the policy landscape 
was relatively crude.  Its output was shaped by the inclusion or exclusion of only a few 
constraints.  These included the amount of developable land, existing development 
density, water service availability, and average travel time between residential and 
employment zones (home-based work trips).   
The output of the model managed to be both specific and vague simultaneously.  
While it showed future population gains and anticipated distributions of land use at the 
district level, and revealed areas around the region where future growth was likely to 
occur, the model paid too little attention to the effects that minor alterations to 
development policies might produce.  This problem was compounded by the way 
individual policies were bundled.  
Bundling policies was a way of narrowing the field of possible future 
development scenarios, a decision that was made as part of the modeling process.29 In 
1972, ARC developed three alternative policy packages for metro Atlanta at the 
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beginning of the RDP process.  These scenarios were carried through the process, until 
one was selected for official endorsement by the Commission board.  Transportation 
infrastructure was the key differentiating factor in each scenario.  The first presumed 
growth and development trends would simply continue unabated, existing policies and 
regulations and infrastructure unchanged.  The second envisioned the construction of an 
extensive mass transit system with comparatively little development of the freeway 
system beyond what existed in 1970.  The third envisioned a limited rail system and a 
highly developed highway and collector road system.  Embedded within each alternative 
was a collection of smaller policies that provided the modelers with more subtle controls 
to alter the dimensions of the projections.  These policies could be added or removed to 
reflect desired adjustments.  The small policy controls included measures of 
transportation accessibility, of developable land, and permissible building densities.  
These policy levers allowed planners to slightly tweak the model at different points in the 
projection chain, changing development standards mid-stream, releasing or removing 
developable land in different years, and testing the effect of the construction of new 
towns or other major regional developments.30 Yet even with fine tuning, the time-series 
nature of the model meant that identifying trends in the data lent itself to projections of a 
future that clung closely to the past, which itself was a way of determining possible 
planning outcomes.  Even though they allowed a certain amount of manipulation by the 
participants in the planning process, the scenario packages, presenting only a few 
alternatives, shaped the order in which planning policies could be presented. 
Allocation models like EMPIRIC proceed along a fine line between rigid and 
flexible, coupling the plasticity of changeable inputs with the reliability of a standardized 
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set of steps.  This often means that models can be guided to produce outcomes that fulfill 
certain basic expectations but at the same time remain somewhat unpredictable when 
confronted with the complexity of a decision making context that depends on the actions 
of an array of loosely related actors.  While the relative flexibility of the model allowed 
for a degree of fine tuning, producing an arguably more realistic vision of future 
development, it also opened more room for negotiation.   
Because of the rigidity of the projection method at the heart of the model, the 
relatively small development policy inputs that were available could only partly influence 
the magnitude and direction of the model’s output.  Thus the decision about which 
development scenario best captured the region’s trajectory, and less the small policies 
that were included, was critical to the output of the model.  Yet because of the 25-year 
projection horizon (as opposed to a more reasonable 10 year horizon), significant 
differences in the built environment eventually accumulated from the rudimentary 
tweaking the model could accommodate.  Policies that gently restricted the amount of 
developable land, for instance, ended up showing shrinkage in the geographic extent of 
the projections; those that opened more land for development expanded them.  The 
combined effect of the policies within the model scenarios produced uneven and often 
confusing results.  The places within the region that the model projected gains or loses 
often conflicted with common sense.  For example, the model suggested that a key 
population and employment node in the region, Buckhead, would decline in total 
population, despite generous development regulations, high density ceilings, and the high 
property values in place at the time the projections were created.31 In effect, the model 
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could not adequately capture the way that development regulations would be expected to 
operate. 
Framing the smaller decisions about which policies to include and which to 
exclude in the design of the model was a single directive that coursed throughout the 
model and the regional planning process itself: the notion that growth, in terms of 
population, employment, and land development, should be the “heart of the planning 
process”.  Growth became simultaneously policy and vision.  To a great extent, the role 
of growth in Atlanta fits the description of the growth machine developed by Logan and 
Molotch in their widely cited book, Urban Fortunes.  The preoccupation with population 
and employment growth, and associated development of the built environment, has surely 
the affect of increasing “aggregate rents and trap[ing] related wealth for those in the right 
position to benefit.”32  
Yet, the issue of growth and who benefits was neither so one-dimensional nor a 
concern limited to land holding elites.  Growth had become part of a general discourse 
within planning, and the respect and prominence attributed at the outset of the process to 
the role population forecasts should play was good evidence.  As much as they were a 
fascination of local politicians and landowners, the urban model and the forecasts of 
future development it produced were also expressions of the growing intellectual 
sophistication of planning practice.  With such tools at its disposal, planners had worked 
their way into important positions within the interstitial complexity of the regulatory 
infrastructure emerging at federal, state, and regional levels.  By virtue of putting 
emphasis on using models and forecasting as necessary steps before policy development 
took place, a planning process that was in many respects a marvel of technical 
 117 
sophistication ended up extending and reinforcing the idea that envisioning growth was 
good.33 These conditions had the effect of entrenching the population, employment, and 
land use forecasts at the center of the regional planning process, which introduced an 
iterative cycle of considering and re-considering what the model outputs predicted at 
nearly every step in the process of creating the development policies themselves.   
Though the results of the allocation model held a significant place in both the 
process and the document from the very beginning, there was no conspiracy, though there 
was a healthy dose of politics.  In other words, there was no clear, pre-determined 
outcome that the model would foretell, established beforehand by a cabal of interested 
parties.  As it happened, the relationship between growth projections and planning policy 
evolved during the creation of the RDP, revealing a labyrinthine path from a few initial 
assumptions to the final draft of the plan.  The openness of the process (a reference to the 
plan as a social experiment, not the level of public participation), the number of actors 
involved, the evolving political and regulatory context, and the role of the planning 
bureaucracy meant that an unobstructed path from the beginning of the planning period to 
the final output would have been an impossible expectation.  Yet decisions about the 
order of events did indicate a level of conscious shaping of the decision making context 
so that a general range of outcomes could be predictable, evidence of which could be 
found in the effort to construct the process so that policy decisions flowed from forecasts, 
not the other way around.   
During the RDP process, the sequence of policy debate always returned to the 
projections: how much growth the forecasts indicated and where they indicated this 
growth would occur.  Discussion of specific policies followed, but they were structured 
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by the magnitude and location of future population the forecasts had first suggested.  This 
pathway served to simplify the task of deeming a particular policy realistic or not.  The 
policies that formed inputs into the scenarios included in the projection model were 
constrained by their adherence to planning tools already established and recognized in the 
state of Georgia, thereby limiting the scope of the model.  More specifically, the 
discussions during important early phases of the RDP process purposely ignored policies 
or planning ideas without strong precedent legal groundwork in the state, whether or not 
those policies had been implemented in other states or discussed in the planning 
literature.  As a result, an explicitly slow growth scenario was excluded from 
consideration.  The case for such an exclusion was carefully worded: “[t]here is little or 
no point in constructing scenarios – involving for example the withholding of large 
amounts of land from development – if no realistic mechanisms exist for implementing 
them in the real world.” This way of conceptualizing those planning policies that should 
be considered and those that should be excluded made for a convenient and effective 
trope.  If a scenario included regulations that had not been tested in Georgia, or that 
represented a substantial leap from existing policies, it was simply excluded.  
These criteria for evaluating potential policies were reproduced in a number of 
reports, becoming a mainstay underpinning policy discussions during the process.  By 
establishing a system of planning based on future scenarios that were tied closely to 
forecasts, policies as seemingly simple as relieving traffic congestion and conserving 
residential land could only be considered as part of a larger package.  As a result of this 
clustering effect, simple policies were turned into complicated decisions with fateful 
consequences for the shape of the landscape.34 The sequence of decision making, 
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excluding and including clusters of policies in the RDP based on the demands of the 
model, demonstrates how closely projections and policies operated in the RDP process, 
and how the forecast-based regional planning process actually unfolded.35 The quiet, 
technical power of professional planning carried the day, even if toward ends that were 
ultimately at odds with some of the professed goals of planners (mass transit, 
environmental protection, compact development). 
Starting from an expected total regional population of 3.5 million, which was 
based on the combined population of the counties that comprised ARC’s planning 
jurisdiction, a figure that was itself derived from a proportional share of the state’s total 
population as forecasted by the Census Bureau, the model had moved recursively through 
an array of data to produce a story of coming changes in land use, employment, and 
population.  In addition to the federally mandated reasons for using a quantitative model, 
the political expediency of perceived objectivity in a contested planning process managed 
by a new agency made for an easier job of selling the resulting plan to politicians and the 
public (if any were actually paying attention). 
The future that the final version of the 1975 RDP forecasted was a seven county 
region knitted together by freeways, arterials, and a 50-mile long heavy rail system.  The 
plan called for reinforcing a spoke-like transportation pattern cinched together in the 
central city, with a lower-density residential landscape expanding in a broad concentric 
ring around the urban core.  But perhaps most significantly, the EMPIRIC outputs 
visualized numeric projections in real space, which enhanced their power and influence 
considerably.  The rudimentary outputs from the EMPIRIC allocation model were 
gathered into a series of visualizations of this pattern. 
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EMPIRIC showed projected changes in population as changes in the overall 
development patterns of the region, which, when completed in 1974 and 1975, were 
presented as maps and graphs depicting future development. At first, simple, black and 
white diagrammatic maps showed superdistricts where opportunity for growth lay.  The 
maps showed the outward growth of the metropolitan region, characterized by moderate 
decline in the core of the region (mostly the city of Atlanta) and rapid growth in the outer 
stretches of suburban counties.  These output maps were then used to create more 
suggestive images that imposed color-coded arrows to show directions of population and 
employment growth on a map of the region.  The final graphics included in the RDP 
presented a detailed rendering of what the combination of projected growth, 
transportation infrastructure, and environmental policies would ideally look like at the 
neighborhood scale.  
This pattern fit neatly within the prevailing discourse concerning the future of the 
region, which was consumed with crime and race and economic decline in the central 
city.  Beneath the surface consistency between numbers and words, the projections could 
also be used to identify specific political districts where future infrastructure should be 
directed, which could exert a very real influence on the way that development occurred 
across the region.  The combination of numbers and images offered an ostensibly neutral 





The tell-tale images in the RDP show a hypothetical progression of land 
development patterns, from a standard 19th century urban grid to contemporary  
conservation-style subdivisions, the organization of the visuals pointing clearly to which 
one of these possible development arrangements would result from following the 
guidelines laid.37 Taken together, the policies in the plan were most clearly aimed at 
minimizing the impact of a group of environmentally damaging practices mostly related 
to water quality and providing for reduced congestion in the transportation network.  
Land use, however much it was an active medium through which transportation and 
environmental policy unfolded, remained implicit, largely a function of confluence of 
other forces.  In sum, the projections, maps, and policies pointed the way to creating a 
low-density, urban landscape and visualized the beginnings of a vast horizontal sprawl 
that would unfold over the next three decades.38 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Projection of Regional Development Patterns, 1975 
Courtesy of Atlanta Regional Commission 
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Measuring the Influence of the RDP 
In spite of the problems of doing and evaluating regional plans and agencies, as 
context and process and product, regional planning has strongly influenced the form of 
urban development within metro Atlanta.39 An important event in the region’s 
development, the 1975 RDP proved to be the beginning of an extended effort that 
produced a loose but careful schematic expression of regional goals and showed in a 
general way how those goals could/should be achieved within a set of parameters that 
were liable to flex over time.  Though a data gathering and management requirement, one 
that also included the calculation of annual population estimates, was included in ARC’s 
legislative dictum, which stated rather vaguely that the agency “shall engage in a 
continuous program of research,” the more specialized and complex task of forecasting 
population and employment, and devising future conditions based on those numbers, 
came to occupy a prominent position in the agency’s agenda only after the agency was up 
and running and the RDP process began.40  
To some extent, the attention to projections and forecasts was presaged by the fact 
that the agency had been given responsibility for area planning activities required by a 
variety of federal programs, which themselves often required forecasts to be prepared in 
order for local programs to be eligible for public financing.  Yet the methodology of 
making forecasts was far from explicit, which gave the agency considerable leeway in 
deciding what techniques to use and when to use them, decisions that were made using 
specialized knowledge that was an outgrowth of the professional bureaucracy.  Though 
an important part of the agency’s work, the modeling and forecasting business remained 
somewhat behind the scenes and largely beyond the purview of most observers outside 
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the process.  The little reporting about the projections that did exist presented them as 
products of an opaque, computerized process.41 But the projections nevertheless became 
a key feature of the planning process, and ended up forming a significant activity for 
ARC, measured by the amount of time and energy put into creating and publicizing them 
and the response they received from stakeholders after they were published.   
As the plan making process neared completion, concern began to center on how 
development policies were generated and approved and who should be allowed to 
participate in the process.  The conversation gathered around the specific questions of 
whether the regional development policies that were considered for inclusion in the RDP 
were only “accommodating growth rather than guiding it,” and if the structure of the 
planning process itself stifled the role of public involvement.  In letters and comments to 
the ARC, a number of organizations and community groups claimed that the RDP was 
hiding an “unconstrained growth policy” that would lead to “continued, uncontrolled 
growth,” and ultimately failure because of the “selection of transportation as the chief 
modifier of future growth patterns.” Criticizing ARC’s data collection activities for 
dominating the planning process, the Georgia Conservancy, a pro-business environmental 
organization, cut to the core, arguing that “alternatives to growth and development should 
be the result of planning, not the basis for planning.”42 A report authored by one of 
ARC’s own advisory subcommittees suggested that the agency’s board so tightly 
controlled the regional planning process that dissent from a growth agenda was nearly 
impossible.43  
Far from being background information to inform decision making during the 
RDP process, the projections had pushed their way to the center of a robust discourse 
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attended by different groups contending for control over development.  As the process 
unfolded, the conversation turned more pointed.  Non-technical participants zeroed in on 
the role of population and employment scenarios in the process, only later realizing that a 
particularly close relationship had developed between the outputs of the allocation 
models and the development policies selected for inclusion in the planning process, 
indication that the forecasts had turned into the primary motive force influencing the 
decision making context, and for justifying the transportation, environmental, and land 
use policies that were described within the document.44 Whether in favor or against, 
everyone involved in the RDP came to understand that the allocation model wielded 
power that appeared to be distorting the planning process.  Hence the question was 
whether regional planning had simply become a tool for the purpose of creating more 
growth, leading to development policies that only accommodated anticipated growth and 
were only incidentally concerned with guiding the shape that growth would take, or was 
the story actually more complex?   
Perhaps not surprisingly, as the outputs of the forecast models circulated around 
the planning and development community, they captured an increasing share of the 
regional discourse.  At a number of junctures, both during and after the RDP process, 
different stakeholders and interest groups commented, contested, and challenged them.  
Because the forecasts became the official regional numbers when the RDP was adopted 
by the ARC Board, they became the basis for functional transportation, water supply, and 
housing plans.  The rancor created by the forecasts lingered some years after they were 
adopted.  For example, the forecasts were the base for ARC’s water quality planning 
efforts in the late 1970s, which were governed by the EPA under the aegis of Section 208 
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of the 1972 Clean Water Act.  In 1977, the forecasts were contested again, this time by 
the EPA, which threatened to withdraw the region’s 208 grant if the numbers could not 
be revised downward.  A settlement between ARC, EPD, and EPA averted a 
showdown.45  
The intensity and persistence of the discussion the projections generated during 
the process underscored their central role in the eyes of not only planners but also elected 
officials, developers, and groups representing the public.  The discourse drew significant 
attention to how the forecasts subtlety embodied a particular vision of urban growth and 
development, and animated the critical role of forecasts in a way that would dominate 
much of the subsequent planning process.  By virtue of the significance of the projections 
and forecasts to policy discussions, the presentation of policies to board meetings and 
public forums ushered the problems of the forecasts into the broader regional sphere.  
The path by which ideas made their way from internal discussions and staff research to 
board meetings and public events raises questions about the way the region was 
envisioned by those who were charged with charting its future.  
 
Conclusion 
How did the RDP and its population projections encourage the growth of the 
sprawling landscape that has come to symbolize metropolitan Atlanta?  This question 
floated around the organizations and stakeholders involved throughout the process.  The 
full implications of the context in which the plan was written would reveal themselves 
both during the three years spent writing the 1975 RDP and for a number of years 
following.46 The structure of the process of writing the RDP explains in part how the 
 126 
projections acquired such wide influence, and at the same time comments on the greater 
significance of efforts to plan at a regional scale.   
The RDP and its forecasts influenced the development of the region largely 
because of their intertwining relationship with the metropolitan planning agency.  In turn, 
the RDP process formed a critical part of a close relationship between regional actors 
(bureaucrats and politicians) that the planning agency brought together, giving both 
credibility and objectivity to the prospect of rapid growth and development.  The 
technical specifications of the forecasting process, determined as they were by a 
combination of regulations and the standards of professional practice, worked with the 
demands of a regional political culture to position growth as a positive end.  Planning in 
this sense established projected growth and then created a set of policies that encouraged 
the realization of that future.  The influence of the regional plan could be seen in the 
simple practice of approving development projects based on need derived from its 
projections.   
The potential problem of overly restrictive development policies had been 
implicitly addressed in the RDP.  After adopting a set of regional environmental and 
transportation policies, ARC also provided a system for allowing them to be modified as 
the need arose.  General policies were designed to allow interpretative flexibility, so if 
they appeared to conflict with what the projections, or circumstances on the ground, 
indicated, there would be room for action, since few polices restricted specific 
practices.47 The projections and forecasts however, remained mostly immune to 
continuous modification.  Because of their stability, the official forecasts were used to 
justify where and when policies should be modified, or infrastructure constructed.  The 
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effect of this kind of planning framework is neither immediately dramatic nor always 
apparent, but accumulates over time.  As land is developed, the locations of concern 
change, making the ins and outs of development hard to track, giving rise to the 
temptation to suggest that spatially disconnected development is the result of random or 
unplanned or uncoordinated decision-making. 
Through the work of staff, committees, meetings, public events, and a series of 
detailed studies, the policies that made up the RDP were gathered together over the 
course of the years 1972 to 1975.  The paper trail left from this process represents a 
distillation of an extensive, complex, and fluid effort that combined the work of a 
professional planning staff, nonprofit organizations, developers, elected officials, and the 
public.  The ideas that emerged from the process were organized around two key 
substantive categories: environment and transportation.  The policies were designed to 
guide and structure the distribution of development around the region, but without the 
explicit force of legally binding regulations.48 This pattern became more apparent as time 
went on. 
In the early 1980s, ARC began the process of updating the 1975 RDP by 
procuring and calibrating a new model to produce updated population and employment 
forecasts. The second model was adapted from one development by the San Diego 
Council of Governments.  Advances in computing power and data availability provided 
for a more sophisticated undertaking, but the order of the process remained essentially 
unchanged.  After producing a set of six alternative scenario packages, each based on 
varying assumptions about the local and national economy and population migration, one 
package was picked by the Board to become the official forecast for the region for 1990, 
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2000, and 2010.  These numbers were then used as the base for the 1984 RDP, reaching 
wide distribution among planners, developers, and politicians, and informing the ways 
policies were selected.49 
By the mid-1980s, ARC was assuming much greater responsibility for reviewing 
major development projects in its member jurisdictions to ensure compliance with 
federal, state, and its own regional policies.  In part a result of ARC’s relatively 
successful control of development along the Chattahoochee River (which was bolstered 
by a lawsuit the agency filed against the Fulton County Commission that firmly 
established its authority to guide land use along the river), the agency’s role in managing 
large-scale land developments through a review process (termed Developments of 
Regional Impact Reviews) was expanded considerably in 1984.  Under the revised 
review system, the agency was directed by the state legislature to analyze the costs and 
benefits to the greater region of major public and private developments anywhere within 
its seven jurisdictional counties.  Municipalities were required to submit proposals for 
large developments to ARC for review before rezoning decisions could be made or 
building permits issued.  While ARC’s comments were not backed by direct veto power 
(though in extraordinary cases ARC could move to legally stop a development via 
lawsuit), the revised review process intensified interaction between involved parties 
(developers, local officials, ARC bureaucratic staff, the public, other affected 
individuals/organizations), which provided opportunity for modifying development 
proposals and revising regional plans to fit into existing growth patterns.50 Part of the 
clearinghouse function of the agency, which had steadily increased in significance during 
the 1970s, the number of reviews logged by the agency increased manifold after 1984. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, the quality and breadth of data available for use in 
preparing projections and regional development plans improved.  At the same time, 
allocation models for calculating and distributing population and employment grew more 
sophisticated, allowing planners more precise control over outputs and a greater variety 
of newly available data to be input.  The process also became steadily more spatially 
explicit as the power and availability of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software 
increased, allowing cross-cutting themes to be displayed with more visual acuity.   
The RDP has continued to be one of ARC’s major outputs, updated every eight or 
nine years (five have been produced including the 1975 edition), and by the mid-1990s 
had come to be a much more far reaching document, closely linked to the demands 
associated with federal transportation funding.  The data demands of new urban models, 
and the recognition of the connections between transportation and air quality, coupled 
with the changes in data availability have helped keep projections and forecasts close to 
the center of the general regional planning process, even though the intellectual direction 
of planning practice steadily evolved away from its more technocratic orientation of the 
1970s.  Later RDP’s reflected changes in federal and state regulations regarding 
transportation, the environment, and public involvement, which resulted in longer, more 
unwieldy, but also more detailed planning documents.  The long term implications of 
regional planning in metropolitan Atlanta continue to be visible in the region’s built 
environment, it’s economy, and patterns of everyday life.  Through the coordinating 
effort of the ARC, the prophesy of forecasted population and employment growth 
effectively came true, as did a vast low-density urban landscape.51 
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Though the volume of reports, hearings, and media coverage concerned with the 
state of regional planning in the U.S. has been substantial, the process of doing regional 
planning remains complex, rather poorly understood, and without a detailed guide to the 
twists and turns the process often takes on the ground.  All of this means that measuring 
the effect of regional planning is difficult, not least because the path between the text of a 
plan and the bricks and mortar on the ground is invariably marred by unforeseen 
circumstances, at times hiding both the role of different participants and their motivations 
for acting.  What appears to be simply the result of political horse-trading may be as 
much a consequence of the confluence of parallel regulations and limited financial 
parameters.  All of this is to say much of the work of regional planning happens quietly, 
behind the scenes in less visible ways, in the small corners of the planning process that 
typically escape notice.  
Despite these contradictions, most of the extant research on the regional planning 
process has consistently suggested that the plans and planning process are more or less 
ineffective, crippled by an often-bewildering array of contradictions between goals, 
policies, and implementation.  The relative powerlessness of the agencies responsible for 
producing regional plans also has been argued, suggesting that most of the policies and 
prescriptions contained in the plans neither provide compelling incentives for their 
adoption, nor possess the kind of authority needed to combat attempts to circumvent 
them.  Most efforts to understand regional planning have looked at simple indicators, for 
example if a policy was adopted or not based on the text of the policy, and as a result 
have tended to capture only a glimpse of the possible effect of the plan.  Yet the plan and 
the process of creating the plan operate in tandem.  Hence the plan as product (the text 
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and images themselves) is a result of the decisions made during the process, the 
participants, admissible data and methods of analysis, policies included and excluded, 
and the socio-economic context.  The effect that the plan will have on the future depends 
largely on the same kinds of decisions (and many of the same actors) as those that went 
into creating the plan in the first place.  Hence, the origins of the plan and the effects it 
produces are ultimately part of the same cloth. 
Taking a sharply analytic view of the regional planning process, beginning by 
looking carefully at how the ARC went about the primary tasks in this effort, lends 
insight into the way regional planning in Atlanta functioned.  In effect, the idea that a 
sprawling region is necessarily a product of an absent or fragmented regional planning 
infrastructure may be misguided.52 Instead, the RDP, and the events that followed it, 
helped engender what could onlt be called a self-fulfilling prophecy.53 
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The Chattahoochee is the biggest of the three major rivers that cut across the 
Apalachicola Basin, a long, narrow watershed that drains just over 19,000 square miles of 
Georgia, Alabama, and a sliver of western Florida.  Seventeen different tributaries feed 
the river, most intersecting along its northern half.  Flowing southwesterly from its origin 
in the Blue Ridge Mountains in north central Georgia to the Florida state line, the river 
winds for most of its 436 miles through rural lands, forming a significant section of the 
boundary between Georgia and Alabama.  The second river in the system is the Flint, a 
substantial water body in its own right that originates near Hartsfield International 
Airport on the south side of the city of Atlanta.  Coming together where Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia meet, the two rivers form the Apalachicola, a wide but short river 
that empties into the Apalachicola Bay in northern Florida, a briny, shallow inlet home to 
one of the nation’s largest and most productive oyster beds.1   
Though the Chattahoochee itself is rarely more than 300 feet wide, its primary 
watershed spans 8,600 square miles, of which a small but significant portion includes the 
largest counties in metropolitan Atlanta.2 Despite its physical limitations, the 
 137 
Chattahoochee has given water Atlanta area households since the city’s first intakes were 
laid into the stream in 1891.  The city’s original pumping station, named for Mayor 
Hemphill, was opened in 1892 on a site three miles north of the CBD, and the R.M. 
Clayton treatment plant was opened in 1934 on the eastern bank of the river along the 
city’s western boundary.  Together, the facilities provided fresh water to and carried 
sewerage away from most of the city’s neighborhoods, several neighboring cities, and 
parts of unincorporated Fulton County. During the first half of the 20th century, the city’s 
water authority grew into the largest regional broker of water, selling supplies to 
neighboring cities and counties. Excess waste treatment capacity allowed the city to 
provide sewer services to many of the same places.  
A comprehensive survey of the Chattahoochee River (and neighboring lands) 
sponsored by the federal government in the late 1920s reflected the optimism of an age 
when a waterfront was considered a necessary feature of any city that expected to grow 
into national prominence.  By lobbying for a comprehensive survey of the river basin, 
boosters in both Atlanta and Columbus (the other significant Georgia city through which 
the river flowed) hoped to build a case for dredging a 9-foot deep channel from the Gulf 
of Mexico to an imagined inland barge port on the west side of Atlanta.  Though the 
survey refuted the wisdom of creating a navigable channel all the way to Atlanta, it did 
support the idea of building a series of dams to regulate the flow of the river and curtail 
its tendency to flood.  With the passage of the federal Rivers and Harbors Act in 1935, 
authorization was granted for spending federal money on a project to harness the 
Chattahoochee-Flint-Apalachicola river system.  The project proposed four new 
hydroelectric dams, three along the lower stretches of the river, which were the most 
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flood prone, and one near the river’s head, in the foothills of the southern Appalachians.  
Buford Dam, the northern facility, would regulate the entire three-river system, generate 
power for metropolitan Atlanta while containing and releasing enough water to maintain 
a 9-foot navigable channel in the section of the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola between 
Columbus and the Gulf.3 
In the aftermath of World War II, when the steel gates of the intake structure on 
Buford Dam were first closed in early 1956, and the waters of the Chattahoochee River 
began to back up into the wide but relatively shallow 38,000 acre Lake Sidney Lanier 
(named for the Georgia-born 19th century poet).  Not inadvertently, the dam responsible 
for regulating the flow of the river system for flood control also helped ensure a 
dependable water supply source for the region.  Devised as part of a larger effort by the 
Army Corps of Engineers to create more navigable waters, generate power, and control 
flooding on the Chattahoochee-Flint-Apalachicola River system, the new dam enabled 
Atlanta’s burgeoning suburban counties to begin taking large quantities of the 
Chattahoochee’s water.  Bolstered by the dam’s regulation of the river’s seasonal flow 
fluctuations, suburban governments were able to build capacity to both withdraw enough 
drinking water to support their expectations of future growth and discharge the 
wastewater that future growth would inevitably produce.   
With the growth of these suburbs, the lake that resulted from the dam’s 
construction, which spread across Hall, Dawson, and Forsyth counties about 50 miles 
northeast of downtown Atlanta, would steadily evolve from its early function of 
generating electricity for the local utility and controlling floods into a popular 
recreational water body, then into a vital source of drinking water, and finally an amenity 
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for the thousands of single-family houses that have mushroomed along its shores.  This 
progression of events engendered significant pressure on the river’s water, both in terms 
of demand for withdrawals and polluted discharges.  Increasing demand for water 
withdrawals produces increased discharge in the form of point-source sewerage 
discharges.  The complicated relationship between supply and pollution in the 
Chattahoochee-Lanier water complex would have a significant impact on the 
management of the region’s water resources that would bind the fate of the lake to the 
fate of the river.   
Belying its comparatively small size and pollution problems, the Chattahoochee 
has consistently provided upwards of 75% of the region’s drinking water over the last 
five decades.  Atlanta’s political leaders have long recognized the precarious character of 
the river, its size, environmental fragility, and capacity to serve as a long-term water 
supply, as an obstacle to future development, even while failing to legislate regulations 
that would protect it.  Warnings issued over the years regarding the ability of the river to 
continue to provide the lion’s share of the region’s fresh water supply have been 
consistently dire and yet consistently wrong.  The evolving role of the regional planning 
agencies, particularly ARC, reveals how the apparent inconsistency between a limited 
water supply, meager watershed protection, and rapid growth has been managed.4 In 
effect, the public bureaucracy stepped into a void left by political leadership. 
With the adoption of the Chattahoochee River Management Plan in 1973, ARC 
opened a significant theater in its effort to guide the development of the region.  Designed 
to control development along a 48-mile stretch of the river just below Buford Dam, the 
river corridor plan proved to be a tool ARC could use to establish its authority over the 
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region’s main water source.  Because the river held such a vital role in the region’s water 
supply (and wastewater disposal), Atlanta’s leaders had long recognized the likelihood 
that local governments were not by themselves in a position to manage the resource 
effectively.  Though initially resisted, after the agency sued the Fulton County 
Commission over its decision to rezone a parcel adjacent to the river without first 
submitting the application to ARC for comment, the legitimacy of the plan and the 
agency’s authority to intervene in decisions about development along the river were 
firmly established.5 
 
The Regional Water Systems 
The construction of Buford Dam was the culmination of a long-term planning 
effort, supported and encouraged by the federal government, to develop the Apalachicola 
Basin, an effort with rather significant implications for water supply and urban 
development.  The legacy of this planning effort, which stretches back more than 50 
years, holds significant implications for Atlanta’s water supply situation.  By the mid-
1950s, there were two regional water systems with intakes on the River, one built by the 
city of Atlanta in the late 19th century, the other by Dekalb County in the 1920s.  These 
two systems, both also in the business of brokering wholesale water to other 
municipalities, were the first of what would become four major regional water 
authorities. In the mid-1960s, the Dekalb and Atlanta systems were joined by authorities 
in Cobb and Gwinnett (both coming on line before the state instituted a surface water 
withdrawal permitting system), which developed new water intakes and wastewater 
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treatment plants to supply water and sewerage to residents and businesses within their 
boundaries but also to sell to adjacent municipalities.   
All four withdrew and discharged in the Chattahoochee.  But because the location 
of intakes and wastewater plants was limited by geologic and topographic conditions, not 
to mention financial considerations, the total number of facilities was limited.  Major 
intakes needed to be located above major discharge points, in places where flow was 
adequate, and within (or very near) the political boundaries of the withdrawing agency.  
There were only a few spots along the upper Chattahoochee that fit these criteria.6 As a 
result of the limit on the number of facilities the watershed could support, agreements 
were struck between larger governments with facilities and smaller governments without 
facilities to provide supply and treatment.  Over time, existing plants were renovated to 
add excess capacity to provide room for anticipated future growth from selling water.  
The number of agreements between local governments expanded steadily during the 
1960s and into the early 1970s as the region’s population grew.  The ongoing influx of 
people and industries lead to rising water consumption, which curtailed the ability of 
smaller municipal water providers to continue to cobble together their own water sources 
from deep wells and the myriad small creeks that carve up the region.  The prevailing 
land use patterns were becoming increasingly urban.  Only the largest water authorities 
possessed the resources to build and maintain the extensive systems that could meet the 
demands of new residents and businesses.   
The resulting web of inter-jurisdictional contracts to buy and sell supplies and 
treatment capacity across political boundaries and between adjacent governments 
produced a dense web of water and sewer mains divided among a handful of large water 
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and sewer authorities.  By the early 1970s, contracts between authorities were beginning 
to send water outside the seven-county Atlanta region, which often resulted transfers of 
the Chattahoochee’s water into other watersheds and a magnification of undesirable 
environmental side effects.  For instance, the Dekalb County Water Authority sold water 
wholesale to Rockdale County (which had no intake system of its own).  The Atlanta 
Water Resources Commission sold water to the Fayette County Water System (which had 
limited intake capacity).  Both Fayette and Rockdale returned wastewater to rivers and 
streams outside the Chattahoochee watershed.7 As the number of water authorities and 
the number of water provision agreements grew, so did the amount of water withdrawn 
from the river.  The number of public agencies engaged in taking water out and putting 
treated water back in hobbled the long-term and cumulative ability of the watershed to 
support the region’s thirst, and seriously degraded the quality of the water flowing to 
downstream cities and counties.  The ultimate effect of the development of the river as a 
water source for metropolitan Atlanta could be seen in the declining production of the 
famed Apalachicola oyster 400 miles south.8 
 
A Legacy of Surface Water Management 
The number and breadth of regulations designed to simultaneously exploit and 
protect urban water resources expanded considerably during the 20th century, resembling 
a loose movement largely orchestrated by the federal government.  While federal interest 
in water resource planning dates back to the founding of the Republic, this interest shifted 
and intensified in the years immediately following World War II, and has been reflected 
in a series of major Congressional reports and legislative initiatives targeted to water 
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policy.  Since 1946 there have been five major federal commissions designed to examine 
water resource planning and management, efforts that have proven both repetitive and 
useful.  Coming in waves, the reports and plans produced by the commissions 
emphasized different aspects of federal water policy, though they shared an overriding 
concern with the need to establish a central water policy for the nation.9 As a cumulative 
effort, the reports often did stimulate legislative action, leading to a number of new policy 
directions that proved important to cleaning the nation’s waterways, and together could 
be described as a national policy.  Yet they did not equal the kind of efficient 
comprehensive policy that had propelled them into existence. 
Through the 1950s and early 1960s, federal water officials struggled with how to 
manage the growing number of bureaucracies involved in water resource decision 
making.  Attention to intergovernmental coordination around the issue of water became 
more pronounced, especially the topography of the interface between local, state, and 
federal governments.10 At the federal level, reforming the complicated relationship 
between the Department of Agriculture, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
Department of the Interior held particular interest, since each agency held sway over 
different aspects of water policy, particularly flood control and infrastructure 
development, their responsibilities often overlapping and at times in conflict.  Forming 
the first wave of federal commissions in the early post-War years, the Hoover 
Commission (originally 1949, reconstituted in 1955), Cooke Commission (1950), and 
Kerr Commission (1961) represented ambitious attempts to comprehensively evaluate the 
situation of federal water policy, offer suggestions for reforming the mechanisms through 
which policies were developed and implemented, and clear up lingering jurisdictional 
 144 
conflicts.  Sifting through the litany of suggestions the commission reports offered, the 
net effect of this work was to encourage a shift of water resource planning “away from 
regional development to the apportionment of an increasingly scarce resource.”11 Settling 
inter-agency conflicts proved harder to accomplish.  Nevertheless, the idea of managing 
water according to scarcity would ripple through the next thirty years of federal water 
policy. 
As pressure from the burgeoning environmental movement mounted in the late 
1960s, concerns over the allocation of surface waters in western states, particularly those 
with rapidly growing urban populations, sparked yet another broad assessment of water 
resources.  This would lead to the second wave of congressional water resource 
commissions and attendant data gathering efforts.  In 1968, the year before President 
Nixon would sign NEPA into law, Congress created the National Water Commission.  
The Commission was directed to make another attempt at cataloging and analyzing the 
increasingly onerous and complex water problems facing the nation, revisiting many of 
the same issues that the earlier commissions had confronted.  The final draft of the 
Commission’s report, published in 1973, contained a long list of specific 
recommendations for changing and restructuring federal water policy.  Though the 
content of individual recommendations varied, a few overarching themes tied all the 
recommendations together.  Seven were identified: refocusing water policy to be more 
engaged in determining future demand, rather than the other way around; prioritizing 
water quality enhancement over development of resources; recognizing the critical role of 
land use in water planning; writing new water conservation policies; improving cost-
benefit calculations used in water project accounting; updating old water laws; and 
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devolving much of the responsibility for water protection from the federal government to 
state governments and regional agencies.  These were the most important findings in the 
report both in terms of influencing future federal and state legislation, as well as framing 
the character of intergovernmental relationships concerned with water.12  
When the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was passed in 1972, it opened a 
tremendous new flow of federal money directed to deal with the ecology of rivers and 
streams that had been degraded by pollution.  The Clean Water Act (as it came to be 
known) largely relied on technology and infrastructure to remedy surface water pollution, 
and established a formula that guaranteed local governments 75% of the cost to build or 
upgrade municipal wastewater treatment facilities toward this end.  Managed by the 
newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Clean Water Act was 
expected to produce dramatic improvements in the quality of the nation’s rivers and 
streams by 1985 (which it ultimately did).  With an initial allocation of $18 billion dollars 
to be disbursed over the course of 10 years, the CWA supported a massive building (and 
re-building) of the nation’s sewer treatment capacity.  The planning requirements 
specified in the text of the Clean Water Act would play prominently in the efforts of the 
State of Georgia and the Atlanta Regional Commission to establish water resource 
planning as an issue worthy of a regional approach. 
The need to work out the details of implementing the Clean Water Act lead to the 
creation of the second commission of the second wave related to water supply quality, the 
National Commission on Water Quality (which came right on the heals of the final 
National Water Commission report).  Set up to clarify and correct the ambitious water 
quality goals set up by the CWA, the Commission issued its final report in 1976, which, 
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among other things, suggested that the 1977 and 1983 deadlines for cleaning up surface 
waters was achievable, though case-by-case extensions would likely be necessary.  
However, following recommendations in the 1973 report of the National Water 
Commission, the new report suggested that the goal for zero-discharges by 1985 should 
be softened, arguing that despite its emotional appeal, the cost of eliminating 100% of 
discharge would be unattainably high.  The 1976 report also underlined previous 
criticism of the enforcement of the National Environmental Protection Act and the role of 
the EPA in the enforcement process.13 
During Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the late 1970s, his administration 
established an independent water task force (assuming many of the tasks of a formal 
Congressional commission) charged with making recommendations on how to improve 
the relationship between federal water policy and the individual states’ roles in 
implementing that policy.  Carter’s task force made a number of recommendations that 
resonated with previous federal commissions, among the most important being the 
suggestion of a greater role for states in the process of making decisions about major 
water projects and a new effort to promote project cost sharing across levels of 
government, though little action followed.  In 1981, as the Reagan administration settled 
into the executive branch, an echo of the Carter task force’s recommendations found a 
receptive audience, except that this time the necessary political capital existed to put them 
into practice.  The new administration aimed to mandate that state and local governments 
co-sponsor all water projects (including financial contributions) and also assume an 
oveall greater share of total project costs.  The passage of the 1986 Water Resources 
Development Act, a major legislative effort backed by the administration that allocated 
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$16 billion for water projects and planning, implemented these policy changes.  To try to 
ensure that the act would actually pass water infrastructure costs down to state and local 
governments, Reagan also vetoed a renewal of the Clean Water Act, which would have 
kept the federal government on the hook for providing a large share of the money.  
Congress subsequently overrode his veto, tempering the effect of the Water Resources 
Development Act.14  
The evolution of federal water policy over the last five decades reflects significant 
changes in the conceptualization of how the nation’s water resources should be managed.  
Backing away from a more exploitive stance, whereby resource development was the 
overriding concern, the early 1970s represent a transition to a more ecologically centered 
view, one that also reflected the role of environmental issues as a key part of the planning 
bureaucracy and the importance of planning within federal policy.  Partly at the behest of 
the federal government and partly by their own accord, states also began instituting new 
regulations to respond to the concern about water quality, creating a parallel layer of 
regulation in the form of state departments of natural resources and water quality boards.  
This context created new demands for comprehensive planning, drawing attention to the 
connections between decisions about water resources, land use, and transportation.  
Beginning in the 1950s, water resource planning represented a burgeoning front in the 
federal involvement in shaping the urban landscape.  By the late 1960s considerable 
financial resources, many of which were directed at infrastructure building, were 
beginning to be brought to bear on the new water policies.  In the years after 1970, as the 
level of funding increased, money was often filtered through regional planning agencies.  
The way these policies were implemented and money was spent by state, regional, and 
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local agencies, provides insight into how formerly divergent environmental issues (water 
and air) were linked together through transportation policy within the increasingly 
complex activities of regional planning agencies.15 In this milieu we can frame ARC’s 
effort to manage the Chattahoochee River and how it assumed the task of coordinating 
water resource planning for the region.   
 
Setting an Agenda 
As it flows into the metropolitan Atlanta region, tracing the critical nexus of 
political borders that separate Gwinnett, Fulton, and Cobb counties, the Chattahoochee 
presents itself simultaneously as both boundary line and residential amenity.  Separating 
the city of Atlanta from its western suburbs, along its rolling bluffs sit many of the 
metropolitan area’s priciest neighborhoods.  Dominated by large-lot, single-family 
houses, which have slowly transformed the natural viewsheds of the water into private 
space, the river’s landscape displays little of the intense industrial and commercial 
development often associated with urban waterways.  Nevertheless, the houses and office 
parks that sprouted along the riverbanks have over the years generated rather 
considerable concern.  
This concern had intensified and begun to capture significant local attention by 
the early-1970s.  As a result of the mountainous, Appalachian character of the northern 
third of Georgia and the absence of modern infrastructure, between the end of the world 
war and the late-1960s most of the land along the river north of metro Atlanta faced little 
development pressure and had remained undeveloped, even rural.  As a result, the 
Chattahoochee’s water still ran clear when it reached the metro area, supporting a variety 
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of fish and game (including the southernmost trout hatchery in North America) and 
providing a high quality municipal water source.  But control over land development, like 
in the rest of the state, had been left up to the individual cities and counties that fronted 
the river.  The state showed little concern over water quality or controlling the 
development that did happen.  So when the fate of the river’s water emerged as a 
significant regional issue, attracting the attention of federal regulatory agencies, a minor 
battle ensued over how local, state, and federal agencies would embrace a common 
framework to decide the river’s fate.  How to handle development, which political 
jurisdictions would be in charge of planning its future, and what kinds of management 
and enforcement tools should be available were questions that framed the debate about 
the river’s future.   
The roots of the debate in the early 1970s stem in part from the work of the U.S. 
Study Commission – Southeastern River Basins and the series of regional pollution 
enforcement conferences the study sponsored.  Inspired by the unrealized promise of a 
regional water basin bill first introduced by Robert Kerr in the 81st Congress, Richard 
Russell, the powerful Democratic Senator from Georgia, introduced a modified version 
of Kerr’s legislation in the 85th Congress in 1958.  Signed into law by President 
Eisenhower later that year, the bill created the United States Study Commission - 
Southeast River Basins, an experiment in planning for region-wide water resource 
development.  Focusing attention on the major rivers in the southeast, including the 
Chattahoochee and Altamaha, the two basins that drain virtually all of metropolitan 
Atlanta, the commission produced a comprehensive survey and plan for conservation, 
land development, and water quality in five major Southeastern river basins.  The 
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resulting three-volume document represented a new kind of water planning effort on the 
part of the federal government.  The only contemporary evaluation of the work of the 
Commission emphasized the value of its administrative structure, which allowed it to 
straddle the divide between different federal agencies and the states, which often have 
apparently competing interests.  The complexion of the commission itself, comprised of 
representatives from six federal agencies and five individuals from the affected states, 
plus a chairman, as well as the generous time provided it to complete its activities, 
allowed a degree of independence from existing federal and state bureaucracies, while 
maintaining connections to both sides.  The power of the bureaucratic staff vis-à-vis the 
politically appointed commissioners was reflected in the ideas that found their way into 
the plan, which overwhelmingly relied on empirical data and technical analysis.  
Quantifying policies, establishing variables that could be measured with the tools at hand, 
allowed the staff to provide apparently neutral, authoritative information to the 
commissioners at critical moments during their policy decisions.16 
The combination of a political commission with a limited life-span, comprised of 
both state and federal representatives appointed by the President, and a large, experienced 
bureaucratic staff drawn from a number of different federal agencies, perhaps avoided 
some of the political difficulties associated with a permanent water planning 
organization.  In spite of its temporality, the Study Commission, through the breadth and 
depth of its plans, proved to be a touchstone for later efforts to conduct water basin 
planning, particularly efforts directed toward the Chattahoochee.17 Rapidly changing and 
increasingly complex land use patterns presented new demands on the management of 
water resources.  Understanding these interactions required more sophisticated analytic 
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techniques, which in turn required more reliable data.  By highlighting the relative 
paucity of good data documenting land and water conditions in Southeast river basins, the 
Study Commission brought needed attention to the challenge of writing comprehensive 
water resource plans that accurately captured conditions on the ground, without adequate 
data.18  
The loose structure of the commission influenced the depth and scope of the 
resulting plan.  Beyond its ability to draw attention to the problems of planning for water 
in a multi-jurisdictional setting, the plan introduced a number of ideas that ended up in 
regional water plans ARC would later produce.  By concluding that floods presented little 
danger, no significant navigation demands currently existed, and hydroelectric plants 
would never provide enough power to be a significant source for the region, the Study 
Commission’s Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) plan set the stage for more 
attention to be paid to pollution, erosion, and recreation.  Accordingly, the ACF plan 
recorded and projected the magnitude of Atlanta’s burgeoning pollution (and population) 
problem and its potential impact on water supply and recreation.  Along with 
inadequately treated sewage being dumped into the river, the plan also warned of the 
potentially dangerous (and growing) practice of collecting municipal supply water from 
one river basin and discharging that water as waste into a different basin.19 The plan 
proposed a new re-regulation dam 10 to 20 miles below Buford dam, to provide better 
control over the river’s flow, important for the ability of the river to provide long-term 
water supply.  Recognizing that in spite of spatial separation, different “activities in all 
parts of the basins are rather closely related to the existence, development, and use of the 
Chattahoochee, Flint, and Apalachicola rivers,” a fact that had been overlooked in the 
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past, the plan relayed the need for greater areawide, cross-jurisdictional cooperation.  But 
perhaps most portentously, the plan identified a looming conflict between neighboring 
governments (states, counties, and cities) over the fair use of the surface water in the 
ACF basin under existing rules of riparian doctrine, and proposed changes in state water 
laws to take into account the complexities of allocating water among a wide variety of 
constituencies.20 
As the Study Commission demonstrates, discussions over how to plan for and 
manage the Chattahoochee River long predate the involvement of ARC’s efforts to guide 
development along the stretch of river that passes through metropolitan Atlanta.  As well 
as providing critical water supply to Atlanta, the Chattahoochee River has been an 
important resource for a range of interests all the way down to the Gulf of Mexico.  Since 
before the turn of the 20th century, small municipalities in both Georgia and Alabama 
withdrew water for their own municipal delivery systems.  Farmers depended on the river 
for crop irrigation and power plants and mills depended on the river’s water for their 
production processes.  Fishermen in and around Apalachicola Bay (at the river’s mouth) 
depended on the briny conditions in the river delta for their shellfish harvests.  Each 
group presented a claim on the river.   
And for many years, the river supported these demands in equilibrium.  The 
residents and businesses in Atlanta, sitting near the riverhead, did not withdraw enough 
water to significantly impede the flow, and they did not return enough polluted 
wastewater to seriously degrade the water available to downstream neighbors.  But as 
demands on the river from the growth of North Georgia increased, the quality and 
amount of water available downstream was seriously eroded.  With the 1948 Water 
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Pollution Control Act, the federal government got involved in interstate water quality 
issues, which had particular salience for rivers and streams, like the Chattahoochee, that 
crossed, or formed, state boundaries.  The dispute that arose between Georgia and 
Alabama, and eventually dragged Florida into the conflict, was provoked by the rising 
incidence of pollution of the Chattahoochee, a problem that was blamed on waste 
discharges from Atlanta and its growing suburbs.  This dispute would persist for forty 
years, and because of the size and importance of the river’s watershed, would color the 
role ARC assumed and force the long-term involvement of the federal government in 
planning the region’s water supply.  
 Just as the ACF advisory commission predicted, by the mid-1960s pollution in the 
Chattahoochee had become severe enough to attract the attention of the state of Georgia.  
In response, the state legislature created a water quality control board, part of the Water 
Quality Control Act of 1964, to address general issues of water pollution in the state’s 
surface waters.  The Act specified that municipal and industrial sewage treatment 
facilities must provide secondary treatment before discharge into the state’s surface 
waters by 1975.  Moving toward this goal, the Georgia Water Quality Control Board 
initiated a formal program in 1965 for abating the pollution that was flowing into the 
Chattahoochee.  Recognizing that the Chattahoochee “is grossly polluted for about 100 
miles below Atlanta,” the water quality board resolved to substantially clean up the 
discharge coming from Atlanta and its suburbs.21 Using data gathered from federal 
surveys of the 100-mile stretch of river downstream from Atlanta, but entirely within the 
State’s boundaries, the program required plans for how abatement would be achieved 
from all municipalities and industries discharging untreated waste into the river.22 Several 
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of Atlanta’s existing treatment plants (constructed in the 1930s and 1950s) were 
overloaded, and part of the city’s sewer and storm water system was combined, meaning 
that during major rain events raw sewage mixed with rainwater and flowed freely into the 
river.  Because of the age and scope of the system, any abatement plan would be 
extraordinarily expensive.  And with projections for significant population and economic 
growth in metropolitan Atlanta for the next three decades, the pollution problem appeared 
to be on the verge of getting out of hand.  In addition to Atlanta’s discharge, a number of 
smaller Georgia cities, also with aged or poorly managed treatment facilities, used the 
river or its tributaries for waste disposal (often untreated), further contributing to the 
overall degradation of the river before it reached Alabama.  Hence Alabama (and Florida) 
users withdrawing water for municipal and agriculture supply were left with a seriously 
impaired water body, with little recourse for correction. 
On the heals of complaints from public officials in Alabama counties in the 
downstream path of Atlanta, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration in 1966 
called to order an enforcement conference to discuss pollution of the Chattahoochee and 
its effect on the interstate waters shared by Georgia and Alabama.  In response to the 
evident pollution problem of the river, brought on by the lack of effective action on the 
part of municipalities and industries, and its effect on both states, the conference brought 
together representatives from several federal agencies and the states of Georgia and 
Alabama to discuss what to do about managing the river’s water.23 Attended by an array 
of public officials from the affected states, as well as industry representatives, politicians, 
and the media, the conference was timed to both head off a more intense squabble 
between Alabama and Georgia (and potential inter-governmental lawsuits) and to 
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develop a plan for abating existing sources of pollution.  The conversation began by 
acknowledging the role of the conference as a combined information dissemination 
session and problem-solving forum.  Details about the scope of the pollution, and its 
sources, were presented, with an emphasis the effects of three wastewater treatment 
plants, all serving Atlanta: R.M. Clayton (by far the largest plant discharging into the 
river), Utoy Creek, and Sandy Creek.  A limited selection of broad recommendations 
were presented at the conclusion of the meeting, most important among them being the 
setting of a timeline for building remedial facilities to control pollution flowing into the 
Chattahoochee by the middle of 1971.  The effect of the meeting lay not only in the 
recommendations, but also in establishing a process for the airing of grievances. 
The topics covered during the conference, the tone of participants, and the 
forthrightness of its recommendations reflected recent federal efforts to consolidate and 
improve national water policy.24 The conference was a visible step on the part of federal 
government to establish and pursue a set of goals in managing water pollution in the 
rapidly growing southeastern river basins.  This formal and public recognition of metro 
Atlanta’s looming water problem was built on findings of a report published by the U.S. 
Study Commission on Southeast River Basins in 1963, which had recommended actions 
to improve flood control, municipal water supplies, and water quality.  By entering 
directly into the growing conflict between Georgia and Alabama over mutually agreeable 
standards of pollution, the conference drew attention to the tremendous problem 
presented by the wastewater treatment plants serving the city of Atlanta, Dekalb County, 
Cobb County, and Gwinnett County, basically the urban core of the region.  These 
jurisdictions represented both the largest users of the river for water supply and the 
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biggest polluters, contributing more than 60% of the total bacterial load entering the 
Chattahoochee at any single point.  By virtue of its scale and growing visibility, the 
pollution problem of the stretch of river between Atlanta and Fort Gaines had moved to 
the top of the list of issues affecting the river by the mid-1960s.   
A second enforcement conference was convened in 1970 to follow up on the 
progress of implementation of the pollution remediation recommendations published in 
1966 and to review new developments in the river saga.  In the intervening four years, 
conditions in the river had worsened.  Recognition of the impact of metropolitan 
Atlanta’s growing waste on neighboring watersheds, particularly the South and Flint 
rivers (both of which dump into the Chattahoochee several hundred miles downstream), 
and the lack of reliable data measuring the extent of this impact, spurred another wide 
ranging discussion on the future of the region’s water supply.  With the possibility of the 
involvement of federal courts looming, the second conference placed the pollution 
problem squarely on the shoulders of the major wastewater treatment systems in metro 
Atlanta.  Noting the fact that the administration of waste treatment in Atlanta was divided 
among 20+ political subdivisions (though there are far fewer treatment plants), the 
keynote report delivered by the Water Pollution Control Administration argued that 
existing treatment facilities are “inefficient, uneconomical and poorly operated with 
respect to the water quality problems of the entire region,” which was clear evidence of a 
dire need for “area regulatory planning.”25 In a relatively harsh tone, the conference 
proceedings provided testimony on the causes of “notable severe lapses” in completing 
upgrades to the treatment plants identified in the 1966 conference.26  
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Comments by local politicians, wastewater operators, and consulting engineers 
revealed the complex technical and financial formulas involved in developing or 
improving water pollution treatment systems, compounded by the necessity of 
coordinating a group of quasi-independent agencies (even though those agencies were 
explicitly bound by a common set of federal and state rules).  Despite the wide 
recognition of these difficulties, neither the state of Georgia nor the federal government 
had contributed much funding for improvements necessary to bring existing treatment 
plants up to a suitable level.  Not surprisingly, the ranking federal official running the 
conference expressed obvious frustration at the progress of reform, commenting near the 
end of the meeting, “What you have to recognize is from 1966 to 1970 is a pretty long 
time. It seems to me in any case where the State of Georgia does not have a positive 
assurance that there is going to be compliance, I think these are the cases we have trouble 
with.”27 A revised list of recommendations concluded the second conference, which 
outlined a 30-day window for municipalities and industries to notify the Georgia Water 
Quality Control Board (serving as a federal liaison) of the date when they expect to fully 
meet all the obligations established during the first conference. A later meeting between 
state water quality officials and the U.S. Department of the Interior would determine the 
acceptability of the compliance plans. 
Expressing the confusion of managing intergovernmental relationships, initiatives 
for changing the practice of water planning came nearly simultaneously from regional 
bodies, state governments, and the federal bureaucracy.  But despite efforts in the 1960s 
to initiate comprehensive documentation and plans for river basins that emphasized 
substantive issues related to the fate of specific rivers (i.e. the Chattahoochee), the 
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difficulties of intergovernmental affairs would resurface in the coming years and continue 
to confound attempts to find solutions to the tangle of problems associated with water 
resource management.  With the opening salvos of what would escalate into a war over 
the rights to the Chattahoochee’s waters, the connection between urban water supply 
systems and water pollution became a front burner issue that would color regional water 
resource planning efforts for years to come.  These efforts would have a long-reaching 
influence.  The on-going urbanization of the countryside, and the visible effects such 
urbanization had on rivers and streams, helped drive home the fragility of watersheds, 
and the impact human activities have on them.  Atlanta’s projected growth (and the 
likelihood of realizing this growth) would remain the primary issue in the water conflict 
between Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.  As ARC took on a greater role in planning and 
coordinating water supply plan for the region, the agency worked to position itself as a 
central player in the heated negotiations that would characterize the interstate dispute.  
 
Imagining Water Supply for a Region 
In 1967 the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission, ARC’s 
predecessor, hired an engineering firm to evaluate the water supply and sewer systems 
around metro Atlanta.  Confirming much of what the Study Commission report and the 
two enforcement conferences had suggested, the engineer’s preliminary report issued in 
mid-1968 evaluated each of the existing systems in the region, which collectively 
revealed the poor (or in some cases nonexistent) state of much of the region’s 
infrastructure and facilities.  However, the critique extended beyond the condition of the 
facilities themselves, to encompass the organizations actually operating the facilities.28 
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The report also noted complications caused by the numerous agreements for cost-sharing 
and trading among the region’s water and sewer systems.29 At the end of 1968 ARMPC 
released two more reports, which put forth recommendations for building a fully 
functioning metropolitan water and sewer authority (tentatively named Northern 
Chattahoochee Water and Sewer Authority).  These reports were built on the findings of 
the engineering report and contained elaborations of several rudimentary water and sewer 
policies included in the 1968 Regional Development Plan. Suggestions for the authority 
included an organizational structure comprised of elected officials representing member 
governments, much like the organization that would be adopted by ARC three years later.  
The proposed authority would be responsible for guiding and managing water quality, 
including operating existing and future sewer facilities, but would leave existing water 
supply systems in place in the hands of local governments.30 Concluding remarks in the 
reports were clear, and provided a telling summary of what would likely lay ahead, 
especially after 1971 and the creation of ARC.  Commenting on the fact that details of the 
problems with water supply and waste disposal had been written before, and that 
intergovernmental relationships were the key to solving the problems, the report asserted 
that the problems “are incapable of solution without the concerted action of many 
governments,” an idea that would only be slowly worked out over the course of the next 
30 years.  By the time the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District was 
established in 2001, the fruition of these three decades of regional water planning was 
realized. 
By the early 1970s, when the bill that would create the Clean Water Act was 
making its way through Congress, a number of different federal and state agencies began 
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looking to apply some of the ideas about region- and watershed-wide water resource 
planning expounded in the 1960s to a few demonstration cases.  When the CWA was 
signed into law, two different agencies, the Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, spearheaded the revised federal role in water 
planning, especially in urban settings.  They interacted directly with state and local 
governments, but as a result of the requirements of existing legislation (A-95 program 
introduced by the 1968 Intergovernmental Coordination Act) concerning metropolitan 
areas, both agencies also worked extensively with regional planning bodies.  In some 
respects analogous to the way watersheds cut across jurisdictions, the regional agencies 
were ideal points of contact between local, state, and federal representatives, mostly 
because they were large enough to span significant portions of watersheds, which 
allowed observation of how water demands from different jurisdictions affected the rest 
of the region.  But regional planning agencies were also repositories with enough data 
and access to expertise to be able to examine complex water issues in the context of 
economic, demographic, and land development.  And with ongoing research and 
development programs in areas that held important implications for the condition of the 
natural environment, namely transportation, adding water issues to their docket was an 
easy fit.  
In 1972, the Army Corps and EPA, in conjunction with ARC and the State, 
initiated a new, multi-year water resource planning project in metropolitan Atlanta 
(officially named the Atlanta Region Water Resources Study, but often simply referred to 
as the Atlanta Study), that included part of the Chattahoochee and Flint river basins, as 
well as the two largest impoundments in the region, Lake Allatoona and Lake Lanier.  
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While part of a larger push to develop comprehensive water management plans in 
metropolitan areas around the country and redirect some of the effort of the Corps toward 
“software (nonconstruction)” roles, the Atlanta Study could also trace its roots to the 
work of the southeastern rivers U.S. Study Commission in the early 1960s.  Problems 
(soil disturbance and runoff) stemming from residential development along the bluffs 
where the river separates Fulton and Cobb counties helped bring attention to the 
condition of the watershed.31 The activities that went into the Atlanta Study, the data 
gathering, public meetings, and mapping, would lay the groundwork for later efforts to 
broker a solution to water supply conflicts and provide input to plans for coordinating the 
relationship between land development and water quality.  More immediately, the Study 
attempted to broker a solution to interim water supply conflicts while laying out several 
longer-term plans for coordinating point-
source and non-point source pollution with 
the water supply.   
 
The legwork that went into the 
Atlanta Study helped ARC develop separate 
areawide wastewater and water supply plans 
with a relatively detailed timeline of 
procedural and infrastructure improvements 
forecasted through year 2000.  These plans 
formed the basis for ARC’s A-95 reviews of 
Figure 4.1: Atlanta Study Boundaries 
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local government requests for federal funding for water supply and wastewater 
infrastructure.  The Study proposed a detailed program for regulating the river’s flow (to 
be managed jointly by ARC, the Corps, and Georgia Power) that would provide a 
medium-term reliable water supply for the jurisdictions with municipal systems that 
depended on the river.  The study also included a sub-study of water supplies for several 
downstream counties that would later be sucked into Atlanta’s metropolitan fold, and lent 
support to the idea of connecting the region’s future water supply to Lake Lanier. 32  
During the same period, using the cover of the Atlanta Study, ARC successfully 
pushed legislation through the Georgia General Assembly granting it development review 
authority over the 48-mile stretch of the Chattahoochee that flows through metropolitan 
Atlanta.  The Study also helped stimulate efforts to pass Georgia’s Erosion and 
Sedimentation Act (1975) and Surface Water Management Act (1977), which replaced a 
vague riparian doctrine of water allocation with a system of state-issued permits for 
withdrawals from rivers and streams of more than 100,000 gallons per day (a threshold 
targeted to Atlanta’s four big water systems).  And beyond the ideas enunciated in the 
course of the Study, the cooperative organizational structure necessary for the parties 
involved helped create a renewed climate of water awareness, establish the role of water 
planning within the growing pantheon of ARC’s activities, and reinforce connections 
between the environment and other facets of regional development planning.33 
 
The Chattahoochee Corridor Plan and the Metropolitan River Protection Act 
The general idea of a sub-regional plan backed by a state law specifically 
targeting the Chattahoochee had been widely discussed during the 1960s when federal 
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and state agencies first turned their attention to the pollution problems the river faced, 
though no specific details of such a law had ever been proffered.  Early regional 
development plans, studies, and conferences had suggested the necessity of protecting the 
river from encroachment by mandating a prescribed distance between the edge of the 
water and any land disturbing activity (a natural buffer), limiting discharges into the 
river, and prescribing the types of land uses appropriate for areas along the river.34 
Though the plans and conversations produced potentially useful ideas, no governmental 
body, at the local, state, or federal level, had taken serious steps to encourage 
implementing the ideas, and the regional agencies responsible for writing the plans never 
seriously attempted to broker implementation in the face of what would have likely been 
fierce resistance.  But by the time the state legislature created the Atlanta Regional 
Commission, public agitation for more aggressive water resource planning had begun to 
reach a crescendo.  Media attention on the water supply problem in the region had 
increased sharply, and editorials decrying the failure of local governments to adequately 
address problems stemming from land development along the river created a drumbeat 
that gathered steam.35 Dealing with this slowing exploding problem was, along with the 
Regional Development Plan update, one of the first tasks ARC undertook.  The 
Commission’s effort to develop a comprehensive plan for the Chattahoochee River 
corridor helped push the state into the complicated terrain of urban watershed 
management, and in retrospect formed one of the key events that would much later help 
propel Georgia’s growth management legislation. 
Behind the plan, where the quiet work of the bureaucracy unfolded, efforts to 
encourage cooperation among the local governments with a stake in river development 
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were responsible for establishing the seriousness of ARC’s role in regional water 
planning.  As publicity increased about the problems development along the river had 
created, and the apparent lack of thoughtful planning concerning that development, 
individual zoning decisions that several years earlier would have escaped notice turned 
into public controversies.  These controversies stemmed from a spate of rezoning 
decisions by the Fulton County Commission.  In a matter of only a few years, a series of 
small land development controversies involving one of the founding members of ARC 
crystallized the fate of future development within the Chattahoochee corridor, ARC’s role 
in water resource planning, and the long-term legitimacy of the agency as the region’s 
dominant development policy body.   
In 1967, a developer with a history of turning the soil of north Fulton County into 
subdivisions and apartments proposed a moderate-sized development for a parcel 
adjacent to the river near a bridge that conveyed Interstate 285 over the water just north 
of the city limits in an unincorporated section of Fulton County.  Situated in the midst of 
a low-density, single-family residential area, the development, a small-scale PUD 
(planned unit development), would have included a mixture of commercial and multi-
family residential structures surrounded by greenspace to be held in a permanent public 
covenant.  Despite generating a low level local outcry among local environmental 
activists, the project was approved by the Fulton Commission, and construction was 
underway in mid 1969.  After preliminary work on the project began to take shape, and 
the deal’s profit-making potential revealed, the developer went back to the Fulton 
Commission in mid-1970 requesting exemptions to the original covenants in order to 
bulldoze some of the greenspace to make way for devoting more of the land to 
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commercial uses.  The Commission granted the request, again despite limited public 
protest, which also neutralized an existing agreement to put aside part of the parcel for a 
future public use area (part of an ongoing but separate effort to create a national park 
along part of the river).36 Though the state got involved, with Governor Carter personally 
appealing to Fulton County for a voluntary moratorium on rezoning land along the river, 
the Commission nevertheless pushed ahead, spurring a group of Fulton Citizens to file an 
injunction in Fulton Superior Court to stop the development (which was granted).  By the 
summer of 1971, the issue of river zoning was evolving into a full-blown regional 
controversy.37 Wrangling continued through the winter of 1971 and early spring of 1972 
over the Fulton Commission’s decision to continue hearing rezoning applications without 
heading the oversight of the governor, as several other large-lot developments were 
proposed for nearby parcels along the river.  As ARC was getting up and running, the 
issue of river development lay in wait. 
In the 1972 session of the General Assembly, senator Robert Walling of Dekalb 
County, introduced a new bill that would have created a five-person board to oversee all 
re-zoning requests along the controversial northern stretch of the river (the section that 
ARC would propose for inclusion in its corridor plan).  As ARC was beginning the task 
of organizing its operations in early 1972, it immediately enmeshed itself in the 
Chattahoochee conflict.  In February, the ARC board met and passed a public resolution 
opposing the Walling’s river bill based on concern that the law would supercede ARC’s 
jurisdiction over planning and development in the Chattahoochee corridor, a power the 
Commission’s executive director realized would be crucial to its legitimacy.38 
Immediately after voting to oppose Walling’s bill, under the auspices of the corridor plan 
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and Act 5 the commission declared that the river was a cross-jurisdictional subject that 
fell under the area review powers granted the Commission.39  
While the first attempt at a river protection bill came about during the uproar over 
Fulton County’s attempts to rezone valuable lands along the river for more intense 
development, the urgency of which might have squashed ARC’s strategic concerns, the 
Commission managed to operate shrewdly to protect its role in the region.  By the middle 
of 1972 the new commission had involved itself in the on-going re-zoning battles in 
Fulton, and had also begun the process of writing a Chattahoochee Corridor Plan that it 
could use to stake a more authoritative claim over development decisions along the river.  
Though it provoked disagreement, and some of ARC’s commissioners even expressed 
surprise at the staff position on the river bill, making its opposition to the bill public was 
strategic, giving the Commission time to develop a comprehensive river plan that would 
meet fit its vision and be subject to its complete control.  This effectively ended the bill’s 
chances of passage during the 1972 session (Walling’s bill was channeled to the natural 
resources committee in the senate and drowned there), but future prospects for a state-
level river bill remained bright.  With the public being denied visible progress, the defeat 
of the river bill helped keep the zoning controversy on the front burner.40 
In mid-1972, after ARC had formally adopted its Chattahoochee Corridor Plan, 
the Commission immediately invoked its authority to review pending development 
proposals for land along the river.41 This action put the commission on course for a head-
on collision with the government of the largest county in its jurisdiction (which also 
happened to be the most urbanized county in the state).  When members of the Fulton 
County Commission resisted ARC’s attempts to review the development proposals, ARC 
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filed a law suit against the county in Fulton Superior Court alleging that the county 
commission had violated the state law that required ARC to review developments with 
potential areawide impact.42 Though ARC’s executive director (Dan Sweat) knew the 
commission lacked explicit zoning review authority (and would likely lose a courtroom 
confrontation), and that the river development proposals might not even qualify as 
areawide plans, he quietly notified the senior Fulton Commissioner, who was also a 
member of ARC’s board, that the Commission was ready for a long fight to against the 
county.  After several months of controversy, and the threat of a petition drive to recall 
the members of the Fulton Commission, the Commission asked ARC to settle out of 
court.  The settlement that was negotiated gave ARC the right to review development 
projects in the river corridor, but more importantly provided the Commission with 
valuable time while state legislation granting the agency more formal and far-reaching 
river corridor planning powers could work its way through the 1973 session of the 
General Assembly.43 
Among its achievements, the effort behind the Chattahoochee Corridor Plan 
identified a few simple mechanisms that could be used in subsequent efforts to promote 
regional coordination and further legitimated the existence of the fledgling ARC.  The 
directness of these mechanisms emerged in staff reports prepared during the planning 
process and remained mostly intact in the text of the adopted version of the plan.  What 
the staff reports understood was that much of the real power of the river plan would lay 
not in ARC’s authority to deny a building permit, but rather in the extensive 
documentation required of proposed developments.  Gathering detailed site and grading 
plans, showing land vulnerability ratings, existing vegetation, and erosion control 
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measures, required a great deal of effort on the part of a potential developer and opened 
avenues for negotiation and enforcement without going through a formal hearing.  It also 
helped ARC build an extensive database of land development information, which would 
become useful support for passing sediment control legislation through the General 
Assembly and in later efforts to establish a regional water supply authority.44  
Yet by virtue of its focus on managing land development activities adjacent to the 
river, at its core the plan was really just a simple (but fancy) river buffer which could be 
easily displayed on a map.  The buffer outlined ARC’s jurisdiction as a 2000-foot swath 
on each side of the river, for 48 miles – from directly below Buford Dam south to the 
railway bridge at Peachtree Creek.  Within this buffer, the corridor plan required all 
development proposals to be consistent with regional policies.  Hence any development 
that included expenditure of public funds or government action or involved disturbance 
of land for the purposes of erecting a structure was subject to review by the commission, 
as well as copious documentation.  The key feature of the corridor plan, the mechanism 
by which the buffer functioned, was the inclusion of a system of precise land 
vulnerability standards.  Based on distance to the water’s edge and flood hazard potential, 
seven graduated vulnerability categories outlined and defined land clearing and 
impervious surface ratios allowable for parcels in the river corridor.  The vulnerability 
standards were sub-categorized into flood plains, flood hazard areas, and vegetative 
buffers.  Permanent structures on land within the flood plain were largely prohibited.  
Within the vegetative buffer, the land within 50 feet of the water on both banks of the 
Chattahoochee and within 35 feet on the banks of any tributaries, trees and plants were to 
remain undisturbed, the only structures allowed were bridges, water supply infrastructure, 
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utility lines, and footpaths.  Flood hazard zones permitted permanent structures, provided 
floors were two feet above the adjacent flood plain elevation and structural height was 
limited to 35 feet.  
The gracefulness of the plan, its substantive focus on a singular geographic 
feature (the river) while concomitantly addressing a bundle of larger regional issues, was 
perhaps most apparent in the corridor map that accompanied the plan.  The combined 
simplicity of the regulations and the visual directness of the map proved a useful tool for 
keeping track of land development.  A real-life demonstration of the idea that mapping 
something is a necessary precursor to controlling it, the corridor map provided a crisp 
representation of the features within the plan’s jurisdiction, showing the spatial 
relationships among individual parcel boundaries, existing land uses, water/sewer 
infrastructure, and topography.  The map also included the vulnerability zones and 
projected where future development might go, including land that should be reserved as 
permanent greenspace.  Because of the ease of distributing a graphic document, the 
corridor map proved to be an invaluable means of disseminating information about the 
river. 
When ARC published its river corridor plan late in the summer of 1972, outlines 
of what would become its longer-term water planning strategy were beginning to emerge.  
Commission board members and staff worked to build consensus around the plan from 
the ground up, laying the foundation for ARC having a prominent role in the river’s 
future, extending its authority, and setting a general pattern for how it would deal with 
the local governments it oversaw.  After the board gave the plan a final green light, the 
document’s procedural requirements were widely circulated among metro local 
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governments.  By the end of 1972, the governments responsible for implementing the 
details of the plan had largely signed on, if not officially, at least unofficially, helping the 
plan gather momentum and direct more serious attention on the river.45 Once the 
legitimacy of the river plan had been firmly established, ARC moved quickly to corner 
more power over river development and planning from the state.  At the beginning of the 
1973 session of the General Assembly, a revised version of the first river protection bill 
(Walling’s bill) was introduced.  
The revised bill, sponsored by Eliot Levitas (Dekalb County) and Paul Coverdell 
(Dekalb County) in the 1973 General Assembly, that became the Metropolitan River 
Protection Act passed quickly through the legislature and onto Governor Carter’s desk 
(who had been a staunch supporter), but not until two attempts by members of the 
Assembly to weaken the bill were presented.  The first, an amendment to reduce the 
width of the protection corridor from 2,000 to 1,000 feet, failed by a wide margin.  But a 
second amendment designed to temper some of ARC’s regulatory authority by allowing 
local governments under the jurisdiction of the corridor plan to override ARC’s 
recommendations for modifying a development proposal with a simple majority vote of 
the elected body, rather than a super majority, passed.46  
In spite of these amendments, the overriding characteristic of the 1973 version of 
the bill was the fact that the new legislation put authority over river planning and 
regulation directly in the hands of ARC, a critical victory for the commission and the 
parties interested in extending state authority over land development.  It had been one of 
the goals of the writing of the Chattahoochee River plan in the first place to firmly put 
ARC in control over planning the fate of region’s primary water source.  But in yet 
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another a instance of the delicate dance between the federal government, the 
Commission, local governments, and the state over control over planning and 
development, the bill did not give ARC formal zoning review authority (i.e. the ability to 
over-ruling a zoning decision by a member local government). 
Nevertheless, the version of the Metropolitan River Protection Act that passed 
into law presented ARC with a new power base for sustaining its river corridor plan and 
managing the way local governments made decisions about land use and zoning within 
the 2000-foot river buffer.  The legislation signed by Carter in 1973, know as Act 66 
(House Bill 1093), required all political subdivisions within the area of the river corridor 
affected by the plan to submit proposals for development on land parcels within the 
corridor to the commission for review against the policies set forth in the plan.  The law 
maintained the requirement that proposals be accompanied by detailed site plans, grading 
plans, and landscaping plans, which included mapping the location of vulnerability 
categories, existing vegetation, topography, structural footprints, and other associated 
land disturbing activities.  Within 60 days of the submission of a proposal, the 
Commission would conduct a review to determine the proposal’s consistency with the 
requirements of the corridor plan, and issue its findings to the appropriate local 
governments.  During the review, local staff and sometimes the applicants themselves, 
typically met with ARC staff to discuss the proposal and commission findings before 
final action.  For the governing authority to issue a certificate allowing land-disturbing 
activities to go forward, a proposal had to be found either consistent with the river 
corridor plan (by official vote of the ARC board), revised to meet stipulations suggested 
by ARC staff review (and then voted by the board), or overridden by a majority vote of 
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the full governing council (simple quorum did not apply).  Later revisions of the Act, 
modified as stricter statewide sedimentation and erosion control policies came on line, 
would require even more extensive documentation in development proposals.  
The Chattahoochee Corridor Plan and Metropolitan River Protection Act were 
both in part outgrowths of piecemeal federal attempts to develop a coherent national 
water policy.  The work of the U.S. Study Commissions and the Corps of Engineers’ 
Atlanta Study were both essential pieces of a larger, on-going regional water resource 
management scheme designed to allocate a relatively scarce water supply.  As 
implementation of the Chattahoochee Corridor Plan unfolded, it gave rise to 
progressively stronger regional initiatives as well as helped encourage the state’s 
assertion of its authority to determine how water should be protected and managed.  The 
Chattahoochee Plan and the River Act were constructed to work together to shape 
development along the river.  But perhaps as significantly, the process of writing the 
plans and figuring out how they could be implemented helped structure the Atlanta 
Regional Commission and its vision of what regional planning should be.   
The river corridor plan exemplifies how Atlanta’s regional planning bureaucracy 
has been able to massage local politics into a regional framework, and how regional 
decision making actually worked.  Much like the ARC itself and its regional development 
plans, the power of the Chattahoochee Plan lies in the details of its structure, in the 
procedures for reviewing development proposals, and the way information flows between 
the commission and local jurisdictions.  In short, ARC managed the planning process as a 
feedback loop.  From its vantage, ARC was able to take a wide-angle view of 
development along the river: from initial proposal for projects to actions by local 
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planning staff to votes by the local governing bodies.  The commission could gather and 
distribute information related to the process to different interested parties (especially 
governments and citizens) as it saw fit. 
 
A Planning Success? 
Almost before the ink dried on the Metropolitan River Protection Act, a push to 
find a more comprehensive solution to problems associated with development along the 
river came as perceived lapses in the jurisdiction of the Act were beginning to be 
reported.  In late 1973, a special investigative committee created by the General 
Assembly issued a report that charged that ambiguity in the brand new legislation would 
make evaluating proposals for compliance difficult, and asserted that ARC had few 
resources to allocate to detecting violations of provisions in the act.  The most obvious 
implication of the committee’s report was that the act was insufficient to the task at hand, 
but this was not the only reading.47  
While leveling an important critique of the legislation, which would eventually 
lead to revisions, in other ways the report failed to recognize how ambiguity could 
provide a platform of power for ARC and the way it went about its designated regulatory 
duties.  The commission’s goal was to subject as much of the river corridor land to its 
review as possible, and leave little of the design of the development regulations up to the 
whims of local governments.  By virtue of the ambiguity in the enabling legislation, ARC 
was left to devise its own standards and rules, and use whatever coercive powers were at 
its disposal.  By putting the design of the review process in ARC’s hands, local 
governments had little footing to influence the shape the review process would take, 
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which gave the commission relatively wide berth in setting standards for reviewing river 
developments. 
 By the mid-1970s, positive changes in the quality of north Georgia’s lakes and 
rivers were being widely reported in the media, most of it attributed to the expanded 
regulatory role of ARC in guarding water quality and federal policy.  Beginning in the 
mid-1960s, around the time of the expansion of federal interest, expenditures and policies 
targeting the effects of Atlanta’s urbanization on the condition of the state’s largest 
waterway grew substantially.  Behind an infusion of federal money unleashed by the 
Clean Water Act, ARC and the state helped oversee a major renovation of water resource 
infrastructure.  The region’s largest wastewater treatment plants were upgraded and 
expanded to include secondary sewage treatment technology, which dramatically reduced 
the amount of pollution escaping into the watershed.  Large municipal systems that only 
recently spilled significant amounts of raw sewage directly into rivers were treating 85 to 
95 percent of pollutants by the end of 1975.  Georgia’s Environmental Protection 
Division (EPD) set up a program that monitored and policed industrial discharges, which 
helped stem many of the most egregious corporate polluters.  Yet in spite of obvious 
improvements, particularly in the Chattahoochee corridor, pollution remained an 
enormous problem, especially for the region’s smaller rivers and tributaries.  For 
instance, in the driest part of the summer, up to 90 percent of the water that flowed down 
the South River, a tributary of the Ocmulgee River that drains small portions of both the 
city of Atlanta and Dekalb County’s wastewater treatment systems, was comprised of 
post-treatment plant effluent.48 Such a level is unsuitable for human consumption, or even 
human contact, beyond any effect on the fauna of the river.  
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In 1975, Senator Eliott Levitas introduced a bill into the Georgia General 
Assembly that created the state’s first comprehensive erosion and sedimentation policies.  
Supported by the newly seated Governor George Busby and passed by a wide margin in 
both the senate and the house, the erosion act established new standards for development 
along the state’s waterways and reinforced EPD’s water monitoring program.  The act 
also necessitated modifications to the Metropolitan River Protection Act, strengthening 
the authority of ARC’s development reviews and making willful noncompliance on the 
part of local governments more difficult.  The changes to river protection legislation that 
accompanied passage of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act (1975) required governing 
bodies, in addition to a majority vote by the full membership, to obtain a written 
statement from the office of the director of the state Environmental Protection Division 
certifying that the plan provides a level of water protection equivalent to that offered by 
following the regulations in the Chattahoochee Corridor Plan, if they hoped to overturn 
one of ARC’s recommendations regarding a development proposal.49 Revisions to the act 
also more explicitly encouraged pre-proposal negotiations between developers, 
landowners, and ARC staff in order to reduce the likelihood of a potentially politically 
damaging confrontation between the commission and local elected officials.  This new 
role for the EPD, as an additional enforcer of ARC’s decision making authority, was due 
to changes wrought by the erosion act, but was also a result of ARC’s influence with key 
state leaders who helped push the state into a more involved role in water planning. 
After the regulations were put in place, the remaining major hurdle ARC and the 
state faced revolved around making the river act and associated water policies more 
difficult for local governments to circumvent.  Targeting erosion and sedimentation 
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offered a simple mechanism through which the river act could be strengthened and 
extended, without re-writing the law from scratch.  Soil erosion, often caused by 
negligent agriculture practices, had been a significant problem in Georgia for a number of 
years, but only by the middle-1960s (when the Water Quality Control Act was passed), as 
erosion caused by urban development practices was increasingly visible, did the state 
government find the political will to take the problem seriously.  The 1975 erosion act 
required the governing authorities of every county and municipality to adopt an ordinance 
to establish acceptable practices associated with land-disturbing activities, but it provided 
few precise guidelines.  Within a set of very general rules and regulations, act set a limit 
of two years for local governments to come up with their own erosion ordinance.50 For 
places that failed to develop their own standards, the EPD was directed to assume 
responsibility for developing and implementing its own regulations, to be written on a 
case-by-case basis, depending on the situation of the jurisdiction.  The new law also set 
up a permitting process, again with few specific state-level requirements; local 
governments had a great deal of leeway to design their own permits (as long as they did 
so).  Any property owner proposing land-disturbing activities now would be required to 
secure a permit from the governing body, which in turn would submit the permit 
applications to the district office of the state soil conservation service for final review.  
The discrepancies between soil disturbing permits and erosion ordinances together meant 
ordinances and permits would likely vary by jurisdiction, at least to a certain extent.  
Notwithstanding local variability in the details of regulations, the state’s decision to 
require ordinances and permits in the first place was the critical step in the regulation 
process.  As if by natural accretion, each new regulation added a brick to the regulatory 
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framework that slowly engulfed the region.  Each regulation offered additional exposure 
and recognition to the issue, eventually reaching the point that simply ignoring the effects 
of planning and development on watersheds was no longer plausible. 
Together, the Chattahoochee River Corridor Plan, Metropolitan River Protection 
Act, and Erosion and Sedimentation Act, fomented by the Atlanta Study and the federal 
studies that preceded it, formed a firm legal footing for the development of the two most 
comprehensive and forward reaching water resource plans the Atlanta region had yet 
seen.  Published as companion pieces in 1976, the Water Supply Plan for the Atlanta 
Region and the Atlanta Region Areawide Wastewater Management Plan envisioned a 
dramatically expanded role for ARC’s umbrella in terms of water resource planning 
activities.  Unlike many major U.S. cities, waste and supply share the same small source 
in Atlanta (the Chattahoochee River).  The fragility of this relationship makes the case 
strong for planning waste and supply simultaneously.  Though fruits of the Atlanta Study, 
ARC’s water supply and wastewater plans were also designed to be consistent with the 
general recommendations for water resource management contained in the 1975 RDP, 
but provide much greater depth and detail, and shine a light on the complexity of the 
relationship between the twin problems of supply and disposal.  Both plans also served to 
thoroughly catalogue issues related to water resources, using data gathered as part of the 
Atlanta Study, many of which had previously been identified but not effectively 
documented and described.  But beyond being a mere encyclopedia of issues, the plans 
also forwarded and amplified a set of specific ideas for managing available water 
resources that would resonate through the region for years to come.   
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 Following a style of thinking that had been standard intellectual practice in 
regional planning circles (drawing inspiration from the 1929 Regional Plan of New 
York), the analysis of the region’s supplies at the center of the water supply plan was 
built on an extensive data gathering and compilation effort.  The plan included 
characterizations of existing water sources, projections of future demand, and 
calculations of the amount, and potential sources, of water needed to sustain the region’s 
expected growth.  But the plan also included several important recommendations (some 
of which had appeared in other report), concerning the reclassification of Lake Lanier 
into a water supply and recreation source and further changes to Georgia’s water laws.51 
Adding water supply to the list of functions of the lake would open a large and reliable 
additional water source for the region’s water delivery systems and primary water 
wholesalers to other jurisdictions (Atlanta, Cobb, Dekalb, Gwinnett).  Rewriting the 
state’s water laws would standardize and clarify who has rights to water and what those 
rights entail.  Other suggestions tended toward smaller concrete actions, including 
reducing water consumption through better conservation, improving connections between 
systems (redundancy), exploring groundwater sources, expanding off-stream storage 
capacity, and limiting development near critical water supplies. 
 The wastewater management plan, prepared and published with the water supply 
plan in June 1976, used a different structure to convey its message, but reiterated ideas in 
the supply plan in the thrust of its recommendations.  Because wastewater was the 
primary subject of the Clean Water Act and the funds it released, specifically through 
section 201 of the act, the level of federal involvement was considerably greater in 
planning and building wastewater infrastructure that in water supply, and reached more 
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directly down into the affairs of local government.  Per the requirements of section 201, a 
few local governments had begun to develop their own wastewater facility plans by the 
time ARC’s wastewater plan was underway.  In an effort to ensure compatibility between 
its own plans and those of its constituent governments, ARC used these local plans in the 
regional process.  In contrast to the top-down structure of the water supply plan, the area 
wastewater plan looked more like a bottom-up approach.  The plan borrowed a range of 
policies from the constituent plans, including enhancing the level of effluent treatment 
(through updated technology), expanding the area available for land treatment (including 
recycling effluent), consolidating treatment facilities, increasing cooperation among area 
governments, and expanding service areas.52  
At the time it was published, point source pollution was the primary front in the 
war on water quality, and, accordingly, ARC’s wastewater plan focused on point sources 
of pollution.  But as the plan was being published, the specter of nonpoint source 
pollution as a quiet but major contributor to the future degradation of urban watersheds 
loomed just over the horizon.  In the context of a regional wastewater plan designed to 
reduce watershed pollution, non-point sources presented a dilemma to achieving a 
reduction in part because the agencies, like ARC, in charge of developing regional 
wastewater plans lacked reliable data to accurately measure or evaluate the impact of 
runoff.53 Not to mention the overall imprecision of the tools available to land developers 
and governments to reduce the problems caused by nonpoint sources.  Only later would 
techniques sophisticated enough to measure the extent of nonpoint source pollution 
emerge that could be deployed on a regional scale. 
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A Region Leads A State 
As state water policies became more sophisticated, they formed an important 
feedback loop with ARC’s regional water planning process, each influencing the other.  
As Atlanta’s impact on the quality of the state’s waters had become unavoidable, the 
areawide water resource plans influenced subsequent action on the part of the State.  The 
water supply plan helped pave the way for re-writing water withdrawal legislation 
(formally moving the state away from existing riparian doctrine), while the state 
Environmental Protection Division used the wastewater plan to guide the issuance of 
waste discharge permits.54 Both plans were important inputs into the creation of new 
publicly protected recreation areas. 
Coming on the heals of the 1976 regional water plans, the 1977 Georgia Surface 
Water Management Act codified the state’s authority over any municipal or private 
withdrawals from surface waters in excess of 100,000 gallons per day.  The legislation 
was largely directed at metro Atlanta, where conflicts over rights to withdrawal cast a 
pall over the entire Chattahoochee-Flint-Apalachicola Basin, the source of the water 
rights dispute between Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.  Because North Georgia lacked 
significant underground aquifers, surface waters offered the only substantial source of 
fresh water for metropolitan Atlanta.  Yet state policies encouraging breakneck economic 
growth, mushrooming residential developments competing with offices and industrial 
parks for water supply, set a course for continuing conflict across the region.  As a result 
of a sharply limited supply of surface water and a growing demand, most all major 
industries and municipal authorities were swept up in the legislation, which required 
them to apply for a withdrawal permit from the state Environmental Protection Division 
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(EPD).  According to the act, the character of permits would be established on a case-by-
case basis, giving EPD the power to tailor the amount of water individual agencies would 
be allowed to legally withdraw, without tying its hands in future cases.  More 
importantly, EPD would have the authority to deny an application for increased 
withdrawals if it determined that a water source was over-subscribed. 
At the same time, as federal interest in the allocation of the state’s surface waters, 
especially the Chattahoochee, had become more widely known, the local office of the 
Justice Department began taking aggressive action to get a handle on development along 
the river.  The fruits of this effort was a bill supported by local river advocacy groups, 
including the Friends of the River, ARC, Jimmy Carter (as both governor and president), 
and a collection of elected officials, to create a long, spindly national recreation area that 
overlapped the 48-mile stretch of river governed by the Metropolitan River Protection 
Act.  The legislation was introduced by fifth district Rep. Andrew Young in the waning 
days of the 1976 session of the U.S. House.  At first meeting resistance in the House from 
one of Young’s fellow Georgia delegation members, Larry McDonald, a Cobb County 
Republican, and apathy among other members of the House Rules Committee, the bill 
did not pass until 1978, when it actively supported by President Carter.55 The result was a 
permanently protected, 9,000 acre recreation area that snaked through some of metro 
Atlanta’s toniest neighborhoods. 
By the middle of 1981, the major work in the Atlanta Study was drawing to a 
close.  If the report had a headline, it was the conclusion that with proper management, 
the Chattahoochee could easily meet the region’s water demands until at least 1990, and 
likely until the year 2000.56 But beyond that, the plan offered fee specific, immediately 
 182 
implementable recommendations.  Among the recommendations that were issued was 
reclassifying Lake Lanier as a recreational water body and developing a specific 
reregulation plan for waters below the lake (a new dam, about 25 miles below the Buford 
Dam, was proposed but later dropped from consideration because of shifts in river 
management priorities).   
Despite the paucity of concrete recommendations, the influence of the study was 
significant because it convened an array of parties around the same issue, it afforded a 
large-scale data gathering effort, and it resulted in a number of significant spin-off 
studies, plans, and policies.   
As I’ve described, both of ARC’s regional water plans (water supply and 
wastewater) were spun off the Atlanta Study, as well as the state’s surface water and 
waste discharge legislation.  Less well known were a corollary study of water resources 
for four counties south of Atlanta (Coweta, Fayette, Henry, Spalding) that highlighted 
looming water supply issues, and offered strategies for dealing with a possible wave of 
population growth (several of which were implemented).  And a separate flood reduction 
study for Peachtree Creek and Nancy Creek, both which flow through the most densely-
built parts of the region, provided guidance for evacuation and flood proofing 
requirements for structures near the floodplain that could be affected.  But as much as 
anything, the years of the Atlanta Study were a watershed period of inter-governmental 
coordination and action involving water planning issues.  By virtue of the involvement of 
so many agencies in a single project, water resource planning in the state received a vital 
boost.  The interactions during the story created a certain consistency of understanding 
among local planners and natural resource specialists (even if elected officials often 
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lacked the same understanding).  As these planners later moved within agencies around 
the region, they took this experience with them, extending the reach of the ideas 
generated in the study for a number of years into the future. 
The legacy of the actions of the organizations involved in forming state and 
regional water policies is visible in the urban landscape, yet there was no single moment 
or crisis that attracted widespread attention that shaped the plans and regulations that 
created the landscape.  Rather, water policy was formed by slow accumulation over a 
number of years, making it hard to see exactly when and where important changes 
happened.  As Atlanta’s population grew during the 1980s and 1990s, the total amount of 
freshwater available to supply development did not change appreciably, though a few 
reservoirs were constructed to help regulate water supply in counties in the southern half 
of the region (recommendations of the Atlanta Study).  How a limited supply of a critical 
resource could accommodate so much new demand lay in the confluence of supply 
technology, recreational activism, management, and a bit of luck.  Despite long-standing 
claims that the region’s water supply would run well short of anticipated demand, the day 
the region’s millions of faucets ran dry never materialized.  Water remained apparently 
plentiful.  To be sure, technological advancements helped push improved efficiency of 
water delivery infrastructure.  New water pipes suffered fewer leaks and less frequent 
breeches.  Building standards, at the local, state, and national level, required adoption of 
low-flow water fixtures, and laws governing the manufacture of common water-using 
appliances stipulated increased efficiency.  These factors held per capita water usage 
stable, even as total demand grew.  But by themselves, technologies of efficiency cannot 
 184 
account for how Atlanta’s water has been able to accommodate such astounding growth 
during the last three decades (3.5 million additional people).  
 Neither can the activities of citizens groups nor the array of small organizations 
that sprung up to support various levels of resource conservation be credited with 
dramatically altering the allocation or management of water resources.  The efforts of 
these groups, the Friends of the River most prominently, helped raise awareness of some 
of the issues facing the river, especially pollution, and they helped pressure politicians in 
some cases.  Yet water management in the wake of the Clean Water Act had become a 
complex endeavor that community-based groups could not easily engage.  They tended to 
pick their battles, along criteria that were visible and close to home.  Thus their rather 
prominent role in pushing for the establishment of a national recreation area along an 
urban stretch of the river exemplifies how the amenity function of the river was put ahead 
of its status as a water source, and made for a compelling media story.  In this way, 
developers and recreationalists were battling over one comparatively minor function of 
the river.  Developers saw the river as a natural amenity that would enhance the value of 
future building projects.  Existing homeowners and recreationalists also saw the river as 
an amenity, but one in which less development increased the value of their existing 
investments. 
During these years, North Georgia avoided the kind of massive, extended drought 
that would have reduced water flow in the Chattahoochee and drained Lake Lanier.  
While most water resource engineers and climate researchers recognized the distinct 
possibility of a worst-case scenario drought befalling the state, and duly warned Atlanta’s 
political leaders, rainfall kept the river flowing.  Models show that an extended drought 
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would wreck havoc on the region’s water supply systems.  Various plans for new 
reservoirs were laid, but most of the proposed lakes were never built.  With the exception 
of a brief drought in the early 1980s, Atlanta simply got lucky.  
While public recognition of the river as a special amenity was important to 
drawing attention to its fragility and importance, the supporting actions of ARC and the 
state brought necessary resources to help sustain the river as a primary water resource for 
the region.  Water resource management in the state of Georgia underwent nothing short 
of a (quiet) revolution in the 1970s.57 Driven both by top-down changes in federal water 
policy and pressure bubbling up from different corners of metropolitan Atlanta, the 
state’s water policy was pulled out of an old system of riparian doctrine based in common 
law to a modern system that handed control over withdrawals and discharges to wildlife 
biologists, limnologists, and water resource engineers.  This change meant that at least in 
theory surface water in the state would be managed in a more systematic and predictable 
way, following along behind the development of state-of-the-art techniques and 
procedures.   
The planners and politicians at ARC played an important role in this 
transformation of water policy.  By virtue of its extensive participation in the Atlanta 
Study, its advocacy for and leading position in developing the Chattahoochee Corridor 
Plan, the Metropolitan River Protection Act, and the region-wide water supply and 
wastewater plans, the Commission assumed much of the responsibility of setting the 
stage for the state’s new water policy.  ARC used its influence in the state legislature to 
help shape state-level water regulations so that they matched up with the interests of 
metro Atlanta.  The strange details buried in the regulations should not be overlooked.  
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Deep in the language of water policy were critical details that would influence how 
regulations could be interpreted and applied in real-world situations.58 While the media 
and the general public often ignored these details, which offered little visible human 
drama or made for good headlines, they were well known among planners, developers, 
and key politicians.   
A key feature of the regulations slowly worked out between ARC and the state 
was flexibility.  Flexibility gave both ARC and the state Environmental Protection 
Division wide latitude in determining how concrete policies would be crafted and what 
tools would be used for enforcement.  To a great extent, maintaining flexibility was 
critical to the success of instituting new water policy at all (as it was for implementing 
just about any policy that restricted land development rights).  Introducing expansive new 
regulations in a state with a historical legacy of hands off environmental policy required a 
broad base of support and a slow hand, especially if those regulations had any hope of 
being passed through the legislature and implemented.  One means of capturing such 
support was to include a wide array of stakeholders, even if they had apparently 
competing and conflicting agendas.  The trickiness of this arrangement gave local 
governments an opportunity to feel like they were negotiating a major role for 
themselves, and their political constituencies, in the process of policy development.  
Folding these interests into a coherent policy framework required a certain degree of 
enterprise on the part of the agencies behind the effort, which generally meant 
relinquishing control over some part of the implementation of regulations to local 
governing bodies.   
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Dividing control of implementing a policy among different hands has upsides and 
downsides, which in the case of Atlanta and Georgia have been particularly visible with 
enforcement procedures.  Enforcing environmental policy usually depends on local 
surveillance, which almost by definition needs to be precise and diligent.  That’s because 
land development at the level of the parcel is in reality comprised of a series of discrete 
operations, carried out separately but usually overlapping, often by different contractors, 
in the course of a short time.  These activities include surveying, ground clearing, 
grading, foundation pouring, framing, wiring, plumbing, roofing, finishing, and 
landscaping.  In terms of potential environmental side effects, the earth moving activities 
at the beginning and end of the process often define how successful on-site mitigation has 
been, but what happens in between can be equally problematic.  Without good baseline 
data and a timely follow up by agents of the regulating authority, evaluating changes to 
sensitive land can be difficult, and permanent alterations can occur quickly and without 
much notice.  The minor violations of environmental regulations that add up to major 
damages over time can only be detected by vigilant observation, a prospect complicated 
any time there is a condition of divided control (i.e. the agency that develops the 
regulations is not the agency that enforces them). 
 
Widening Scope 
Despite its shortcomings, water policy was another important moment in ARC’s 
growth and maturation as an agency.  By virtue of its wedge position between federal 
regulations, state laws, and local conversations about what the region’s riparian future 
should be, ARC found another way to assert its legitimacy and establish a central role for 
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itself among the region’s pantheon of planning agencies and interest groups.  By taking 
up the mantle of regional water policy, the Commission strengthened its power to write 
and promote policies it favored.  The role of the Commission in water issues also 
underscored the importance of the regional focus of federal policy during the 1970s.  The 
string of new federal policies introduced during the decade, which included 
intergovernmental coordination, transportation, water, and air quality, either reinforced 
existing regionalist policies or created new programs that were designed to expand the 
duties of regional agencies.  This policy push aided ARC’s ability to serve as a regional 
information broker, convening parties around an issue (or set of issues) as the need arose.  
This role provided an official foundation and leverage for transmitting ideas to municipal 
bodies within the commission’s jurisdiction and for encouraging their implementation.   
Advances in water resource management in the 1970s introduced an important 
new dimension to regional planning in metropolitan Atlanta, one that would ultimately 
lead to the passage of mandatory comprehensive land use planning legislation in the 
second half of the 1980s.  The importance of connecting environmental regulations (and 
water more specifically) to land use planning cannot be understated.  In the early 1970s, 
the problem of watershed planning, particularly in urban and suburban areas, was 
beginning to challenge existing development practices across the country.  The volume of 
debate in the U.S. Congress over the implementation of a national land use program, 
though having produced no signed legislation to show for the effort, indicated an 
approach to land use that leaned on existing water protection regulations for support.59 
With money available to attack water pollution, and enhanced tools to more precisely 
measure the levels of degradation of water sources, hitching the discussion of land use to 
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water quality made strategic sense.  Water supply was after all critical infrastructure, a 
prerequisite for urbanization of any scale.  When a few states began to take up the cause 
of making land use planning an important state government function, they did so also by 
leaning on the issue of water quality. 
By the early 1980s, the idea of state-mandated land use planning had achieved a 
significant measure of support among metro-area legislators, and a few key officials from 
the rural counties that form a ragged fringe around Atlanta, one of who would be elected 
Governor in 1982.  His election was the beginning of a slow elevation of the level of state 
involvement in water, air, and land use policy, even as the federal government was 
concomitantly in the process of deregulating industry and attempting to undermine many 
of the planning and regulation programs erected during the 1960s and 1970s.  Yet at the 
start of 1990, Georgia had entered officially the ranks of so-called growth management 
states, an odd distinction for a place that was widely perceived as a backwater free-for-all 
for land developers.  The role of ARC and its regional agenda in bringing mandatory 
comprehensive development planning to the entire state highlighted again the quiet 
power of the Commission and the lessons learned during attempts to exercise a form of 
coordinated regional planning in Atlanta. 
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When the returns from the 1980 Presidential election were in, Ronald Reagan 
stood atop a ten percent margin in the popular vote.  In defeating Jimmy Carter, Reagan 
had won outright the popular vote in all but six states, leading to a landslide victory in the 
Electoral College and dealing Carter one of the worst defeats of an incumbent president 
in the twentieth century.  The patron of administrative reform, and Georgia’s first and 
only President, was sent packing back to Atlanta.  Reagan’s self-proclaimed revolution 
officially kicked off January 20, 1981, when he uttered a few words in his inaugural 
address that would resonate throughout the next eight years: “government is not the 
solution to the problem; government is the problem.”1 When Reagan signed Executive 
Order 12372 in 1982, rescinding OMB Circular A-95 and restating the way the federal 
government should interact with local governments, his assault on the federal role in the 
public sphere reached all the way down into the internal workings of the nation’s regional 
planning agencies.2 
 As Reagan worked to quash the remaining vestiges of the New Deal legacy, 
returns from the 1980 Census showed that the demographic shifts that had began to 
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define urban life in the United States in the 1960s had continued unabated through the 
1970s.3 Though the long term migration of blacks out of the former confederate states 
appeared to be slowing down, the draining of large central cities of middle and working 
class whites showed little indication of reversal.  Bolstered by the completion of the vast 
majority of the urban segments of the Interstate Highway system, people and jobs were 
leaving the urban core at a remarkable rate.4 In many places, there was little to stop them, 
and conversely much to encourage them.  New houses on the periphery tended to be 
affordable and accessible to those with adequate means.  Long distance automobile 
commuting suffered from little of the gridlock that would later come to characterize the 
life of the hapless suburban commuter.  The journey from home to work in most places 
remained quick and painless.  With jobs and housing and a cache of social institutions 
rapidly developing, picking up an entire household and reconstituting it along the urban 
fringe without missing a beat was easier than ever.  As might be expected, suburbs 
ringing large central cities were booming.5 
 The 1970s had seen, in addition to the standard list of political and economic 
catastrophes, a number of innovations and policy changes that profoundly influenced the 
practice of regional planning. The Federal Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 
had instructed the Office of Management and Budget to set up the A-95 review program, 
an interlocking set of regulations that was intended to more firmly tie the actions of local 
governments to broader federal policies.  In practice, the program worked like a prism, 
requiring local governments in urban areas to subject applications for federal financial 
assistance to a review by the area’s designated regional planning agency, which would 
then package the application and the review and send it to Washington for a final 
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decision.  The act was designed to sync with existing requirements for intra-agency 
review that had become standard practice in a number of federal agencies by the early 
1970s.6  
At the same time, the activities required of regional planning agencies had 
become considerably broader, encompassing individual environmental and transportation 
programs as well as the ways those policies interacted.  The 1972 Federal Water 
Pollution Control Amendments (Clean Water Act), which opened new funding sources 
for building wastewater infrastructure, mandated the involvement of regional planning 
agencies, and helped push more coordination in the area of water resource planning.7 
Changes to federal transportation policy in 1970, 1973, and 1975 had broadened the role 
of regional planning agencies in a number of ways.  The revisions established a federal 
urban highway system, mandated more consultation between federal, regional, and local 
agencies, required compliance with stipulations in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, 
and opened the Highway Trust Fund to mass transit expenditures (at the discretion of the 
state/regional agencies responsible for distributing funds).8  
 Leveraging the publicity stemming from the Congressional debates over Senator 
Henry Jackson’s bill to establish a national land use law, new planning initiatives 
appeared in a number of different places (though in most cases resulted in no legislation) 
and opened conversations about the shape future development should take.  While the 
national land use bill never made it to law, the debates surrounding the bill highlighted an 
array of issues that would prove important to subsequent state-level efforts to institute 
comprehensive planning laws.9 Driven in part by the evolving environmental movement, 
state-level planning initiatives capitalized on growing citizen interest in and 
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understanding of environmental issues, and concomitant discontent with the impact of 
urban development on fragile natural resources.10 The introduction of mandatory 
comprehensive planning laws in Oregon in 1973 offered a demonstration of an aggressive 
new stance toward regional and local planning.   
Oregon’s law, with its relatively strict and top-down requirements, presented one 
model for how states might take a leading role in the control of land development, a 
model that was oriented toward preserving valuable agricultural land and organized 
growth controls around a collection of regional planning agencies.  The comprehensive 
reach of the Oregon law meant that no county or municipality was exempt.  Every 
jurisdiction was required to prepare a plan and submit it for state approval.  In some 
respects, Oregon’s law could be read as a state’s response to the federal regulatory 
buildup of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it could also be read as a necessary step 
toward filling the void that would be left behind when the failure of national land use 
policy began to appear imminent.11  
As a few other states moved to deal with the issue of land use control, Georgia 
embarked on its own rather lengthy journey to restructure the relationship between the 
federal government, state bureaucracy, and local governments.  The bill the General 
Assembly passed that came to be known as the Georgia Planning Act (GPA) had its 
origin in the early 1970s during Governor Jimmy Carter’s attempts to streamline and 
professionalize the state’s public bureaucracy.  As part of Carter’s wide-ranging effort to 
reorganize state government, a new Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and a 
substantially reconfigured Department of Community Affairs (DCA) emerged.  In the 
process, Carter also created a temporary growth and planning commission, charged with 
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developing a strategy for writing a state land use planning law that would fit the 
requirements of the national land use policy that was then being debated in Congress (and 
many hoped would pass).12 While Carter’s growth commission failed to produce 
workable legislation, the idea had long legs.   
After years of debate, comprehensive planning legislation was finally signed into 
law in the summer of 1989.  By that time, the state had firmly established its authority 
over water and air quality and had built a comprehensive framework of regional 
development authorities (the Atlanta Regional Commission being the crown jewel).  The 
authority of the planning act branched out from this regulatory base, leveraging existing 
water laws and using the twelve regional development authorities as a crucial middle-
ground, and mined ARC for intellectual capital.  Surface water protection laws provided 
entree for the state to stake its authority and interest in local planning, but the regional 
development agencies provided the necessary organizational infrastructure for getting the 
legislation off the ground, building up a critical mass of planning expertise, and 
implementing the resulting policies. 
As the largest and most capable regional planning agency in the state, the Atlanta 
Regional Commission played a critical behind the scenes role in the development of laws 
that comprised the Georgia Planning Act.  The process of local plan reviews the 
Commission learned to perform during the 1970s formed the heart of the regulations 
contained in the final version of the GPA.  The standards by which local plans would be 
reviewed were developed and tested by ARC in its jurisdictions, and the substantive 
information that would form the basis of local plans was developed and promulgated by 
Commission planners.  State legislators with close connections to ARC and the 
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metropolitan area were responsible for introducing state planning legislation and ushering 
it through the General Assembly, and Joe Frank Harris, the Governor who signed the 
GPA into law, had been an important supporter of creating a more comprehensive 
regional planning agency in metropolitan Atlanta in the days surrounding the creation of 
ARC.  Together these factors underscore the long-term role the Commission played in 
brokering planning in metropolitan Atlanta, its position in managing inter-governmental 
coordination, and in encouraging the bringing forth of state power to issues of land 
development. 
 
The A-95 Program 
When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act 
in the summer of 1968, and immediately directed the Office of Management and Budget 
to bring forth a set of guidelines to implement the new law, the country was in the middle 
of a vast expansion of federal oversight of local and state government activities related to 
land development.  Having recently experienced the problems of local and state 
compliance with federal policy during the crest of the Civil Rights movement, Johnson’s 
administration understood that directing large quantities of program-specific money from 
federal agencies to local governments would likely prove to be rife with potential for 
mismanagement and abuse.  Hence the terrifically complex factors affecting the condition 
of the built environment sparked a rather lengthy discussion of how the federal 
government should manage the nation’s increasingly problematic metropolitan landscape 
and head off potential political roadblocks. 
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The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) had issued a 
series of reports beginning in the mid-1960s arguing that a more stable framework for 
managing and implementing federal programs was needed, particularly those involving 
the distribution of funds for planning and building infrastructure (which was reaching a 
crescendo).  Examining the condition of local and state building codes, the fiscal 
relationships between central cities and suburbs, and recent episodes of urban unrest, the 
ACIR reports collectively provided a critical examination of the state of American 
government.13 Because the ACIR worked closely with Congress and the President, the 
sense of crisis in the reports was able to reach the highest political levels.  In its 1968 
annual report to Congress, the ACIR forcibly asserted that the “American political system 
- and in turn federalism and the federal system - was on trial as never before in the 
Nation’s history with the sole exception of the Civil War.”14 The report argued that the 
mushrooming poverty afflicting the nation’s urban areas stemmed largely from the 
manipulation of federal policies by the decision-making bodies of local governments, and 
that the federal and state role in dealing with iniquities between and within metropolitan 
regions deserved serious reconsideration.  The primary recommendation the report made 
to the 90th Congress was to pass the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, a bill previously 
introduced by Senator Edmund Muskie in 1966 and 1967 but had failed to pass.  Intended 
to restructure intra-government relationships as a step toward finding solutions to the 
national crisis, the bill was based on ideas accumulated in over several different ACIR 
reports.  It was designed to operationalize the recommendations of those reports 
concerning the disbursement of federal grants and land acquisition policy.  
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Upon passage of the Act, the President directed OMB to come up with a way to 
codify the array of issues contained in the new law, the result being the issuance of 
Circular A-95 in 1969.  A document written to explain in detail how coordination among 
different levels of government should unfold, the circular was also designed to publicize 
the new statues upon which its authority rested.  The A-95 program was premised on the 
idea that communication is the critical piece of coordination, and that forcing different 
levels of government to communicate would have the effect of increasing cooperation, 
while leaving specific details about what constitutes cooperation up to the affected 
parties.  At issue were the procedures for distributing the largesse of the growing number 
of federal grant programs pumping money from federal coffers into state and local 
agencies.  While these kinds of dry procedural activities rarely receive much attention in 
the media, the circular was nevertheless an important effort to bring focus to the 
background issues of coordination among different levels of government, especially the 
pathways through which federal agencies interact with the state and local governments 
that were largely responsible for overseeing the implementation of urban policy.  With 
the glut of new federal policies, and almost every one with a different set of requirements 
that local and state governments would be expected to meet, what had been a slow 
breakdown of communication among the dizzying array of bureaucratic arms turned into 
a rather acute situation of confusion and acrimony.15 
 The response the A-95 program offered was to reposition (or promote) regional 
planning agencies as the primary point of contact between federal programs and 
state/local recipients. Among the specific provisions contained in the circular, two most 
clearly signaled the change in status of metropolitan planning organizations.  One was the 
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wholesale expansion of the grant review function that had been instituted by the Model 
Cities Act in 1966 and reinforced in the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969.16 In 
order to qualify for Model Cities funds, metropolitan areas had to designate a regional 
planning agency to review all local applications for funding.  If an agency already 
existed, it need only be designated; if none existed, an agency had to be created whole 
cloth.  Without a review agency in place, metropolitan area governments would be cut off 
from receiving Model Cities funds.  NEPA now would require sign-off by the regional 
agency on all local government applications for funds to construct water treatment 
facilities.  The A-95 circular reinvigorated and expanded the review functions that 
substate regional planning agencies would be required to take on, providing additional 
structure to the process of how reviews of funding requests should proceed. 
  The second was something called the Project Notification and Review System, 
which required state and regional governments to comment on virtually all grant 
applications for federal funds related to physical development (i.e. infrastructure) and 
human resources filed by constitute local governments. Serving both an early-warning 
function and a forum for conversations across jurisdictional lines, the notification system 
underscored and reinforced the existing clearinghouse function of regional planning 
agencies.  Other important parts of the circular explicitly (strongly) encouraged each state 
to establish a system of substate planning districts that would provide a consistent, 
overlapping administrative framework for channeling money and information between 
federal, state, and local development programs.17 While the Act did not specify precisely 
how program reviews would operate, it did mandate the federal grant programs that were 
to be included in the review process and the chain of interactions that needed to occur for 
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a sufficient review to take place.  It also included suggestions for the subject matter that 
review comments and recommendations should consider.  These requirements implicitly 
structured at least some of the characteristics the review agencies would need to possess, 
at the very least in terms of staff expertise and capacity.  Together, these rules and 
requirements privileged the regionalist perspective and regional planning organizations.  
Revisions to the circular occurred during the 1970s, changes which increased the number 
of federal programs requiring review and made civil rights and environmental concerns 
more explicit parts of the review process.18 And these revisions would also have a direct 
bearing on the origin of the Georgia Planning Act. 
Though it was around for only a dozen years, the overall efficacy of the A-95 
program, and its affect on regional planning agencies and the metropolitan landscape, 
became the subject of a great deal of internal discussion, the topic of a number of ACIR 
and OMB reports and evaluations over the course of the 1970s.19 Yet even by 1980, 
consensus on the effect the program was having on intergovernmental relations remained 
elusive.  For its part, Atlanta’s regional planning agency praised the program’s ability to 
improve and organize communication among local governments.20 Other observers 
contended that substate regional planning had “moderated the effects of fragmentation, if 
not the fragmentation itself,” yet most agreed that in spite of the reforms, “federal 
regional policies remain[ed] complex.”21 Though the number of federal programs 
covered under A-95 continued to grow during the 1970s, the perceived ability of the 
program to cut through the confusion of so many different sources of funds and policies 
remained suspect in the eyes of many.  Overall federal interest in substate regional 
coordination had certainly grown, but evidence persisted that indicated that federal policy 
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remained split between supporting multi-purpose regional clearinghouse agencies and 
specialized, single purpose programs, an indication that the A-95 program was not doing 
everything that it should.22  
 
National Land Use Debates 
 Beginning in 1970, a well-publicized debate unfolded in Congress over whether 
the U.S. needed a comprehensive national land use policy.  The consensus among most 
researchers and policy analysts and a number of politicians was that controlling land use 
should become a critical part of the conversation about how to get a handle on two other 
significant problems associated with urban development patterns: environmental 
degradation and socio-economic inequality.23 The seriousness of the issue could be seen 
most readily in the efforts of Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington), chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to bring a comprehensive national land 
use bill to the floor of the Senate between 1970 and 1974.  Writing in 1972, Senator 
Jackson claimed that, “environmental crises, energy crises, indeed most of the domestic 
crises with which the media confront us, can be traced to decisions as to how our land is 
used.” When the Nixon Administration responded by offering its own version of a land 
use bill, it became clear that a public debated about a “national land use crisis” was in the 
offing.24  
In terms of the federal involvement with the forces that shape the national 
landscape, engaging land use was envisioned as the final point of a feedback triangle, the 
first two being transportation and the natural environment.  In the post-war period, 
federal policy had extended its reach into transportation infrastructure planning and made 
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significant headway into environmental protection, particularly water resource planning, 
but the issue of direct federal incursion into land use and land development had been 
more or less submerged since the 1930s.25 But as the rising environmental movement 
brought attention to the often severe externalities associated with modern land 
development practices, and the overall growth in the extent of development along the 
urban fringe, how land should be used looked to be an unavoidable federal issue.26  
The context in which the debate about an umbrella land use bill was framed in 
part by the recent proliferation of federal policies that touched land use issues in indirect 
ways.  Both Jackson’s bill and the Nixon Administration’s counter were built around the 
idea of reforming the state and local decision-making context, one that would help build a 
bank of planning expertise and data.  Both bills played off fears of compromised 
environmental quality.  Both proposed using federal grants-in-aid to designate a system 
of state-level land use planning agencies as instruments of delivery.  Both were fiercely 
debated.27  
But while the administration backed bill would have created a relatively passive 
law, one that was largely decentralized and would have provided the opportunity for state 
designated land use planning agencies to apply for planning funds from the Department 
of the Interior to develop and implement their own land use plans, Jackson’s drafts went 
much further toward creating an active administrative infrastructure.  His bill called for 
the establishment of a permanent land use council, which would include the Vice 
President and Cabinet Secretaries, which would oversee the nation’s land and water 
resources at the highest political level.  The council Jackson’s proposal envisioned would 
fund on-going study of national land use patterns, coordination of federal planning 
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programs, national water supply, and river basin protection, reported periodically to the 
President and Congress.  Other details included establishing a collection of river basin 
commissions and an explicit national land use policy backed up by a program to provide 
grants to state and regional planning agencies.  The council would also be responsible for 
reviewing state land use plans and compiling and maintaining a national land use 
database.28   
The debate over the competing national land use policies lasted through four full 
sessions of Congress.  After legislative impasse in 1970 and 1971, in 1972 and again in 
1973 a compromise bill that attempted to combine the concerns of both Jackson and the 
Administration was introduced and passed in the Senate only to founder in the more 
scabrous environment of the House.  By the time the compromise bill was introduced for 
the last time early in the 1974 session, it had been scaled down to rather modest 
proportions.  But even with the exclusion of serious penalties for states that refused to 
adopt sufficient land use controls, and reducing the federal role largely to overseeing the 
distribution of grants to the states, opposition to national land use policy remained just 
staunch enough to prevent the bill from passing.  With the sudden resignation of Nixon 
and the competing demands of the energy crisis and economic inflation, as well as 
Jackson’s decision to seek the Democratic Party presidential nomination in 1976, the 
remaining momentum behind the land use bill dissipated.  Though Carter Administration 
brought a background and interest in the role of land use in sustaining the environment, 
by the time Carter took office in 1977 the national conversation had moved off in other 
directions, responding to matters that appeared more pressing.29 
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In some ways, the failure to pass an explicit national land use planning policy 
helped undercut the long-term fate of the A-95 program.  The review and comment 
process that the circular mandated would have received a significant boost from a 
national land use policy that required states to demonstrate that their planning efforts 
were coordinated with the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, the HUD 701 program, as 
well as the array of federal transportation planning programs, all of which were subject to 
the A-95 review process.  This is not to say that the review program could not succeed 
without the national land use policy, but that the failure of the land use legislation robbed 
the review program of a power that would have made subsequent attempts to suspend it 
difficult.  As part of a thicket of regulations that attempted to direct a substantial number 
of federal domestic policies into a regional framework (even if it was a rather chaotic 
framework), a formal land use policy would have served as a particularly strong lever for 
a more thorough transformation of the practices of urban development.  It would have 
given intergovernmental coordination an extra stick with which to encourage closer 
cooperation of local and state governments. 
When Reagan rescinded Circular A-95 in July 1982, he removed an important leg 
from one of the most extensive federal efforts to encourage substate regional planning.  
While the words in Executive Order 12372 lacked the caustic edge that Reagan often 
used to describe (and denigrate) the work of the federal government, the document 
directed Federal agencies to “support State and local governments by discouraging the 
reauthorization or creation of any planning organization which is Federally-funded, 
which has a Federally-prescribed membership, which is established for a limited purpose, 
and which is not adequately representative of, or accountable to, State or local elected 
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officials.”30 By aiming to squelch federal support for planning organizations, and make 
those that already existed accountable to local elected officials, the order excised the 
heart of many of the regionally focused programs and policies created during the 
previous two decades, and took away the tools that regional agencies had used.  Aside 
from the political imperative of shrinking the federal government, disagreement about the 
effect of the A-95 program in reducing the overall complexity of the 200 plus federal 
grant programs that had a planning component and the methods used to guide local 
governments in obtaining and using funds from the programs, emerged as important parts 
of the argument for suspending the OMB circular.   
Giving state and local governments, especially local elected officials, more 
control over how federal programs would be operated and assistance would be allocated, 
ostensibly meant that top-down policies needed to be better tailored to the specific 
conditions of each place they touched, an idea with considerable political appeal. This 
was a core tenet of Reagan’s Federalism.31 But the effect of reducing federal oversight of 
and engagement in inter-governmental coordination efforts also left the door open for 
local governments to wield significant power in manipulating the goals of federal 
financial assistance programs to their own ends (precisely what the Intergovernmental 
Cooperation Act was created to combat).  Pulling the plug on the A-95 offered a 
comparatively easy demonstration of how the Reagan administration would go about 
redefining the role of the federal government without involving the Congress.  It also 
presented an opportunity to disrupt lingering coordination requirements attached to the 
Model Cities and Intergovernmental Cooperation Acts.  And it created a power void, 
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which would be filled by a motley variety of local laws, business coalitions, and non-
profit organizations.   
Absent clear federal leadership, the disputes among the different levels of 
government involved in the development process escalated during the 1980s, leading to 
what could be described as a partial re-assertion of authority by the states.  Moreover, the 
rise of state planning legislation came at the end of a period of general modernization of 
state government – the longer term fruit of efforts begun during the 1970s to reform 
bureaucracies and rewrite state constitutions.  The confluence of these trends meant that 
by the end of the 1980s, seven states had passed legislation that mandated some form of 
local land use planning, joining the ranks of Oregon and Hawaii, which had passed 
mandatory planning laws in 1961 and 1973, respectively.32 Though the programs differed 
from state to state in terms of the issues that should be included in the plans, the process 
of establishing compliance, the role of regional agencies, and the process of achieving 
coordination among local governments, the collective effect was to confront the problem 
of growth management at the point where the federal government had relinquished some 
of its authority.33 At the same time, the accumulating effects of growth and development 
continued to spill from one political jurisdiction to another, even as local governments 
were often unable or simply unwilling to deal with the consequences of their decisions.34  
Along with Georgia, the states that passed comprehensive planning legislation 
during the 1980s included Florida, New Jersey, Maine, Vermont, and Rhode Island.  
Each of the state programs adopted elements from Oregon’s genre-defining 1973 
planning act, and they all shared at least a few common characteristics, but as a result of 
the idiosyncrasies that invariably emerge from the legislative process, they also ended up 
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being sufficiently different enough from each other to present different models of how 
growth management can be structured.  As befits a source of inspiration, Oregon’s 
growth management laws reached further to restrict and control growth than any of the 
subsequent efforts, yet in many respects the basic form of Oregon’s law found its way 
into other state efforts.   
Perhaps what made the form of Oregon’s law inspiring was the clarity and 
straightforwardness of its regulations.  In simple terms, they mandated the preparation of 
local land use plans, established growth boundaries around the state’s cities, set up 
intermediary regional agencies, and provided a path for the state to enforce plans if local 
governments resisted.35 The law also established a statewide plan to which all local plans 
would be required to demonstrate consistency.  Utilizing the fragile resources of the 
Willamette Valley as a point of departure for establishing broader environmental 
protections across the entire state, Oregon created a state-centered, state-dominated 
model that combined local and regional planning, one that relied on public regional 
planning agencies, penalties, and legal proceedings to force compliance, with less room 
for cooperation.36  
Among the issues enunciated in the Oregon plan around which subsequent state 
efforts tended to diverge the most was the appropriate role of the state bureaucracy and 
methods of ensuring cooperation.  A politically sensitive issue in most places, state power 
was perhaps nowhere touchier than in Florida and Georgia.  Of the group of early growth 
management states, only these two could properly be called Sunbelt states, rapidly 
growing and harboring a social and political history seemingly hostile to virtually any 
kind of centralized land development regulations.  Both states had long bouts of 
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economic depression and domination by rural legislators.  Both had experienced 
sustained population influx beginning in the late 1940s, and comparatively meteoric rises 
in prosperity.  Both possessed extensive and fairly fragile surface water resources easily 
threatened by development.   
Florida moved first to devise an institutionalized response to the pressures of 
growth.  The state’s legislature kicked off what turned out to be a long process of 
building a comprehensive body of planning legislation in 1967 (pre-dating Oregon), and 
over the course of the next seventeen years passed a series of regulations to deal with the 
effects of growth.  The statues together formed a barrier of planning designed to create 
links across local, regional, and state governments.37 While Florida’s web of planning 
laws was complex, two comparatively simple features stand out.  One was the idea of 
identifying places with particularly fragile environmental characteristics (areas of critical 
state concern) and the other was targeting large-scale developments that had obvious, 
cross-jurisdictional impacts (developments of regional impact) for special 
consideration.38 Though used in only a few instances, areas of critical concern were 
meant to require heightened planning requirements tailored to sensitive environmental 
resources identified by the state’s community affairs department.  Developments of 
regional impact were projects that were expected to have effects (traffic, pollution) that 
crossed county boundaries, and thus required a more detailed review by regional planning 
agencies and the state.39 Conceptually, both critical concern areas and developments of 
regional impact have their origins in the broader environmental movement.  And both 
concepts came to play a role in the final form of Georgia’s planning legislation.   
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Jimmy Carter and the Idea of Growth Management 
When Jimmy Carter assumed the Governor’s office in January of 1971, he 
promised a number of changes to the way the state of Georgia would be administered.  
Carter had won the election by presenting himself as a post Civil Rights politician, a 
reformer who understood the necessity of modernizing the state’s political climate and 
rescuing Georgia from the grips of Lester Maddox and the old guard he represented.  In 
his first “State of the State” address, Carter noted not only his intention to end the politics 
of discrimination, but also his desire to streamline state government and improve the 
environment.  He claimed that there were “more than twenty agencies responsible for the 
inventory, preservation, conservation, utilization, enjoyment, and development of the our 
natural resources,” all of which exemplified “the need for reorganization of government.” 
By putting an agenda of reorganizing the state’s bureaucratic departments front and 
center in his administration, which would include natural resources, community affairs, 
and transportation, Carter took his role as an administrative reformer seriously.  The 
reorganization plan he presented called for a thorough rearrangement of the executive 
branch, including the creation of the state’s first department of natural resources, 
transforming the state highway department into a more robust department of 
transportation.40 Also included in this campaign for better government was Georgia’s 
response to the national land use policy debate.41 
By the middle of 1972, Carter’s efforts were showing clear payoffs.  At the end of 
the 1971 legislative session, he signed Act 5, creating the Atlanta Regional Commission.  
At the end of the 1972 session, he signed bills establishing the Georgia Department of 
Natural Resources and the Department of Transportation.  Carter supported and signed 
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the Metropolitan River Protection Act during the 1973 session, combining the efforts of 
ARC and the state to control development along a critical northern stretch of the 
Chattahoochee River.42 By the time Carter entered his third year in office, he could boast 
about his success in natural resource preservation.  With all this major legislation under 
his belt, in his third State of the State address Carter could proclaim that Georgia had “a 
unified, well planned and coordinated single department to enhance the protection, 
development, enjoyment, and use of our natural resources.”43 Continuing with his 
promise to transform the state’s role in the regulation of the environment, in 1974 he 
successfully pushed through additional funding for the DNR to be able to expand its 
inspection programs to enforce air and water quality regulations.  And as part of his 
legislative program for his final year in office, Carter proposed the creation of a 
commission to address planning and development.  As a unit within the Governor’s 
Office of Planning and Budget, Carter’s “Planned Growth Commission” would have 
supported greater involvement by the state in issues of land use and local planning.44 
But, despite previous success, the Governor’s commission struggled to find an 
effective public voice, coming on line just as the volume of the national land use debate 
in Congress was being muted, and just as Carter was focusing his eyes on a run for 
President.  As a result, the commission failed to generate much traction during the year of 
its existence.  Casting its prospects in a relatively modest light, the group’s chairman, 
Joel Cowan, a local planner turned developer who had spent a number of years working 
for the regional planning agency that predated ARC, as well as several local 
governments, suggested that the goal of the commission was simply establishing “an 
ongoing study process,” rather than producing concrete land use legislation.45 In spite of 
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its struggles to reach even a modest goal, the commission’s membership included several 
legislators and citizens who had played a significant role in the politics of metropolitan 
planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and several others who would go on to 
positions of influence in later efforts to institute growth management.  But the notion of 
the commission as a piece of a larger process that would promote change over time 
proved rather prescient, as one of the members of the commission, Joe Frank Harris, 
would go on to be elected governor in 1984 and oversee passage of the bills that would 
form the Georgia Planning Act. 
As Carter was leaving office, the state was in the midst of suffering from the same 
problems of energy supply, inflation, and unemployment that consumed the rest of the 
nation (and Carter’s subsequent term in the White House).46 Legislative efforts that might 
have supported statewide land use and development planning were subordinated to more 
pressing economic issues.  Bills that would have further reorganized the framework for 
transportation and environmental planning in metropolitan Atlanta failed to produce 
lasting change.  And Carter’s legacy of enthusiasm for administrative reform and 
environmental protection did not exactly make the transition to George Busbee, an 
experienced legislator who won the 1974 election for governor but who championed 
himself more as a reliable steward than an innovative leader.47 Nevertheless, the idea that 
the state should be more intensively involved in development planning had been planted, 
an important step even if it would not bear fruit until the next decade. 
 The journey from Jimmy Carter’s suggestion, in the twilight of his only term as 
governor, that Georgia needed an executive branch agency that would be directly 
involved in land use planning and local land development, to the passage of the bills that 
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became the Georgia Planning Act was, like every other part of this story, marked by a 
series of incremental steps, each moving the state a little bit closer to a more 
comprehensive view of its role in governing physical development.  Most of these small 
steps involved strengthening water and air quality regulations, which came down from 
the federal level in bits and pieces.  But in the small voids that often develop where levels 
of government come together, the realm of intergovernmental relations, the states 
assumed a significant role in the implementation of these laws, and within this wiggle 
room Georgia put together a series of erosion and sediment control acts, largely 
administered by DNR, that would form one of the pillars of later comprehensive planning 
legislation.  First placing land development regulations within the state agency 
responsible for monitoring and protecting the natural environment marked the beginning 
of an indirect approach to land use planning, lending a degree of authority and creating a 
source of financial support to an issue that had often proved politically unpopular.  
 With the change in gubernatorial administration in 1975, the visibility of 
environmental and land use planning issues was diminished, but certainly not 
vanquished.  Governor Busbee focused much of his political energy (spread over two 
consecutive terms, from 1975 until 1983) on reforming the state’s public education 
system and promoting economic development, an agenda not necessarily at odds with 
Carter’s administrative reforms, but one that valued gradual change and improving 
existing programs over deep transformation.48 Though lacking the kind of focused 
leadership that Carter had provided, between 1975 and 1980 the role of the state in 
planning for land development remained a fixture of discussion and debate within the 
Georgia General Assembly, even without the specter of major legislation.  Despite 
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Busbee’s relative disengagement with the issue, a series of quiet efforts led by individual 
legislators helped reposition planning within the state’s administrative bureaucracy, and a 
series of new laws and modifications to existing laws dealing with environmental 
regulation, bolstered the state’s involvement in regulating the way land would be put to 
use.   
This incremental procession of legislation was kicked off in late 1974, just after 
the election, when a subcommittee of the state legislature concerned with the state’s role 
in planning and community development (State Planning and Community Affairs 
Committee) delivered a report that described and analyzed existing planning related 
activities within various state departments and agencies.  Lead by Representative Elliott 
Levitas, the Democrat from Dekalb County who had been instrumental in the passage of 
Act 5 in 1971 (which created ARC) and the Metropolitan River Protection Act in 1973, 
the effort was the most ambitious attempt on the part of the legislature to 
comprehensively evaluate the state’s involvement in development planning.49 Among the 
findings of the committee, several stand out. 
 The Committee’s report supported the introduction of legislation in the upcoming 
1975 legislative session that would begin the process of identifying geographic areas that 
were of “critical state concern,” which would in turn trigger state scrutiny to assure 
necessary cooperation across jurisdictional boundaries in order to protect those areas.  
The report identified a need to refine the state’s laws to clarify the legal authority under 
which local governments could authorize new planned unit developments, which by 
virtue of their incidence and scale (several large examples had appeared around the edges 
of metropolitan Atlanta) had been attracting attention at the time.  The committee found 
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that the state’s system of area planning and development commissions (ARC being the 
largest and most prominent) were playing an important role on a number of issues, often 
being relied upon by small local governments for information and analysis and plan 
preparation.  In response, the committee recommended additional legislation that would 
allow such commissions to provide more intensive “managing staff services” to the local 
governments within their jurisdiction.  Perhaps the most far reaching task reported on by 
the Committee was a review of the planning activities allocated, individually, to the 
Office of Planning and Budget (OPB), the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the 
Department of Transportation (GDOT), the Department of Human Resources (DHR), and 
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  Noting the scope and variation of planning 
activities undertaken by each agency, many a result of necessary involvement in federal 
programs, but others the result of confusion and administrative overlap, the Committee 
focused on planning activities it considered comprehensive, which were largely contained 
in the DCA and OPB.50 
 The Committee reported that OPB was responsible for a range of activities related 
to budget planning, long-term capital improvements, and coordination among different 
state agencies.  The DCA was found to be responsible for coordinating community affairs 
programs and providing guidance on the state’s housing needs.  The committee also 
noted that DCA often failed to follow through with its statutory responsibilities, and was 
in need of extra legislation to ensure that it would follow through with its responsibilities 
in the future.  The committee urged OPB to take a more active role in coordinating and 
mediating between different state agencies with overlapping services, as well as better 
support the work of the state’s area planning and development commissions.  The 
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committee also suggested a state policy board was needed, which could perhaps be part 
of DCA, to “bring together key legislative/executive decision-makers in a single structure 
and have them provide guidance to the State planning process.” The report brought 
needed attention to what the state’s actual role in development planning was at the time, 
and shined a light on the existing agencies that showed the most potential for being 
transformed into instruments for comprehensive planning.  With its findings, the 
Committee enunciated several planning issues that would re-emerge in the next few years 
and help propel a renewed legislative agenda that would culminate in the Georgia 
Planning Act.51  
The first ripples from the report were to be seen early in the 1975 legislative 
session, as a handful of new resolutions and laws were passed that dealt with region-wide 
and state-level planning.  Out of wide-ranging deliberations about the state’s proper role 
in development planning, especially in the Atlanta area, the legislature passed a 
resolution directing the committee on State Planning and Community Affairs to begin a 
comprehensive study of the work of the Atlanta Regional Commission.  A corollary 
committee was formed to study the possibility of creating a single organizational unit to 
manage metropolitan Atlanta’s freeway system, administratively separate from the 
Department of Transportation.  And an important new environmental law designed to 
address surface water quality problems stemming from erosion and sediment runoff was 
passed out of the same session.   
The Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1975, as the law was named, mandated 
that local governments immediately write and adopt ordinances governing a wide range 
of land-disturbing activities adjacent to lakes, rivers, and wetlands, aimed at buffering 
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state waters from flagrantly destructive development practices.  Borrowing a page from 
the Metropolitan River Protection Act, the erosion act directed the creation of a land 
disturbance permitting system and required anyone proposing a land disturbing activity to 
submit a plan that detailed how erosion and sediment would be managed at the site level.  
In cases where local governments chose not to write their own ordinances, the state 
would assume responsibility for instituting and managing regulations.52 The 1975 session 
also saw the passage of a few amendments to the Metropolitan River Protection Act, 
changes that encouraged individuals or corporations planning to develop land within the 
Chattahoochee River Buffer to undergo a pre-review procedure, whereby a proposed 
development plan would be reviewed by ARC before a formal application for permission 
to disturb the land was filed in the local jurisdiction.  The idea being that an earlier 
moment of information exchange within the planning process would hopefully lead to 
greater cooperation between the various parties responsible for managing the region’s 
primary surface water source, and less opportunity for costly confrontations.53 These two 
legislative actions were important steps on the part of the state’s political leadership 
(however unwitting their intentions may have been) to begin bringing environmental 
regulation and growth management together. 
 During the 1976 session, the General Assembly passed two more ideas from the 
report of the State Planning and Community Affairs Committee, both intended to support 
the ongoing reconfiguration of the state’s role in local and regional planning and its 
interaction with the local government agencies responsible for implementing land 
development regulations.  To deal with the clutter surrounding the overlapping duties of 
the Office of Planning and Budget and the Bureau of Community Affairs, Levitas lead 
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his usual group of metropolitan legislators in pushing through measures that would 
further consolidate the state’s comprehensive planning functions within the offices of the 
BCA, particularly those policy areas that involved interaction with local governments.  
Part of this consolidation involved amending Act 1066, which originally laid out the 
state’s role in overseeing local planning efforts (and first established the OPB and BCA), 
so that future responsibility for “long-range community development planning and 
research relevant to local governments” would be passed entirely to Community Affairs.  
Further underscoring the vision for the future BCA, the legislature also voted to move the 
state housing department, a nominal office created by a 1972 executive order of Jimmy 
Carter, to the BCA, prescribed a new set of duties for the office, and provided for the 
appointment of the first, full-time executive director.  While moving the housing office to 
Community Affairs, the state also relocated several other ancillary offices, including the 
State Building Administrative Board and the Georgia Residential Finance Authority, to 
support the work of the housing director.  The new housing executive director was 
charged with developing a state housing program, providing technical assistance to local 
governments, and preparing an annual report on housing in Georgia.  By virtue of its 
expanding palette of duties, BCA was becoming a key node in the state’s planning 
infrastructure. 
 In 1977, the legislature passed the Georgia Safe Drinking Water Act, which set up 
a new permitting process for water supply systems that would serve 25 or more people 
(effectively capturing all withdrawals except those by individual well owners).  Designed 
to work in conjunction with the soil and sedimentation act, the new drinking water law 
was also a response to amendments to the Federal Clean Water Act and to the need for 
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more thorough monitoring of the state’s water resources.54 The 1977 session also saw the 
passage of the companion Georgia Water Quality Control Act, which required all non-
agricultural surface water users withdrawing more than 100,000 gallons of water per day 
for any purpose to obtain a permit from the Environmental Protection Division.  This 
netted most major industrial users and virtually all municipal systems.55 The permitting 
systems were designed to provide reasonably reliable information about how the state’s 
fresh water was being used and a data source for future water management plans.  
Finally, in 1978 the legislature revised the state’s building codes to require more 
conservation sensitive water fixtures in new residential construction. 
By the end of the 1970s, the state’s interest in more tightly controlling its surface 
water resources was becoming clear, and steps toward making the connection between 
the overall regulation of local environmental quality and the organization of the 
bureaucracy responsible for such regulation and enforcement were beginning to be 
visible.  Evidence of the continuing legacy of Carter’s administrative reforms could be 
found in the work of the legislature in the ensuing years.  Though individually the new 
laws were small, they added up.  Taken together, the legislative actions in the late 1970s 
continued to push state interest in the direction of a more encompassing system of land 
use planning and development management.  
 
Getting Through the General Assembly 
By the time the nation was gearing up for the roll out of the 1980 Census, the 
Atlanta Journal was trumpeting the rising power of a suburban legislative faction, one 
that was expected to distinguish itself as a third power braced against the older rural and 
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urban factions.56 As in-migration keep cranking and the economy rolled along, the state’s 
population continued to grow at a dramatic clip, though the overwhelming majority of 
this growth remained concentrated in the northern third of the state, particularly in the 
metropolitan just north of Atlanta counties.57  
As Jimmy Carter entered what was to be his final year in office, the national 
recession was taking a huge political toll on his domestic agenda and economic 
difficulties were trickling all the way down to rapidly growing states like Georgia, which 
meant federal agencies were forced to retrench policies in the service of reducing 
spending.  The change in tone presented by Reagan during the 1980 election foretold of 
his efforts to reduce regulatory interference and promote free-market competition in the 
name of a no-holds-barred economic growth that he and his advisors argued would pull 
the nation out of its recession.  Despite coming from the opposing party, Reagan’s ideas 
found a receptive ear in Governor Busbee and his oft-stated goal of increasing Georgia’s 
economic competitiveness.   
Reagan’s early attempts to follow up on his campaign promises took a variety 
forms, some more newsworthy than others.  In one of his less known moves, in the 
middle of 1982 he ordered OMB to rescind Circular A-95, thereby suspending one of the 
key bases of power in the hands of public regional planning agencies.  Later that year, Joe 
Frank Harris was elected governor of Georgia.  While these two events had no direct 
connection, each portended significant changes that would affect the agencies supporting 
regional planning in Atlanta.  The effective end of the A-95 program meant that the 
Atlanta Regional Commission would no longer be the sole point of contact between local 
governments and federal funding programs and new federal programs would likely by-
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pass the agency.  While ARC maintained its plan review function, local governments 
could, at least theoretically, more easily ignore the Commission’s input and advice during 
the process of applying for federal money.  But Reagan also began scaling back the 
existing federal infrastructure programs that provided money, pushing them away from 
building and into managing and maintaining.58  
As Joe Frank Harris took office in 1983, he was faced with the Reagan 
administration’s loud rhetorical antipathy toward the thrust of existing federal 
environmental policy and toward maintaining levels of federal involvement in supporting 
local and regional planning activities.  While himself a conservative legislator from a 
small north Georgia town, Harris had cut his political teeth during the early 1970s and 
Jimmy Carter’s gubernatorial term, bearing witness to Carter’s style and deeply 
influenced by Carter’s aggressive attempts to reform state government and develop an 
expanded role for the state in local planning and development.  Harris’ interest in the 
environment remained mostly quiet during his first term, but by the middle of 1984 (just 
after the end of the state’s legislative session), a few initiatives were underway that 
indicated that the state’s interest in planning may have receded from view, but had not 
waned, and would expand dramatically in a few years (helped along by ARC and the 
relentless growth of meto Atlanta). 
After the flurry of activity in the middle of the 1970s, a lull that lasted into the 
first few years of the 1980s had seen the state’s environmental movement (if it could be 
properly called a ‘movement’) slow its progress, at least in terms of the introduction of 
significant new legislation.  Yet in the background, support for expanding the scope of 
the state’s control over development continued to evolve among certain key officials and 
 222 
organizations (notably the ARC and its allies), setting up conditions that would lead to 
another round of new planning regulations in the late 1980s.  The continuing 
transformation of the metropolitan landscape, buildings, infrastructure, demographics, 
and economy helped create an environment favorable to additional planning regulation.   
Upon the public release of a rather extended economic and demographic profile of 
metro Atlanta in late 1983, ARC noted several issues that had already affected the region 
and several issues on the horizon.  The urbanized extent of the metropolitan region had 
expanded significantly since 1970.  During that decade, the most rapid growth had 
occurred in the unincorporated sections of counties surrounding the central city, helped 
along by a 1972 state law that permitted counties to provide a full range of urban services 
(more or less equivalent to cities).  The state had also recently passed legislation allowed 
counties to impose, by referendum, limited term sales tax increases to fund internal 
infrastructure projects, as well as a law that opened the door for tax increment financing 
districts.   
Expansions in the reach of water and sewer systems supported by Clean Water 
Act funds, particularly in the major northern suburbs (Cobb, Gwinnett, North Fulton), 
provided some of the infrastructure critical to growth.  The first segments of Atlanta’s 
regional rapid rail system had opened, though the bulk of the track was still under 
construction.  A major freeway reconstruction project had expanded the capacity of the 
portions of the Interstate system within the perimeter highway.  And all the while, ARC 
was in the process of updating the regional development plan, which supported a 
vigorous conversation about the future of the region.  But looking into the future, the 
report noted that federal support for transportation and environmental planning within the 
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Reagan Administration had been successfully tweaked to emphasize market solutions to 
government responsibilities, which meant creatively managing existing infrastructure 
capacity rather than building anew would be the order of the day.59   
Against this background, partly a result of it, in 1984 ARC’s governing board, at 
the advice of the planning staff, voted to establish a formal regional development 
notification system.  With a literal sounding name (Major Development Area Plan 
Reviews), the notification system could be seen as simply an extension of the area plan 
review function set up when the commission was created.  In some respects it was, but in 
the folds of its design the notification system was an important expansive of the existing 
program.  The system was designed to kick in when ARC received notice that a major 
development had been proposed to a local government within the region.  Commission 
planners, as part of their review process, would then notify affected local governments 
and state agencies, share critical documentation of the proposed project, and give 
potentially affected governments an opportunity to review and raise issue with the project 
(or signal their approval).60 As information from affected parties came forth, ARC could 
arrange and coordinate conversation about the project as well as suggest changes or 
alterations to the proposal.  Though created to manage the flow of information 
concerning the cross-jurisdictional impact presented by large-scale developments 
(buildings and infrastructure and the like), the plan reviews were also another step in the 
direction of the kind of comprehensive planning process Carter had imagined in the early 
1970s.  The early-warning system became a critical node in the continuing development 
of the state’s planning policies, one of the points through which ARC’s work would 
influence the direction the state would take.61   
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When the new Regional Development Plan was published in 1985, it crystallized 
attempts by the planning staff to grapple with the legacy of the 1975 plan, and revisited 
more than a few of the same issues.  Like the 1975 plan, the policies, analyses, and 
discourse of the updated RDP emanated from a set of population, employment, and land 
use projections produced by a large-scale urban forecasting model.62 Yet the planners at 
ARC had come to recognize many of the problems associated with the projections and 
the policies from the first time around (including the complaints that had been voiced 
back in 1975 when the plan was being written), which tinted the RDP update process 
with a sense of dissonance.  Increasingly evident was the first plan’s mixed legacy in 
terms of the growth that had been predicted and the growth that had actually happened.63 
The update attempted to reflect some recent changes in ARC’s capacity (major 
development reviews) and its context (declining federal support).  Yet the update process 
also presented an opportunity to speak to larger structural issues framing those problems 
(issues that were less palatable before).       
 The most significant of those issues to emerge was the idea of spreading 
mandatory county-level land use plans across the state, though this time the idea found 
support from several different sources simultaneously (and found a sympathetic ear in Joe 
Frank Harris).  A relatively severe drought that lasted through the early-mid 1980s, 
helped push the issue of water resource management into the public eye.  The Atlanta 
Water Resource Study finally trailed off in the early 1980s.  Several high profile court 
cases involving land use were decided that called into question the legal standing of 
existing development regulations of several local governments.  And in early 1985 the 
state of Florida passed a major piece of its growing collection of land use laws.64 By the 
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end of 1985, even the long-time (and notoriously conservative) director of the Georgia’s 
Department of Natural Resources had began to publicly mention the need for mandatory 
land use plans for all counties in the state, a sure signal of the seriousness of the idea.65   
 The early shreds of the conversation regarding a future of much tighter regulation 
of land use treaded gently around the details of how the state’s involvement might be 
structured (and how far it would reach), out of fear of raising the ire of rural legislators 
whose support would ultimately be necessary to secure the passage of any major bill.  Yet 
an increasing number of metro Atlanta legislators recognized the limited ability of the 
region’s political units to independently deal with the spill over effects of the rapid and 
sustained growth that had become de rigueur.  And ARC’s research agenda continued to 
expound upon and publicize land use management practices in Florida and Minnesota, 
the two states perceived as being the most politically similar to Georgia.  From 1985 to 
1987, through the course of retreats, working sessions, reports, and conferences on the 
prevailing conditions in the region that included a number of major players in state 
politics, ideas about the what the near future of land use planning should look like began 
to emerge more clearly.66  
 In 1986, Joe Frank Harris easily won a second term in the governor’s mansion.  
Among the promises he made during the campaign season, the biggest was the pledge to 
establish a special commission (later named the Quality Growth Commission) to be 
charged with devising a strategy for expanding and strengthening the state’s role in local 
comprehensive planning.  True to his word, the commission that Harris put together made 
its public debut in the early summer of 1987.  Membership included a number of 
metropolitan legislators, business people, local elected officials, and non-profit directors.  
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A well-regarded Atlanta environmentalist, John Sibley, was appointed executive director 
of the staff function of the commission.  One of Harris’s closet political allies, Atlanta 
planner/developer Joel Cowan, served as chairman of the appointed board, and several 
members of the commission also sat on the ARC Board.  It was, in most respects, a 
collection of individuals who were supporters or friends of Harris, but membership tilted 
heavily toward Atlanta (where development issues were felt most intensely) and the 
commission was headed by an individual with a reputation for being thoughtful and far-
sighted.67  
 During the formal swearing in ceremony of the QGC, Harris declared that the 
work of the group would “determine the means to continue our economic development, 
[and] to balance that development with wise management of natural, physical, and 
financial resources.” Harris promised his utmost support for the commission, and by 
including several seasoned legislators who he could trust to usher any resulting 
legislation through the General Assembly, he increased the likelihood that the 
commission’s recommendations would actually see the light of day.  Two of those 
legislators were expected to become contenders for the governorship sometime in the 
next decade or so.  One, Johnny Isakson, ended up being elected to the US Senate, and 
the other, Roy Barnes, was indeed elected Governor twelve years later.  Given eighteen 
months to come up with a report and a few concrete recommendations, the commission 
operated on a relatively tight time frame.  By the time the recommendations were 
expected be published, Harris would have only two legislative sessions to get any 
resulting bills written, introduced, and passed.  To deal with the time constraint, the 
Governor attempted to appoint members he believed could get along and likely would be 
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able to arrive at broad agreement on a set of recommendations.  He also encouraged the 
commission to adopt a mode of operating based around conflict resolution and consensus 
building.  This decision was driven by the need to come up with “practical, do-able steps 
the state can take,” which was another way of saying that the commission would train its 
focus on modest and flexible strategies that could find fairly wide support in the state 
legislature.  And using a consensus-oriented technique would hopefully avoid bogging 
the report down in an impasse or a nasty public fight over its validity, or even worse, a 
fundamental dispute about the constitutionality of planning at all.68 This strategy was 
possible only because many of the recommendations had been studied and researched 
beforehand, and most were ideas had already been developed, and in some cases tested, 
by ARC within metro Atlanta.   
 Since ARC’s founding in 1971, the agency had maintained a steadily expanding 
research program.  Gathering and organizing information on an array of issues 
(demographic, economic, transportation, land use, among others), ARC’s research had 
lead to a number of planning policies being tested and implemented in the counties within 
its jurisdiction.  Aside from the ideas that made it to the policy stage were a number of 
other topics that were enunciated, researched, and discussed, but not immediately 
adopted.  These included investigations of regional zoning authority, establishing a 
regional tax, lessons from implementation of growth management in other states, and the 
impact of court decisions on planning activities.  Together, the policies and background 
research formed a substantial body of knowledge and rich ground for cultivating new 
policies, some of which were reflected in the recommendations in the final QGC report.   
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After holding 19 separate public hearings and almost countless internal meetings 
to discuss and preview ideas being considered for inclusion in the report, the final draft of 
the Quality Growth Commission report was published at the end of 1988 to quite a bit of 
publicity, not all positive.  Acknowledging the sensitive political context into which any 
new state regulations would be thrust, the report reflexively acknowledged the 
importance of property rights and maintaining a business-friendly climate. Starting with 
two rather broad goals, to “accommodate the inevitable growth of the future without 
allowing a deteriorization in the qualities of life” and to “upgrade the quality of life in 
low-growth areas through realistic and innovative economic development programs,” the 
commission offered a handful of specific recommendations.  Though they spanned 
several substantive areas, including land use, transportation, water, and waste, the 
primary focus was on the process and organization of local planning activities and the 
state’s relationship to those activities.  Recommendations included expanding the state’s 
system of rural four-lane highways to improve connections between less developed 
regions, increasing funding for local infrastructure development, and permitting local 
governments to institute development impact fees.  But the recommendations with the 
biggest potential impact included developing a system of regional reservoirs in North 
Georgia, establishing a cabinet level Development Council, significantly expanding the 
work program and funding of the state’s area planning commissions, requiring local plans 
to be reviewed by a corresponding regional planning commission, and requiring all 
counties to write and adopt a comprehensive development plan every ten years.69 
Upon publication, questions about the report were immediately raised, 
particularly about how the governor would orchestrate the process of transforming ideas 
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into laws.  A number of observers argued that by adopting a consensus approach, Harris 
had given up the fight with rural legislators even before it had begun.  Harris was often 
accused of “pull[ing] the teeth from his own program,” a critique based on the 
expectation that he would soften the penalties the state would mete out to local 
governments that refused to comply with elements of any forthcoming planning 
legislation.  The fact that the commission had stopped short of requiring all counties to 
adopt a formal zoning ordinance fell on Harris as a shortfall.70 But most of the 
recommendations of the committee were widely hailed in the Atlanta media.  Front and 
center was the new mandate that local governments would be required to write plans and 
submit them to regional agencies for review and approval.  This struck many observers as 
an essential step in ensuring the state’s future growth would be orderly and as an 
important part of modernizing planning laws.  Because of long-standing water supply 
issues, the suggestion that the state should build a system of reservoirs was welcomed as 
a necessary hedge against an uncertain future.  Because so much of the report focused on 
issues important to north Georgia, metro Atlanta especially, the recommendations served 
to reiterate the region’s political dominance in state wide affairs.  The commission report 
scored a major point in the battle to slowly expand the state’s authority over its natural 
resources and reign in local governments. 
 At the start of the 1989 legislative session, Governor Harris officially presented 
the recommendations of the Quality Growth Commission to the members of the General 
Assembly in his State of the State address.  Describing the proposed growth strategies as 
“a new way of thinking about old problems,” Harris noted that the “carrot and stick 
approach is attractive and usually successful,” a nod to his understanding of the need to 
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maintain a precious balance between home rule and state authority that everyone 
involved in the process recognized would be necessary for any significant new legislation 
to survive the General Assembly intact.  In the speech, the Governor outlined four 
separate pieces of legislation that he would introduce to the Assembly in the coming 
session.  The proposed legislation included a new water supply act to begin the process of 
acquiring sites for regional water reservoirs that would serve the rapidly growing counties 
of North Georgia, amendments to the 1975 Erosion and Sedimentation Act, a new 
program to provide state-backed loans to local governments to build new solid waste 
facilities, and the main event, a multi-faceted bill that would mandate local 
comprehensive plans, renovate and expand the activities of the Bureau of Community 
Affairs, and reforming the existing system of regional planning agencies across the state.  
To support this legislation, the Governor requested $31 million in additional state funds. 
This collection of bills formed the crux of Harris’s legislative agenda for the year.71 
As the recommendations of the Quality Growth Commission began to appear as 
bills in the first days of the Assembly session, the potential for failure ran high.  
Georgia’s legislature had seen its share of tumult, and in many respects was still in the 
throes of a transformation from a body dominated by rural representatives to one 
dominated by metropolitan Atlanta.  Rural legislators still held a number of committee 
chairmanships and wielded considerable sway among their colleagues.  Because of 
lingering rural resentment of Atlanta’s growing political power, many observers expected 
growth management legislation, widely perceived as an Atlanta issue, to fail. 
Into this fray came the largest single piece of legislation, which began life as 
House Bill 215, which set up the basic framework requiring local governments to adopt 
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plans for managing development.  Companion bills included Senate Bill 84, which 
strengthened the state’s existing soil erosion law, Senate Bill 86, which directed DNR to 
begin planning a system of regional water reservoirs, and House Bill 102, which provided 
state assistance (technical and financial) to local governments for planning and building 
new solid waste disposal sites. 
In spite of their aggressive reach, certainly unprecedented in Georgia, the bills 
generated surprisingly little controversy among the rank and file of the General 
Assembly.72 Though the main comprehensive planning bill would likely affect rural areas 
disproportionately, the majority of city and county officials appeared to accept the basic 
tenets of the legislation.  The powerful knee jerk reaction expected from rural legislators 
barely peeped.  The legislators involved in the QGC process attributed this in part to the 
pre-session work members of the commission had put in, befriending potential enemies 
of the recommendations before they were released, smartly diffusing most potential 
roadblocks before they had a chance to derail the entire process.  But part of the 
acquiescence also stemmed from the fact that the Governor’s bill did not require 
constitutional amendments, and used a system of financial carrots to encourage 
governments to participate rather than penalties against them for failing to do so.  As a 
result, in a conservative region where maintaining local control of land use decisions 
could trump virtually any move by the state to do otherwise, the land use bill was 
perceived as leaving local governments alone.  As one representative put it, “it’s strictly 
up to the local governments.  They don’t have to do it if they don’t want to; they’ll just 
lose a little state money if they don’t.” Yet, despite the apparent voluntary character of 
the legislation, the likelihood that it would lead to new land use restrictions in areas 
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where there had been none ran high.  Zoning remained the cheapest, easiest and most 
thoroughly tested available tool for managing land use, and was likely to be one of the 
first tools local governments would adopt.  Regarding the planning bill, and the chain of 
dominoes likely to fall as a result of its passage, the same rural legislator quipped in an 
interview with a reporter from the Journal-Constitution, “I think everybody realizes we 
need it.”73  
Nevertheless, the first version of HB 215 faced enough opposition in the 
legislature that a few concessions were unavoidable.  The most notable point of 
compromise involved the power of the General Assembly to get directly involved in the 
writing of the detailed regulations that would come after the bill had passed into law.  
The QGC had recommended that the state Bureau of Community Affairs (to be renamed 
as a Department) should be responsible for writing the minimum standards that local 
plans would have to meet in order to be considered compliant.  Opposition to giving 
DCA staff such authority emerged among a handful of rural legislators in the House of 
Representatives, and a compromise had to be struck that would give the legislature a 
hand in setting those standards in order to avoid defeat.  By the time the bill emerged 
from the Senate the initial comprise had been scaled back, giving certain legislative 
subcommittees only power to approve (or reject) the minimum standards in total, but not 
to mettle with their content or suggest revisions.74 Yet this compromise must be 
considered minor, especially in a legislative session that also saw the passage of several 
other new environmental regulations and a sales tax increase to fund the new planning 
law.75   
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To their credit, Harris and the QGC seemed to understand the sentiment of their 
opponents much better than their opponents understood the breadth of the planning bills.  
Taking a broad and incremental approach to the process of writing and passing land use 
legislation afforded them relatively wide latitude in terms of how the specific features of 
the laws would be implemented.  Even on the eve of the final vote on the main planning 
bill, the extent of the law’s impact on land development practices remained unknown to 
the legislators that were voting on it.  Though everyone realized that passage of the act 
meant that cities and counties would be responsible for producing and adopting 
comprehensive development plans, on paper the penalties for failing to do so appeared to 
be limited to losing certain state funds.  Different state departments would be permitted to 
withhold funds, though the law did not require withholding or specify which funds might 
be subject (or the extent).  The DCA was charged with the task of fleshing out the 
internal structure of the act, but this was not predicted to be finished for at least twelve 
more months, long after the act would receive the Governor’s signature.  Even the legal 
status of the act remained mysterious during the vote, as some legislators said they 
expected affected communities to challenge the constitutionality of the regulations.  And 
a few lawmakers still clung to the belief that the new law would turn out to be zoning in 
disguise.76   
The vote in the General Assembly in favor of the bill belied any lingering 
opposition.  In addition to the land use bill, the three companion bills also easily passed 
on to the Governor for his signature.  With these votes, a dramatic expansion of state 
authority over the local planning process was put into action.   
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In its final version, running nearly 100 pages, Act 634, also known as the State-
Wide Planning and Development Act, or the Georgia Planning Act (unofficial), 
accomplished much of what the Governor and the QGC had intended, erecting a program 
that would strongly encourage local governments to embrace the idea of comprehensive 
planning.  In five separate but related parts, the Act established a prescribed program for 
mandatory state-wide planning and development, created the Governor’s Development 
Council, and forged new, concrete connections between the Department of Community 
Affairs and Department of Natural Resources.   
Part one of the act established the Governor’s Development Council, which was 
to be a permanent executive branch body comprised of the commissioners of the major 
administrative divisions of the state along with a few extra members appointed by the 
Governor.  Meetings of the council would occur at least once a month.  The Council was 
charged with supervising and reviewing the long-range planning efforts of state agencies, 
particularly the design and construction of public facilities.77 The Council would help the 
different fragments of the public bureaucracy learn to work together plotting the state’s 
future. 
Part two redefined the responsibilities and powers of the revised Department of 
Community Affairs.  In its new guise, DCA would serve as the primary liaison between 
local governments and the state, function as the state’s principal agency for managing 
comprehensive development planning, and provide general technical assistance to local 
governments.  The act also set parameters for membership on the Board of Community 
Affairs, responsibilities of the Board, and responsibilities for the commissioner of the 
department.   
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Part two also stipulated details of the kinds of planning activities for which DCA 
would be responsible.  Among other things, this included providing planning assistance 
to local governments, organizing a database of land information, devising a rural 
economic development plan, maintaining a program of research on planning, 
development, and government affairs, and staff support for the Governor’s office in 
developing a comprehensive plan for the state.  The two most important of these 
activities, the crux of the carrot and stick, were developing the minimum standards 
against which local comprehensive plans would be evaluated and the authority to grant 
funds to local governments for development related projects based on those evaluations.  
DCA was also directed to prepare regulations for protecting natural resource and vital 
areas identified by DNR, as well as update the standards for determining developments of 
regional impact.   
If local governments produce plans that meet DCA minimum standards, they 
would be designated ‘qualified local governments,’ which would allow those 
governments to apply for grants to fund infrastructure and support economic 
development activities.  The local plans were expected to analyze housing, land use 
(existing and future), transportation, human services, natural resources, historic resources, 
infrastructure, vital areas, economy, and recreation facilities, in addition to any other 
substantive topics deemed necessary or useful.  Every county, and every city with a 
population over 2,500, would be required to develop a comprehensive development plan.  
Updates to local plans would proceed according to schedules established as part of the 
minimum standards.78 In practice, the clarity of the minimum standards system would go 
 236 
a long way in defining the character and quality of local plans, which would in turn help 
determine how effective the state’s effort at growth management would be later judged. 
Part three of the Act established a system of regional development centers across 
the state, succeeding the area planning and development commissions that had been in 
existence for almost twenty years.79 The new regional development centers were intended 
to be intermediaries between local governments and the state, much like before.  As such, 
every county and municipality was assigned to an RDC and required to pay annual 
membership fees to support its work (which supplemented state funds).  But unlike 
before, the RDC’s were designed to be more engaged in local planning issues.  The 
concrete tasks set forth for the RDC’s included adopting regional plans, providing 
information to the state database, assisting local governments with plan preparation, and 
serving as liaisons with adjacent governments.  But here too, the most important function 
had to do with the implementation of the minimum planning standards for local 
comprehensive plans.  The DCA strategy for monitoring local comprehensive planning 
would be constructed on top of the regional development commissions, which meant that 
RDC’s would be the front line, responsible for reviewing and commenting on local 
comprehensive plans, comparing them against the state’s minimum standards, and 
rendering judgment on a plan’s quality.  In essence, the RDC’s would operate as 
miniature versions of the Atlanta Regional Commission, though this could hardly be 
called mere happenstance.80 
Part four of the Act actually authorized counties and municipalities to write and 
adopt comprehensive plans, capital improvements plans, and regulations appropriate to 
carrying out the policies in the comprehensive plan.  It also directed all counties and 
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municipalities to be assigned to an appropriate regional development center, pay dues to 
said center, and participate in the effort to develop a state land development database.81   
Part five of the Act outlined the role of the Department of Natural Resources in 
the comprehensive planning process.  In effect, the law required that DNR develop its 
own set of minimum standards to protect the sources of the public water supply.  These 
standards included buffers around rivers, streams, and wetlands, and land development 
density stipulations for lands that abut or otherwise impact the quality of surface and 
ground water resources.  The law did not dictate particular numeric standards for buffers 
or land density, but left those decisions to DNR staff, similar to how the details of the 
minimum planning standards were left to DCA figure out.82 
Part six tied up odds and ends resulting from the changes in state code wrought by 
the Act, correcting conflicts with existing legislation, clarifying and strengthening 
procedures for reviewing development proposals on lands covered by the Metropolitan 
River Protection Act, and setting up a few new requirements related to rural economic 
development and the modernization (digitization) of local land records.83 
Each of the companion bills offered a complimentary wrinkle to the state’s 
attempts to exercise more control over land development.  To a great extent the major 
QGC recommendations, certainly the ones that received the most attention, reflected 
ideas that could be traced to an origin somewhere within ARC’s seventeen year long 
program of research and practice.  A plan for creating a system of regional reservoirs (in 
conjunction with an additional dam on the Chattahoochee River) in metro Atlanta had 
been a topic of discussion for years, outlined in detail in ARC’s 1978 Water Supply Plan 
and included in both the 1975 and 1985 Regional Development Plans.  Since its 
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inception, member counties had been required to subsidize ARC based on population, 
and the state had provided an annual contribution, which supplemented the money the 
commission received from the federal government.  In fact, money had been an important 
factor in ARC’s stability and ability to carry out the kind of far-reaching, multi-faceted 
research and planning exercises envisioned by the Quality Growth Commission for the 
rest of the state (which the QGC seemed to realize).  One of ARC’s long-time activities 
included reviewing and commenting on the relative merits of local plans cities and 
counties within its jurisdiction prepared, comparing those plans against the most up to 
date Regional Development Plan.  As administrator of the A-95 review program, the 
Commission also was responsible for reviewing local government applications for federal 
financial assistance, providing comments to the granting agency on the quality of the 
application and its relationship to the activities of other governments in the region. 
Before the QGC recommendations were published, Georgia had no law 
mandating local comprehensive plans.  While the authority to write plans and adopt 
zoning had been established by the state in the 1950s, by the late 1980s, only about 30% 
of Georgia’s cities and counties actually had plans, and about the same percent had 
adopted zoning ordinances.  The story was quite different in metro Atlanta, where by the 
early 1970s 80% of the cities and counties within ARC’s jurisdiction had both plans and 
zoning ordinances in place, most of which were updated on a relatively consistent basis 
(though not on consistent schedules).  That so many metro area governments had plans 
and ordinances in part could be attributed to size: population, budget, bureaucratic staff.  
But the work of ARC (and its predecessor agencies) played an equally important hand, 
which the new planning act intended to bring to the rest of the state.  For the first twelve 
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years ARC existed, it had provided a steadily expanding variety of services to its member 
governments in support of comprehensive planning and zoning.  The stream of 
population and employment projections, catalogs of development patterns, and research 
reports provided critical background information, presented and distributed to encourage 
local governments to adopt and implement steadily more aggressive planning regulations.  
But ARC’s research reports and model policies offered more than off-the-shelf 
information.  They were also accompanied by various support services that included 
direct staff supervision of the preparation of comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances.  
And the Commission’s training sessions for elected officials and staff helped cement the 
channels of information flow. 
The Georgia Water Supply Act, signed into law in 1989 along with the planning 
act, authorized the state’s Department of Natural Resources to begin the process of 
designing and constructing a system of new reservoirs in north Georgia, specifically to 
deal with anticipated water supply problems.  More specifically, the act granted DNR 
power to purchase (or otherwise obtain the rights to) real property for the purpose of 
building reservoirs and gave the agency leeway to write its own rules and regulations 
governing the selection of particular sites and how the facilities would be managed over 
time.84 The Solid Waste Management Act, signed at the same time, required any 
landowner in a large county (over 350,000 population) contemplating constructing a solid 
waste disposal facility within two miles of an adjoining county to seek approval from the 
government of the neighboring county, thereby triggering a process of cross jurisdictional 
cooperation.85 Amendments to the 1975 Erosion and Sedimentation Act refined parts of 
the original act and set up stricter regulations on land disturbing activities adjacent to 
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state waters.  With the amendments, an undisturbed vegetative buffer of 25 feet was 
required along all the banks of all state waters, land disturbing activities were relegated to 
100 feet from stream banks, and storm-water discharges from disturbed areas had to be 
controlled to minimize turbidity (a measure of the relative amount of suspended solid 
particles in a sample of water).  The changes further bulked up the requirements for 
issuing land disturbing permit applications, taking into account the applicant’s past record 
of compliance, and extended DNR’s powers of enforcement, allowing the Department to 
pursue violations of provisions contained in a permit long after its issue.86 
 Implementing the planning policies contained in the new acts was perceived at the 
time as a potential struggle.  Only a few years prior, Florida had begun its own process of 
implementing growth management legislation, which had been passed into law in 1985, 
and media reports about the twists in that process were not entirely encouraging.  
Florida’s law, a bundle of regulations much like Georgia’s, required every county to 
adopt a comprehensive plan and to identify critical environmental resources that deserved 
extra protection.87 But Florida’s law allowed little room for negotiation between the state 
and local governments, having laid the burden of proof on local doorsteps to demonstrate 
with their plans that adequate infrastructure (roads, water supply) would exist prior to 
new development being approved.  Yet in spite of the lack of much room for argument, 
resistance among local governments had been strong.  Half of the local comprehensive 
plans submitted to the state’s Department of Community Affairs were initially rejected as 
inadequate and in need of significant revision. But by 1989, by all appearances Florida’s 
growth management laws were beginning to take hold, as local governments got used to 
the process and the changes to the decision making framework the laws required.88 
 241 
 In some ways, Georgia’s road to implementing its new land use laws faced fewer 
ostensible roadblocks.  Local governments had more standing in the process, more 
authority to negotiate with the state, and thereby more perceived control over how the 
laws would work on the ground.  The state presented its role as less commanding, at least 
on the surface.  Because of the carrot/stick structure of the laws, negotiation and 
consensus, rather than punishment, would be the preferred strategy for ensuring 
compliance.  If a local government failed to produce an adequate plan, it would become 
ineligible for certain state funds, but likely would not be taken to court or dragged before 
an executive committee to explain its behavior.  That the minimum standards had not 
been published by the time the bill was voted in the legislature seemed to point toward a 
level of flexibility in the implementation process, as did the assurance that the General 
Assembly would be able to vote to accept the minimum standards once they were 
published, though without the authority to change them.  The soft quality of Georgia’s 
regulations cleared a path for legislative approval that might otherwise have been 
blocked. 
 
Growing State Control 
Together, the collection of planning-related acts put into place during the 1989 
legislative session offered a significant step toward more oversight of the processes of 
land development.  But the push for growth management legislation did not come out of 
the blue.  In many respects, the fruition of Georgia’s growth management laws was the 
culmination of a long-running effort to increase the authority and scope of the state’s 
control over local governments, a recognition of the manifold problems associated with 
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unchecked home rule and its interference with orderly economic growth.  This 
knowledge emerged from several different sources simultaneously.  Rising national 
consciousness of the fragility of the natural environment, changes in intergovernmental 
relations, modernization and reform of state government, and the ongoing urbanization of 
the population all contributed to the concern about the way land should or should not be 
developed. 
Against this broad backdrop, the timing of the state of Georgia’s interest in land 
use planning must be understood in the more immediate context of the experience of 
rapid urbanization in metropolitan Atlanta, and the region’s central role in the state’s 
economy and politics.  By the mid-1980s, Atlanta had been experiencing sustained 
population and economic growth for the better part of 30 years.  The influx of people and 
jobs brought both pressure and opportunity for new development.  Housing, offices, 
stores, and all the accoutrements both necessary to support growth and help propel 
growth spread outward from the urban core like a ripple, turning small towns, farms, and 
forests into subdivisions, strip malls, and office parks: a vast low-density urban carpet.  
For many places swept into the regional fold, the notion of doing local planning, or 
managing what individuals do with their private land, became a necessary but confusing 
evil, one about which most local governments knew little.  Yet the side effects of not 
taking planning seriously were increasingly obvious to almost everyone on the inside.  
The rest of the country would also soon sit up and take notice. 
Yet amid this confusion, Atlanta had long hosted an active public discourse about 
regionalism, one that centered around a project of extending the reach of planning to 
places where it had little history.  Since 1971 this discourse had been revealed in the 
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work of the Atlanta Regional Commission, which played an important role as a 
demonstration site for new planning policies as well as an information broker.  As the 
march of urbanization stretched deeper into the north Georgia countryside, ARC’s role 
became more complex.  New state laws steadily supported the work of the Commission, 
in spite of periodic attempts to undercut it.  Through a variety of often overlapping 
channels, the Commission provided data, training, technical services, and advice to local 
governments within its jurisdiction, all part of a strategy to encourage a higher level of 
planning consciousness.  But at its heart, this effort remained incremental.  The steps to 
devising and implementing particular policies took time, and policies needed to appear 
flexible in order to win sufficient political support.  Georgia’s often conservative rural 
politics, coupled with a state supreme court that tended to read the rights of the individual 
property owner as sacrosanct, meant that major regulatory changes could only come 
about slowly. 
Lifting a page from ARC’s two decades of experience dealing with local 
governments in metro Atlanta, the incrementalism built into Georgia’s state-wide 
planning legislation should be measured by its clear-eyed understanding of the political 
situation, as much as for its timidity.  A good example of this was DCA’s delay in writing 
and publishing minimum planning standards until well after the enabling legislation was 
passed.  At first, the delay in publishing minimum standards looked like a concession to 
the rural legislators who seemed dead-set against any kind of mandatory planning law.  
But upon second glance it becomes obvious how the delay actually gave the agency and 
those in favor of stronger planning rules additional leverage, providing a cooling off 
period and letting the bureaucracy do its work in peace. 
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In effect, the growth of ARC (and parallel organizations in other regions), out of 
the combined effort of local, state, and federal governments, was the first step in a long-
term process of coupling economic growth to planned development.  Beginning in the 
minds of the first cadre of post-war metropolitan planners, officials, and businessmen, the 
value of planning and regional coordination was recognized early on for the predictability 
it could produce for investors, property owners, and businesses.  While the idea of 
regional planning found traction in its economic promise, its role evolved into a key tool 
in addressing serious environmental issues.  While the idea was hatched and nurtured in 
Atlanta in the early post-war years, with time and maturation it was eventually rolled out 
to the rest of the state.  Following the wave of urbanization that moved from the central 
city outward, and the accompanying transformation of the state’s political leadership, in 
effect the passage of the Georgia Planning Act in 1989 symbolized the extent that the 
influence of metropolitan Atlanta had finally reached: the entire state was now under its 
sway. 
The question as to why growth management would happen in Georgia, a place 
long perceived as conservative, pro-development, anti-environment, before it did in many 
ostensibly more planning friendly places in the U.S., brooks no simple answer.  Maybe 
Georgia’s growth management laws were the product of the imprint Jimmy Carter left 
through his gubernatorial term.  Maybe Georgia’s laws were actually meant to be hollow, 
a nod to responsible planning to appease a few vocal factions only to be ignored in the 
aftermath.  Or maybe Georgia’s handful of progressives found a model process for 
developing and implementing planning regulations within a political environment 
otherwise hostile to growth regulations. 
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Putting these pieces together in the context of Georgia’s political scene in the 
1970s, despite what has been suggested in other places, indicates that the state harbored a 
surprisingly progressive stance toward planning as a process.  No one would suggest that 
the urban landscape that had taken shape by 1990 was a model of compact urban 
development.  But by elevating planning to a position of importance within the state 
bureaucracy, the state had obviously invested in local, regional, and state planning as 
public institutions. 
If the early political careers of two influential state legislators who were members 
of the Quality Growth Commission, Roy Barnes and Johnny Isakson, are any indication, 
Georgia’s growth management laws were the result of a long-term investment in public 
planning, one with surprisingly broad consensus.  Both products of Cobb County, the 
differences between them in some ways were merely a result of party affiliation.89  
Barnes emerged from the state’s old democratic party, from a faction that had made 
strides in moving past its roots as the party of massive resistance to desegregation.  
Isakson identified himself with a centrist faction of the state’s republicans, a 
businessman’s version of the party that emphasized economic expansion and 
professionalizing government.  Barnes and Isakson worked together in the legislature to 
get the QGC’s recommendations through the necessary committees in tact.  Both were 
outspoken in their support of mandatory comprehensive planning.  Barnes and Isakson, 
perhaps more than any other state politicians of their generation, represent the strange 
dichotomy of Georgia’s land development politics in the years after 1970: agreement just 
below the surface that belies what otherwise appear to be fundamental disputes. 
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"That Northern Arc has had a life of its own," said Atlanta City Councilman Doug 
Alexander. "Every time we've tried to stop it, it keeps coming back to life." – Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, July 9, 2001 
 
Introduction 
By the early 1990s, resistance to regulation, a posture popular among many of 
Georgia’s local politicians, had been tempered by the long-term efforts to expand state 
control of land development.  The effect of environmental regulations and changing 
standards of planning, most visible in the bundle of planning laws passed in 1989, was 
beginning to be felt throughout the state, as minimum standards for local comprehensive 
plans were issued and the first wave of new plans were being reviewed for compliance.  
In many respects, the new comprehensive planning regulations were the inspiration for 
the state’s entrée into the world of growth management, and that practices developed in 
metro Atlanta were the model for planning in the rest of the state.  By the time the ARC 
turned twenty years old (1991), the Commission was entering a new phase of realizing 
the full promise of its scope and influence, building on its status as the center of the 
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region and state’s planning intelligence and continuing to balance its role as arbiter 
between local government and broader federal and state regulatory authorities.   
Through the 1980s, a decade book ended by economic recessions, population and 
employment growth in Atlanta continued almost unabated.  The 1990 Census counted 
just over 2.8 million souls in the eighteen counties surrounding the City.1 Ranked as the 
nation’s 12th largest urban region (and the largest MSA), metropolitan Atlanta had again 
seen population gains of more than 30% during a decade, maintaining its status one of the 
fastest growing urban regions in the US, growth that unleashed a wave of new 
urbanization across the low hills of the northern third of the state.  The speed with which 
rural, unincorporated places were overlaid with residential subdivisions and retail 
shopping centers encouraged a low level consternation over the effects of growth, even as 
the process of laying plans and infrastructure to support its continuation unfolded.  
Responding to the obvious on-the-ground changes that were a result of this growth, ARC 
began preliminary work on its next Regional Development Plan at the end of 1991. 
The election of Zell Miller as Governor in 1990, another long-serving Democrat 
legislator from North Georgia who cut his political teeth under Jimmy Carter, and who 
would be followed by Roy Barnes in 1998, promised a few more years of comparatively 
progressive, but decidedly status quo leadership.  Since the policies behind the thirty 
years of development leading up to this moment had been under the control of relatively 
stable political faction since the early 1970s, broadsides, attempts to overturn the political 
leadership, were usually mild and only partly successful.  Though Atlanta and Georgia 
had been stepping into a new position on the management and regulation of development, 
at least in terms of the shape of the regulatory process, the state and the region were in 
 253 
many respects no different from most other growing Sunbelt places, at least in terms of 
the visible evidence presented by the built environment. 
Two of the most important regulatory changes affecting land use revolved around 
a few key environmental issues, namely water quality and air quality.2 The Clean Water 
Act in 1972 literally had unleashed millions of federal dollars to build water treatment 
plants in cities, counties, and small towns around the country, resulting in both markedly 
cleaner discharges into the nation’s surface waterways but significantly increased 
capacity for wastewater treatment, which encouraged more development.3 Amendments 
to the Clean Air Act in 1970 and 1977 had helped push the refinement of the tools and 
techniques for measuring urban air quality and had tied specific measures of air quality to 
transportation planning and policy.  Though air quality in most urban regions showed 
only minor improvement during the 1970s and 1980s, the science of evaluating air 
quality improved quite dramatically, which turned out to be a necessary precursor to 
setting more stringent future air quality goals.4 
With the passage of another round of amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 
and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991, the federal 
government rekindled its interest in regional planning.  By reversing Reagan’s eight year 
long attempt to reduce and/or remove federal involvement in and oversight of regional 
planning, the return of powerful controls on development and infrastructure decisions 
begin pulling authority away from the whims of local politics.  The new regulations, 
signed into law by President George H.W. Bush, provided powerful new support to the 
work of public regional planning agencies, and offered new tools for furthering the 
transformation of the standard practices of regional planning.5 
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The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments made urban air quality a high profile 
environmental issue by setting new ambient air quality standards with lower thresholds of 
acceptability, which increased the number of heavily populated counties deemed out of 
compliance and forced many communities along the urban fringe which had previously 
escaped regulation to confront the effects of their land development and transportation 
planning practices.6 The amendments also saddled the public agencies responsible for 
managing regional transportation plans with the task of demonstrating that future 
investments in transportation infrastructure would help improve air quality (rather than 
merely prevent further decline).  ISTEA required a new set of criteria for how 
transportation funds should be allocated by regional planning agencies, with the intention 
of promoting more comprehensive and coordinated planning and finding a different 
balance between expenditures on different transportation modes.  Both laws focused on 
the importance of transportation infrastructure, especially high capacity roads, for its 
influence on metropolitan development.   
Since the 1940s, urban road systems have been planned at a regional scale, and 
conflicts over the planning and building of roads has offered a window into the 
intermingling of the political, bureaucratic, and public sides of the regional agencies 
responsible for transportation planning.  On one hand, the conflicts have typically 
revolved around the introduction of freeways into established urban settings, in the mold 
of Robert Moses and the Lower Manhattan Expressway, a phenomenon that has been 
well documented.7 The city of Atlanta itself was the site of several such conflicts.8 On the 
other hand, battles over suburban roads that have little impact on established 
neighborhoods have been far fewer, and have received virtually no documentation. Yet in 
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the late 1990s, metro Atlanta experienced just such a road battle, centered around a 
greenfield freeway (nicknamed the Northern Arc – a reference to its shape) that would 
have carved a path 
primarily through 
forests and pastures and 
a small handful of low-
density residential 
subdivisions, well 
beyond the urban core.9 
The fight over a 
limited-access highway 
that would have crossed 
the suburbs along the 
outer edge of 
Metropolitan Atlanta offers insight into the history of the region’s recent development, 
revealing the centrality of the ARC’s position, the climate of regional planning after the 
1989 growth management laws, and the renewed role of federal power after 
ISTEA/CAA.10 
But examining this road conflict in the suburbs north of Atlanta also allows us to 
explore the story of Roy Barnes, the final installment in the line of progressive Democrat 
Governors.  During his single term as governor, Barnes helped create and lead a political 
coalition under the banner of pushing the regional planning agenda into the future, in 
what would have been another major expansion of state power over existing land 
Figure 6.1: Northern Arc 
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development practices.  Yet Barnes’s agenda ultimately collapsed under the pressure of 
attempting to transform the institutions supporting the sustained period of urban growth 
that has characterized the last three decades.  A large part of this collapse stemmed from 
the Northern Arc.  The conflict surrounding the highway was among several events that 
helped defeat Barnes’s re-election, which put a Republican in the Governor’s Office and 
handed control of the state governing apparatus to the GOP for the first time since the end 
of Reconstruction.  At a broader level, the road fight demonstrated the changing character 
of struggles over the jurisdiction of (sub)urban space, which have their roots in both 
disputes over racial secession and neighborhood control and the growth of powerful state-
level land development regulations.11  
 
Building Up North 
Up through the completion of the urban freeway system in the early 1970s, 
Atlanta’s high-capacity road network had been planned and built around a presumption of 
periphery-to-center mobility.12 As constructed, the regional freeway system more or less 
followed routes that had been laid out in 1946, ten years before the Federal-Aid highway 
system was signed into law and thirty years before the interstates would really begin to 
help underwrite the region’s massive horizontal sprawl.13 By 1970, Atlanta’s urban 
system was comprised of four major roads, two that ran north/south (I-75 and I-85), one 
that ran east/west (I-20), and a ring road (I-285, nicknamed ‘the Perimeter’) that tied the 
north/south and east/west roads together.  Though the suburban counties north of the city 
were the largest and most rapidly developing sections of the region, the only high-
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capacity east-west route in the vicinity was the northernmost eight-mile stretch of the 
Perimeter (I-285). 
Though the 60-mile Perimeter was designed as a by-pass for long-distance 
through traffic, not as an urban arterial, new development along the highway had begun 
to transform its character even before the asphalt dried.  Changes in transportation 
behavior, related to the rise of multiple car households, the on-going entrance of middle-
class women into the workforce, and the decline of public transit ridership, contributed to 
congestion on the road.14 In the process, I-285 had come to resemble exactly the urban 
arterial road it had not been designed to become.  Drivers quickly learned to use the road 
to run errands, to shop, and to drive between a suburban home and a suburban workplace.  
Interchanges operated almost like regular street intersections, with buildings at first 
huddled at the edges of overpass bridges, and later, higher-rent office towers fronting the 
stretches of road between interchanges began to sprout, as if overlooking a picturesque 
promenade or boulevard or river.  The utility of the road helped push the number of 
vehicles traveling along the northern stretch of highway steadily upward over the years, 
which clogged not just the traffic lanes, but threw gridlock onto the arterial routes that 
crossed the highway and the segments of the two freeways (I-75 and I-85) that intersected 
it north of the city. 
As the vast unincorporated suburbs north of the city grew through the 1970s and 
1980s, a number of large subregional employment and shopping nodes developed along 
the busy corridors crisscrossing the triangle formed by the intersection of I-75, I-85, and 
the northern section of I-285.  Within the triangle, no less than five major shopping malls 
opened between 1970 and 1990, each positioned along the same segment of I-285 (which 
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was rapidly becoming like a decidedly un-quaint Main Street for the entire region).  First 
came the associated retail and commercial concerns that tend to co-locate with anchor 
shopping centers.  Later the corporate back offices came, and then the front offices.15 All 
told, this pearl string of development nodes attracted increasing numbers of commuters 
from all directions, but particularly commuters from other northern suburbs.  Between 
1960 and 1990, Atlanta’s two largest north suburban counties grew dramatically: 
Gwinnett’s population increased by 710% and Cobb’s grew by 290%.  With the 
seemingly endless influx of new comers in the 1980s, all constantly driving between 
population, employment, and shopping nodes, traffic congestion in the northern suburbs 
had turned into a significant issue by the middle of the 1980s.  As employment and 
residential locations further decentralized, and the distance between them grew, 
individuals and households were pulled in different directions, some commuting to the 
central business district but just as many going from suburb to suburb.  Without the 
option of crosstown mass transit, coupled with the wheel-like shape of the freeway 
system, the vast majority of these commuters drove, and most drove alone.16   
To make matters worse, metro Atlanta’s arterial and surface road system varied 
widely in quality and extent.  Major thoroughfares and arterials, many of which were old 
state routes, wound their way along the region’s predominant north/south oriented 
ridgelines, curving and twisting with the landscape.  In general, this class of roads 
remained part of the state system of general purpose highways, which subjected them to 
control by the Department of Transportation (and its predecessor agency, the State 
Highway Division).  The region’s surface streets, smaller in scale and controlled by local 
governments, tended to be far less comprehensively developed.17 For many years, 
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counties in Georgia had no standardized system for acquiring and planning future public 
rights-of-way.18 Since most north Georgia towns dated their origins to the mid-19th 
century, they had been able to establish grided street networks with little difficultly, but 
unincorporated counties, which lacked the necessary legal authority, did not.  And 
because so much of metropolitan Atlanta’s development was happening in 
unincorporated areas, a significant portion of the region’s surface streets and 
neighborhood roads were laid out and constructed by individual landowners and 
developers, only being turned over to local government control once the lots in the 
residential development had been sold.  The vast majority of these routes were designed 
to only serve specific land subdivisions, which meant that the internal street networks 
tended to be self-referencing and essentially fenced off (or cul-de-sac’d).  Without 
governmental oversight, adjacent subdivisions were only rarely connected together. 
The planning and building of a network of local roads was an expensive 
proposition that had fallen through the cracks.  While in theory road building had been 
largely left up to local governments, most of them were consistently constrained by 
funding.  Road building is, compared to other local government activities, a capital 
intensive undertaking that requires money and expertise beyond what most local 
governments can provide or raise themselves.  While capacity building money had been 
available from the USDOT through the 1970s, Reagan’s 1980s agenda had included 
curtailing federal funding of new infrastructure in favor of managing existing systems, a 
stance that made finding money to build local roads that much more difficult.  And while 
the state stepped in to pick up some of the slack, much of its focus was trained on 
building and maintaining the state highway system, which included a large number of so-
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called development roads, designed to connect rural counties to the Interstates.19 The 
ARC was not in the business of building roads (or anything else), which meant that most 
counties were left with little alternative but to accept new residential roads as ‘gifts’ from 
private developers.  As a result, aside from a few places, a secondary network of through 
routes did not emerge by accretion as in other regions of the country.  In other words, the 
grid so common in many urban areas simply never came to exist in metropolitan Atlanta, 
a fact that forced distributed traffic patterns into a constrained system of arterials and 
freeways. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the pressure of changing demands on the region’s 
transportation networks dramatically increased the yearly average number of hours of 
road congestion.  During this period, ARC produced two new Regional Development 
Plans as well as a series of corresponding regional transportation plans.  Both broad and 
specific in scope, these regional plans together enunciated the form the metropolitan road 
system should take, a form that continued to reiterate periphery-to-center connectivity.  
To some extent a product of inertia, the design of the urban freeway system was also 
related to a long-standing belief among regional planners that maintaining accessibility to 
Atlanta’s original central city business district (Downtown) and on the emerging 
Midtown business district would ensure the region’s overall health.  Yet the RDPs and 
transportation plans also projected much of the suburban development that would 
contradict the intentions of the road system.  The widening conflict between 
infrastructure design, projected development patterns, and limited financial resources was 
leading to a frustrating situation, one that would be further complicated by the changes in 
federal transportation and environmental policy in the 1990s.20 
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Planning For Air Quality 
While the popular perception of transportation, and especially automobile 
congestion, often centered on its economic and social burden (opportunity cost, financial 
cost, time cost, congestion), by the early 1980s the indicators used to measure and 
evaluate Atlanta’s air quality also revealed an up tick in the number and variety of 
environmental problems connected to the way the region’s transportation system had 
been constructed and the development it had helped encourage.  In short, the rapidly 
expanding number of automobile and truck trips, spurred by a rapidly growing population 
and job market spread across the region, appeared to be causing a steady deterioration of 
the region’s air quality.21 The consequences of this trend would become apparent by the 
end of the 1990s, as the federal government, working primarily through EPA, would 
repeatedly refine and expand the scope of urban air quality regulations. 
The history of government concern over urban air quality extends all the way 
back to 1955, when the first version of the federal Air Pollution Control Act was passed 
by Congress.  The law provided money to support pollution research, but did not specify 
measures of control.  In 1963, Congress passed the first version of the modern Clean Air 
Act, which established federal interest in pollution control and set the first emissions 
standards for large stationary sources.  In 1967, the Air Quality Act expanded the scope 
federal involvement beyond setting stationary source standards and into regional ambient 
air monitoring (Air Quality Control Regions) and point-source inspections, as well as 
introducing the idea of state implementation plans (SIP) for controlling future pollution.22 
While mild in terms of its language and effect, in part a reflection of the imprecision of 
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environmental science at the time, the 1967 act took the critical step of identifying the 
long-term environmental side effects that the nation’s burgeoning automobile-oriented 
transportation system might be expected to induce.  Major revisions to federal air policy 
came again in 1970, coinciding with the upwelling of popular support for environmental 
issues (1970 was the inaugural Earth Day) and the beginning of the congressional debates 
about a national land use policy.  The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act transformed 
the policy into a sharper regulatory instrument, establishing ambient air quality guidelines 
that urban regions would be expected meet (National Ambient Air Quality Standards – 
NAAQS), forging much more explicit links between regional plans and environmental 
quality, and refining the goals of the state implementation plans.23  
In 1977, Congress passed another round of revisions to the Clean Air Act, which 
better defined its intentions, expanded further the role of states in meeting air quality 
goals, toughened the requirements for urban areas to remain in compliance, and finally 
set deadlines by which regions would be expected to demonstrate improvements in 
ambient air quality.  The new amendments required states and their regional planning 
agencies to work cooperatively to write and adopt a state implementation plan that set out 
specific steps for managing transportation systems to avoid significant increases in the 
emission of several measurable atmospheric pollutants.  The amendments also 
established a system to classify counties according to their relative pollution levels, 
which would in part determine the allocation of future federal transportation funds.24 
Once written and approved by the state, the SIP would be sent to EPA for final approval; 
after a nod from EPA, the SIP would become the primary guiding agreement between 
urban regions, states, and federal agencies regarding air quality.25 
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The 1977 clean air amendments stated that responsibility for managing the state 
air quality program be allocated to an appropriate state agency, which in Georgia was the 
comparatively green Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the agency Jimmy Carter 
helped create to consolidate into a single office what had been disparate environmental 
programs scattered throughout the state bureaucracy.  Since the heavily populated 
counties in the Atlanta region made the biggest contribution to the state’s vehicle 
emissions, and the Clean Air Act was designed to work around county boundaries, the 
focus of the state’s air quality planning would be centered there.  Though ARC was the 
leading agency in process of regional planning, GDOT and DNR played significant roles 
as well, and with the introduction of new air quality rules, new levels of cooperation 
between ARC, DNR, and GDOT, were necessary.  For this to happen, the process of 
developing the SIP and ARC’s existing transportation planning process had to mutually 
reinforce one another, which meant that the new air quality requirements needed to fit 
within existing procedures that defined regional planning.   
Because the first measurements of Atlanta’s air quality found it within an 
acceptable range, the first SIP, written and approved in 1980, presented few major 
suggestions for changing the existing trajectory of development.  It’s major contribution 
was outlining a region-wide private vehicle inspection program designed to gather 
enough data to set a baseline that would then allow the state to monitor changes in 
automobile emissions over time, which could be used to develop a strategy for further 
reductions in the future. 
But just two years later, in 1982, new air measurements (more accurate) revealed 
that a significant portion of metro Atlanta was beginning to exceed the minimum 
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threshold levels for ground-level ozone, one of the two key air quality indicators EPA 
adopted to enforce the provisions in the latest Clean Air Act updates.  As a result, EPA 
immediately placed ten metro Atlanta counties in the “Serious” category based on 
elevated levels of ozone.26 This designation meant that DNR, GDOT, and ARC would 
now be required to revise the region’s transportation plans, measuring those revisions 
against an air pollution model that correlated infrastructure, travel behavior, and various 
climatic conditions, in order show that the future impact of regional transportation plans.  
By virtue of the region’s lapsing air quality designation, ARC’s current plan for future 
transportation projects would be required to demonstrate that the regional agency was 
making a good faith effort to reduce emissions and meet future air quality standards.  The 
lapse also meant that all subsequent updates to the region’s transportation plans would 
have to be tested against EPA’s air quality models.   
Over the next eight years, EPA reviewed and approved a number of minor 
updates to ARC’s regional transportation plans, while continuing to monitor the levels of 
carbon monoxide and ground level ozone across the non-attainment counties.  Despite the 
regular approvals of the transportation planning process, measurements of CO and O3 
showed levels very slowly but steadily rising across the region.     
Yet even with a rapidly growing population, Atlanta’s air quality only fell 
completely out of compliance with established ground level ozone levels an average of 
about five days a year between 1983 and 1990, a slight bump from the first few years of 
the 1980s .27 Some of the change could be attributed to the simple increase in the number 
of cars and trucks on the roads and the miles those vehicles were driven, a result of a 
growing and mobile population living in a large, complex metropolitan region.  Another 
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part could be attributed to the vagaries of Atlanta’s humid climate and the happenstance 
that comes with how, when, and where air samples are taken.28 Yet an important part of 
the increase could only be related to the regional plans themselves, a connection the EPA 
explicitly made in its regulations.  Regional planning agencies were required to use 
specified urban simulation models to project future air quality based on changes in 
population, transportation infrastructure, and land use.  The EPA used the outputs of the 
models to determine if a region’s planning efforts were on track to meet pre-established 
air quality standards.  The reasoning behind this requirement was simple.  An increase in 
population does not necessarily lead to an increase in automobile trips, or an increase in 
the length of the average trip, but because of how the plans were written in Atlanta, it 
did.29 
 
The Outer Perimeter 
If ever there was proof that bad ideas never die, we need to look only as far as the 
ancestry of the Northern Arc, which began life with a more literal name: the Outer 
Perimeter.  The idea for a 200-hundred mile long, limited-access highway encircling all 
of metro Atlanta was first laid down in plan form in the early 1970s (but was dreamed up 
in the late late-1960s), toward the end of the halcyon days when the federal transportation 
funding machine ran smoothly, and was oriented toward big new construction projects 
rather than maintenance.  The earliest incarnation of the road, appearing in the late 1960s 
as a congestion relief route for I-285, was scuttled by ARMPC and the state before any 
detailed planning happened.30 In mid-1971 the idea for another, longer version of the 
outer loop emerged from a General Assembly transportation study committee, though it 
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gained little traction with the state highway department and quietly disappeared into the 
night.31  
As the then-new Atlanta Regional Commission was getting to work, the road was 
again discussed in a staff report from 1973, which offered up the possibility that a second 
ring road might be useful if the region met its long-term growth expectations.  Within the 
internal agency conversation at the time, the Outer Loop occupied an intriguing but by no 
means central position in on-going regional transportation planning efforts.  Arguments 
in favor of building the road included the potential to reroute growing long-distance truck 
traffic from a trajectory that takes it near the center of the region, providing an additional 
high-speed, east-west linkage, and boosting the economic development potential of the 
rural, Appalachian foothills counties north of Atlanta. Arguments against the road 
cautioned that its ability to relieve or reduce traffic would likely be limited, the exorbitant 
cost would jeopardize funds for other transportation projects in the state, and its impact 
on the natural environment would be substantial.32   
By the mid-1970s Atlanta’s urban highway segments were complete and final 
design and preliminary construction on the MARTA heavy rail transit system was 
underway.  When these factors were considered against the Outer Perimeter’s estimated 
cost, and ARC’s effort to strike a new balance between investments in roads and other 
transport modes (at the encouragement of USDOT), the road was pushed onto what 
seemed like a permanent back burner and out of ARC’s long term regional transportation 
plans.33   
But by the early 1980s, as air quality was beginning to be realized as a powerful 
tool for reigning in overzealous road building regimes, ironically another push for the 
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Outer Loop was poised to begin.  With Georgia’s rapid growth through the 1970s, 
demand for new road investment ran high.  A new state program for developmental 
highways had been created by the General Assembly in 1989 at the behest of Governor 
Joe Frank Harris, the Governor’s Road Improvement Program (GRIP), a program that 
provided state funds for planning and building highways in non-urban counties to support 
economic development.  Presided over by the Governor and GDOT, almost all of the 
GRIP territory remained outside the purview of the Atlanta metropolitan planning 
apparatus, and thus not subject to its review or federal air quality standards.  And while 
modest development highways were nothing new in the state, the budget for expanding 
and building bigger highways had grown more substantial as the state’s tax revenues had 
increased.34  
Thus under the umbrella of the GRIP, a newer, slightly different version of the 
Outer Perimeter was proposed by GDOT in 1986.  Yet in GDOT’s updated estimate, the 
new version of the Outer Perimeter was expected to cost upwards of $1 billion, which 
was far more than GRIP could possibly muster on its own, and there was little prospect 
for additional help from the federal government.  Not easily deterred, GDOT pushed 
ahead with internal preliminary planning for a few segments of the road, hoping that 
some as yet untapped source of funding could be generated within the state or a change in 
federal policy would be in the offing.35 While projects in the developmental highway 
system continued to move forward each year, the Outer Loop portion garnered no 
consistent support over the next several years (least of all from Governor Harris), having 
been discussed in annual budget sessions in the General Assembly, but never having 
found anyone with enough political muscle to push the project forward.  The fact that 
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certain portions of the road ran right along the edge of ARC’s jurisdiction meant that any 
decision to begin building the road would require the Commission’s formal approval.  
Even with no real support, as a result of size and cost and sheer magnitude the road 
remained visible, periodically appearing in the pages of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
which kept it closer to the public imagination than its actual likelihood of getting built 
probably warranted.36  
In early 1991, ARC staff began another multi-year process of updating the 
Regional Development Plan.  But this time the update process was redesigned, partly in 
response to the Georgia Planning Act and partly as a result of ISTEA, to include 
extensive public input.  The new update to the RDP had been dubbed Vision 2020, a 
clever name that attempted to capture both the ‘visioning’ at the heart of the process and 
the planning horizon over which the new plan would stretch.  By orchestrating dozens of 
public events across the region, the level of participation and publicity far outstripped any 
previous effort.  A number of regional issues emerged out of these meetings, but none 
more challenging and charged that the Outer Perimeter. During the period of public input, 
the road was a consistent item of discussion (perhaps a result of the AJC’s reporting), 
with both proponents and opponents.  In effect, the perception of GDOT as the driving 
force behind the road helped fracture the transportation planning conversation, which was 
the first step in the transformation of the Outer Perimeter into a central regional conflict.  
In response to what looked like a looming storm over the issue of the road, and its ability 
to sustain itself in spite of the odds against it, in 1993 ARC staff (at the direction of its 
governing board) began an intensive, systematic analysis of the Outer Perimeter, as a side 
project of the new RDP, which was nearing completion.37  
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The ARC study of the feasibility of building the road was presented in a series of 
reports, which attempted to examine a no-build scenario as well as several versions of the 
road, each varying by extent (some were not complete circles) and length of radius from 
the central city.  Individual segments of several of the versions were also examined 
separately.38 The staff reports explored the cost of acquiring land and the building costs 
of the different versions of the road, projected the average number of daily vehicles that 
would use different stretches of the road, and analyzed likely air quality impacts.  
Collectively, the reports concluded that any version of the entire loop would be 
unsuitable, in terms of congestion relief, cost, and environmental externalities.  But the 
reports left open the possibility of a northern segment of the road, a 60-mile stretch 
between I-85 and I-75 through the most congested part of the region, becoming feasible 
in the future.39 While far from a glowing endorsement of this segment, the reports 
suggested further study.  
Given the indeterminate effect of the road, the conclusions of the study were not 
without controversy.  As the drafts of the staff reports circulated among ARC’s various 
policy subcommittees, several disagreements arose about what policy recommendations 
should be issued regarding the road. Though the report considered certain segments of the 
road to be the more viable than others, even while dismissing the feasibility of the entire 
road, individual subcommittees came to different conclusions about policy.  Some 
wanted the entire project deleted from the transportation plan, some wanted a few 
segments of the road but no possibility for anything more, and some wanted the northern 
segment now plus plans for completing the rest of the road in the future.  Within the 
subcommittees, votes on policy recommendations fell along thin margins.40  
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While the staff reports and subcommittee votes were important, it was up to the 
full board to vote on a recommendation for what to do about the road.  A decision to 
include or exclude the road from regional development plans would ultimately determine 
its eligibility for federal funds, which would in turn more or less decide if it would be 
built.  Of course, all of this would depend on the approval of EPA and the impact of the 
road on the region’s air quality. 
When the board gathered to vote on a final recommendation, members remained 
divided on the value of the road.  Subcommittee reports had been presented and positions 
staked.  After a rather spirited discussion among the board, a compromise between 
proponents and opponents was agreed to.  Introduced and supported by the commission 
chair, who had been a vocal supporter of the entire road, the comprise plan directed staff 
to further analyze the 60-mile northern segment of the road connecting I-75 to Georgia 
Highway 316 (which would now be known as the Northern Arc) for details about its 
impact on conformance with federal air quality standards and to search for potential 
sources of financing.  This northern segment of the road had a radius stretching a little 
more than 30 miles from the central city, and it would connect the region’s four major 
north-south freeway routes, I-75, Georgia 400, I-85, and Georgia 316.   The compromise 
also allowed future study by commission staff of a shorter eastern segment (20 miles) of 
the road, between I-75 and I-20.  Any formal consideration or study of remaining 
segments of the loop was rejected.  Instead, staff was instructed to look for transportation 
alternatives to building a new road.41 All of the immediate tasks related to the road would 
be included in updates to regional transportation plans, a step that would allow projects to 
move into more detailed design and engineering phases, as funding became available.42  
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Despite the staff research studies and the resolution of the ARC board, there was 
still little indication that money would be available to actually engineer and build the 
Northern Arc, given what was only an estimated price tag and very preliminary research 
into routing.  While including the Northern Arc in the region’s transportation plans 
opened the door to design and construction, and certainly signaled a new level of intent, 
the road remained mired in public controversy and bore the stigma of becoming the 
largest transportation project in the state’s history (even though its price tag was just an 
estimate).  ARC was far from committed to the project, and the hurdles that remained 
would ultimately prove too much to overcome.43 
 
Air Quality Gets Serious 
Stepping back to 1991, recognition of the region’s burgeoning air quality problem 
was reverberating loudly throughout the planning and development community.44 One 
year earlier, Congress had passed a major amendment to the Clean Air Act, transforming 
the law again, reclassifying acceptable levels of pollutants, specifically targeting mobile 
sources of emissions, and directing state, regional, and local governments to come up 
with new ways to deal with seemingly intractable urban air quality problems.  As a result 
of these changes, more counties were added to the list of those that violated pollution 
thresholds on a periodic basis and some counties were bumped from a lower category to a 
higher category.  New deadlines were established for non-attainment counties and regions 
to demonstrate how their efforts would address sources of air pollution (particularly 
mobile sources).  The new law promised that without concerted action, particularly dirty 
urban regions would begin to see their access to federal transportation funds restricted. 
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Thirteen counties (up from ten) in metro Atlanta were promptly deemed out of air 
quality compliance upon the adoption of the new 1990 clean air standards.  In an effort to 
reduce the overall impact of mobile source emissions on the nation’s air, the new 
amendments (like the earlier amendments) required urban regions deemed non-compliant 
to revise their future transportation plans to clearly show how they would bring about a 
fifteen percent improvement in the measure of two major air pollutants, ozone and carbon 
monoxide, between 1994 and 1996.  After 1996, however, a three percent per year rate of 
improvement was required until 1999, at which point a re-evaluation would occur. 
The revisions to the CAA directed the states to continue to play an integral role in 
the process of demonstrating improvement.45 An update to the existing State 
Improvement Plan (SIP) was required to set new air quality standards that reflected the 
improvements required by the act.  To meet the new deadlines, ARC, DNR, and GDOT 
developed an update to the SIP and submitted it to EPA in 1993 (around the time the 
Outer Loop was being debated by ARC).  After initial tests of the revised SIP, EPA ruled 
that the plan as written did not effectively show how metro Atlanta’s non-attainment 
counties would meet air quality standards by the 1999 deadline, sending the plan back to 
the state for revision.  Thus began a back and forth between the state and EPA over the 
fate of the air quality plan.  Between 1993 and 1996, DNR, ARC, and GDOT were given 
a series of extensions, which ostensibly gave them time to revise the plan into a condition 
that would pass EPA’s compliance test.   
Because of the serious air quality status of Atlanta’s metro counties, an approved 
SIP was non-negotiable; it had to become a central piece of the region’s transportation 
plans.  Without an acceptable SIP, EPA would refuse to approve any further updates to 
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regional transportation plans (because updates had to show conformance with the 
standards set out in the SIP).  Without updated and conforming transportation plans, 
many transportation projects would no longer be eligible for federal funding.  Therefore 
an approved SIP was a critical step if the region expected to continue receiving its share 
federal transportation funds.  At the end of this period, if the agencies failed to produce a 
qualifying plan, the state would be left in a difficult position, unable to demonstrate 
compliance and subject to the loss of a portion of its federal transportation funds (though 
it was uncertain whether EPA would hold to its initial standards).46 
During the period (1993 to 1996) of negotiation, shifting compromises between 
the EPA, DNR, GDOT, and ARC allowed transportation funding to continue to flow 
even as the actual planning strategies the region would use to pull itself into conformity 
with ambient air quality standards were still being settled.  Finally, in mid-1996, a revised 
draft of the SIP was tested against EPA’s air quality model as required by the CAA.  The 
plan failed again.  Contrary to its stated intent, the state’s plan, more specifically the 
projects contained therein, showed air quality actually getting worse by 1999, leading the 
region in the opposite direction of its goal.  As expected, EPA indicated that it would 
stick to its earlier promise that without an approved plan, any project designed to add 
road capacity would be ruled ineligible to receive federal funds beginning in early 1997 
and continuing until the state presented an approvable SIP (requests for funds to support 
non-motorized infrastructure or managing existing infrastructure projects would remain 
eligible).   
The local reaction was swift.  The media editorialized vehemently, arguing that 
the state’s failed plan was a pointed indictment of metro Atlanta’s broken transportation 
 274 
planning process.47 The political boards of ARC and GDOT absorbed the brunt of this 
criticism.  The impact of EPA’s decision, and the publicity it generated, forced ARC and 
its partners to immediately revisit the plan, this time with a sense of urgency.  Thus began 
a haphazard process of removing road projects from the plan in the hope of getting down 
to a set of projects that could pass air quality tests, including some that were politically 
popular but environmentally damaging (and contributed to the rejection of the SIP).48 
EPA’s decision to hold fast on its threat to cut funding was a wake up for many who had 
either assumed a compromise would be reached or lacked a nuanced understanding of 
how the regional planning process had been changing, and set off a frantic scramble by 
ARC and the state to quickly revise the region’s transportation plans, which meant 
learning to walk a very fine line between necessary and politically possible actions.  
There were attempts in several suburbs to develop local sources of road funding that 
would not be subject to federal review, thus providing a backdoor for deleted projects to 
go forward, but due to the tremendous cost and complexity of planning and building 
roads, these efforts failed.49 
The state also pursued several broader strategies that would hopefully help 
demonstrate concrete steps toward future air quality improvement.  In addition to 
changing the balance of road projects versus non-motorized projects, the strategies 
included a major expansion of the regional auto emissions testing program.  Mandatory, 
bi-annual testing of all private vehicles was expanded from the region’s four core 
counties to all thirteen in the non-attainment zone, and was accompanied by lowering the 
thresholds.  Emissions was a politically easy sell since it required only minor change in 
behavior and standard practice, and could be accomplished without the approval of the 
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General Assembly.  And projects deemed to be non-polluting, sidewalks, bike lanes, 
intersection improvements, were still permitted, so ARC encouraged metro counties to 
move quickly to add requests for money to build non-auto infrastructure to the list of 
projects to be funded, even as certain road projects had been targeted for removal.  ARC, 
GDOT, and DNR continued to deliberate over revisions to the SIP and regional 
transportation plans during the remainder of 1996, though amid an increasingly confused 
and acrimonious context.50 An easy solution to a looming restriction on building new 
road capacity was not forthcoming.  Compromise proved to be a nearly impossible 
conundrum: no one wanted to give up projects but no one wanted to lose federal money. 
In a rather disingenuous attempt to circumvent EPA’s pending enforcement 
action, in very early 1997 ARC and GDOT together came up with a plan to ‘grandfather’ 
several of the problematic capacity-adding transportation projects just as the freeze in 
federal money was due to take effect.  By rushing through the environmental impact 
statement process, using an expedited approval, the grandfathering plan would have 
allowed almost 30 separate capacity adding projects to move forward before funds were 
cut.  In fact, the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments did provide for a process for 
grandfathering transportation projects that had been budgeted if they also had approved 
environmental impact statements complete by the time a funding freeze went into effect.  
Under the grandfathering exception, the projects would be allowed to move forward even 
if the region failed to develop a transportation plan that conformed to air quality 
regulations.  But in order for grandfathered projects to move forward, both the USDOT 
and EPA had to fully sign off, signaling all necessary planning activities were in place 
and accomplished in good faith. 
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Then, in June 1997, the Clinton Administration announced that the EPA would 
impose tougher ground-level ozone standards for urban regions, making compliance for 
existing non-attainment metropolitan areas like Atlanta more difficult but simultaneously 
granting those regions an extra five years to demonstrate efforts to comply (pushing the 
deadline back to 2004 from 1999).  The rule change presented a decision: keep existing, 
lower air quality standards but meet the earlier deadline, or buy some time but face a 
higher threshold down the line.  As discussions continued between ARC and GDOT 
about which path to take and how to keep the grandfathered projects in the plan, another 
intentional loophole in the 1990 CAA amendments prompted questions from 
environmental organizations about the legality of their tactic.51    
In late 1997, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) wrote a letter to USDOT 
charging that Atlanta officials were disingenuously manipulating the grandfathering 
clause in the CAA, violating federal laws in the process.52 One of the features of the 
Clean Air Act was the relatively open door for lawsuits.  In effect, the 1970 amendments 
were designed to allow legal action as a check on the regulation and enforcement process.  
Environmental organizations were able to take advantage of this opening to force 
government to take action in cases where action was needed but government had failed.53 
As a result of the EDF request, USDOT turned its attention to several of the projects in 
ARC’s list, asking new questions about the legitimacy of their grandfathered status and 
the completeness of the environmental impact statements filed on their behalf.  But even 
as the projects were being scrutinized, ARC and the state put their heads down and 
plowed ahead, passing an interim transportation plan at the end of December that 
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included the entire list of grandfathered projects, even the ones still under federal scrutiny 
(all of which were in the end given the green light).  
With interim plans in place to keep the transportation planning process going over 
the short term, the commission and the state turned their full attention in the new year to 
creating a long-term transportation plan (SIP) that would bring the region into conformity 
with air quality standards and release the planning process from the EPA’s grip.54 But in 
November 1998, ARC’s efforts to quietly maintain its process were shaken by a 
threatened lawsuit from several local environmental groups, including the Sierra Club 
and the Georgia Conservancy (represented by attorneys from the Southern Environmental 
Law Center), which alleged that the actions of the ARC, the state, USDOT, and EPA to 
continue the existing transportation planning process and grandfather projects were 
purposive efforts to undermine the spirit of the regulations designed to clean up the 
region’s air.55   
The following February (1999), the group made good on its threat and filed the 
first of what would be a series of lawsuits (enough that group would later be nicknamed 
the ‘Roadblockers’ by the local media).  The lawsuits variously charged that ARC and 
GDOT, with USDOT and EPA approval, illegally attempted to include road building 
projects under the grandfather clause of the Clean Air Act.  The agencies attempted to put 
these projects into the existing funding pipeline, despite the fact that construction had not 
begun and several of the projects did not have approved environmental impact 
statements, and all in spite of the fact that there was no conforming SIP.56 
In March, the U.S. Appeals Court for the federal district in Washington DC ruled 
in a different, but analogous case that the prevailing standards USDOT was using to 
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determine if grandfathered road projects would be allowed in areas in violation of the 
Clean Air Act was in fact illegal, a decision that did not bear directly on metro Atlanta 
but served notice that a settlement between ARC and the environmental plaintiffs would 
likely benefit everyone involved, especially the state (which had the most to lose).  And 
that is what happened the following June, when an out-of-court settlement was negotiated 
that canceled the vast majority of the grandfathered road projects, provided for an 
independent panel of experts to oversee ARC’s air quality modeling process during the 
ongoing update to regional transportation plans, and required an analysis of the likely 
impact of the proposed transportation plans on low-income and non-white populations.57   
In the meantime, ARC and the state had completed further revisions to the State 
Implementation Plan and resubmitted the plan for EPA evaluation.  In December 1999, 
EPA notified ARC and Georgia DNR that its latest version of the SIP, while close, again 
failed to show that metro Atlanta would be able to meet future air quality standards with 
the mix of projects included in the plan.  In response, the state quickly changed the plan 
according to EPA’s suggestions, which included expanding the number of counties 
covered by annual auto emissions testing, instituting stricter pollution controls on 
industries in counties on the fringes of metro Atlanta, upgrading the pollution control 
systems of several electric power plants close to Atlanta, and requiring a lower-sulfur fuel 
to be sold in most North Georgia counties.  Based on these changes, EPA finally 




Zell Miller hid somewhere in the Governor’s office during the 1990s, while 
Atlanta’s transportation planning process slowly worked its way into crisis.  While at the 
time he could have been described as a comparatively liberal Democrat from a small, 
rural county in northeastern Georgia, Miller had mostly remained out of the spotlight on 
the state’s transportation problems.  Staking his legacy on education reform and 
overseeing the introduction of the state lottery, planning and the natural environment had 
never been one of Miller’s pet issues.  He had earned his political chops first as a 
legislator in the 1960s, as chairman of the state democratic party during Jimmy Carter’s 
term, and then as Lt. Governor to both George Busbee and Joe Frank Harris’ Lt. during 
the late 1970s and 1980s.  Winning the 1990 gubernatorial election, and again in 1994, 
Miller remained more or less hands off on big planning and environmental issues, leaving 
that work to his close political allies at the Department of Transportation, and since much 
of the Atlanta controversy unfolded toward the end of this second term, he let the issue 
fall to whoever would become the next Governor.59 
Roy Barnes, who had been an important player in the legislature almost from the 
moment he was first elected to the General Assembly in 1974, emerged early on as a 
contender for the Governor’s office during the 1998 campaign season.  Closely 
associated with Joe Frank Harris, and with a vocal interest in metro Atlanta, planning, 
and environmental issues, Barnes was the embodiment of a moderate, Clinton-esque 
democrat from one of the more conservative corners of Atlanta’s suburbs.  Winning the 
November general election over a well financed but emotionally uninspiring Republican, 
Barnes had campaigned on a platform that made reforming Atlanta’s regional planning 
process one of his key planks.  Among other promises, Barnes vowed to break the air 
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quality logjam that had been building during the two years before the election.  In a state 
that appeared to be increasingly trending Republican and suburban, Barnes offered a 
balance of connectedness to the state’s old, mostly rural political guard (required to get 
anything through the legislature), sensitivity toward new suburban issues, and a 
progressive environmentalism that resonated with the urban electorate.  With metro 
Atlanta falling out of air quality compliance, the suspension of a portion of federal road 
building funds, and a pending lawsuit by a collection of environmental organizations, the 
business-as-usual arrangement that long characterized the region’s existing planning 
process was beginning to show signs of unraveling.  Barnes came into office with a self-
assigned mandate to do something to get the regional transportation planning process 
back into compliance, while protecting the state’s natural resources and ensuring 
continued economic growth.60 Among other things, he promised to help create a powerful 
new regional planning authority that would significantly expand land development 
controls, an effort that would in some respects define his legacy. 
Though young, Barnes arrived at the doorstep of the Governor’s mansion as a 
relatively old legislative hand.  By the time he won the Governor’s Mansion, Barnes had 
served 22 years in the General Assembly, 16 in the senate and six in the house.  Perhaps 
more importantly, he had been one of the floor leaders in 1989 when the bills to create 
the Georgia Planning Act were ushered through the legislature.  Having worked on such 
significant legislation, laws that changed the practice of local government planning, 
Barnes was versed in the details of planning and environmental policy as well as political 
expediency.  He had experienced the sensitive politics of convincing rural legislators to 
accept greater state control of land development practices, an idea that often directly 
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contradicted their political identities.  But with the publicity Atlanta’s air quality crisis 
had generated, establishing a new and substantially more powerful regional planning 
agency, in effect another step in the on-going extension of state power, became Barnes’ 
most urgent post-election priority, and one he wasted little time pursuing.61 
Introducing the bill that would become the Georgia Regional Transportation 
Authority (GRTA) in the first weeks of the 1999 session of the General Assembly, 
Barnes worked to push the legislation quickly through in order to avoid as much 
resistance as possible.  Drawing on his legislative experience, Barnes understood that by 
acting quickly, and striking early in the session, most legislators would know little about 
the bill they were voting on, thereby increasing its chances of passing.62 The idea of an 
agency like GRTA, with the power to raise bonds, veto zoning decisions, and built 
transportation systems, had been around the region for many years, and could be dated all 
the way back to the origins of the ARC.  Yet honest attempts at building an agency with 
so much authority had never really gained much foothold.  During the late 1960s, when 
the fate of Atlanta’s regional planning agency was being debated, conversations about the 
shape the new agency should take regularly mentioned including zoning review and 
revenue raising, as well as direct election of its political board, but none of those powers 
made it into the final version of the ARC legislation.  Over the next twenty years, 
expanding the power of the Commission had been a discussion endemic to the regional 
planning community, but moves to actually go through the process never moved into the 
necessary legislative context.63 But in the mid-1990s, as the transportation crisis was 
beginning to coalesce, the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce convened a group of 
business and government leaders to come up with ideas for solving the region’s air 
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quality crisis.  The idea that emerged, a throwback to conversations about ARC, was an 
agency along the lines of GRTA.64  
A powerful governmental body on paper, the legislation that created GRTA 
opened a new front in the relationship between the state, the region, and local 
governments.  In short, the agency was directed to support and strengthen existing 
programs for coordinating land use and transportation planning across jurisdictions in 
metro Atlanta, serving as an intermediary between the state and ARC.  Among the 
powers granted the Authority was the ability to float public bonds to raise capital funds, 
revise and modify regional transportation plans, build and operate transit systems, and 
overrule local zoning decisions on major projects.  Having such a broad array of powers, 
GRTA was met with a heightened sense of expectation, which ranged from glee to 
outright hostility (depending on the source).  With the explicit support of the conservative 
metropolitan business community and a collection of traditional liberal allies (blacks, 
urban whites, environmentalists), Barnes and GRTA were together expected to mount a 
vigorous response to the crisis of out-of-control urban sprawl and traffic congestion, and 
present another installment in the accumulation of control over land development.65     
The new authority was to be governed by a 15-member board appointed by the 
Governor.  Joel Cowan, a local planner/developer with deep political connections to 
Harris and Barnes, and who had been instrumental in the development of the Georgia 
Planning Act, was named chairman of the new agency, and a professor of city planning 
from Georgia Tech was hired as executive director.  Other members of the board 
included Barnes’ friends, political contributors, and a few prominent members of the 
business and political community (including Shirley Franklin, future Mayor of the city of 
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Atlanta).  Members would serve at the pleasure of the Governor.  In the event of a change 
in administration, they would be subject to replacement.  In its earliest days in mid-1999, 
GRTA worked to clarify its role in the region, build relationships with ARC and GDOT, 
and set up an administrative structure (including building a modest professional staff) that 
would allow it to carry out its charge.  By the end of GRTA’s first year in operation, the 
agency had requested a 600% increase in its budget to fund a substantial expansion of its 
staff, and had begun to exert itself in the regional planning process.66 
After ARC approved a revised transportation plan in October of 1999, GRTA 
faced its first major test early in 2000: reviewing the plan before its submission to EPA, 
which required close collaboration between the two agencies.  Since EPA had tentatively 
approved Georgia’s SIP in February of 2000, the path for getting the USDOT stamp of 
approval on the region’s transportation plans was finally clear, pending GRTA’s 
agreement.  That previous August (1999), evidence of the difficulty of integrating GRTA 
into the work of ARC and the pre-existing regionalist coalition had been reported in the 
local media.  Observers were worried that conflict between the agencies might destroy 
the planning process and any hopes for solving the region’s planning problems.  
Nevertheless, whatever initial conflict existed between the agencies slowly resolved its 
self as the agencies worked together during the coming months.  In June of 2000 GRTA 
unanimously approved the updated transportation plan.67 During the subsequent twelve 
months, GRTA began moving more aggressively to make its presence felt across the 
region, negotiating a contract to plan and operate a local bus system in Clayton County, 
convincing ten counties to join a metropolitan-wide commuter bus network, and getting 
involved in the process of reviewing major regional developments.  Despite much initial 
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hand wringing about GRTA’s potential role in the region, particularly among local 
governments, by early 2001 the agency had begun to look like the firm but reasonable 
guiding hand that it was supposed to be.68 
Gearing Up For Battle 
In the wake of EPA’s approval of Georgia’s SIP in February of 2000, controversy 
over the process used to reach agreement on the plan intensified.  Though approval of the 
plan was pending, it had not yet been fully signed off on by USDOT, questions about the 
legality of the updates continued to surface.  And with final approval looming, the door 
would be open for ARC and the state to move forward with final approval of updates to 
regional transportation plans, thereby fully re-opening the flow of federal road building 
money.  Once this step had been taken, an injunction would be much more difficult to 
obtain.  The collection of local and national environmental agencies that had stepped in to 
challenge (and successfully thwart) ARC and GDOT’s previous attempts to grandfather 
transportation projects had become quite interested in using Atlanta as a test case of the 
strength of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Therefore in April, before 
USDOT or GRTA approved the regional transportation plan, and after an inquiry about 
the agreement between ARC, the state, and EPA failed to produce an acceptable 
response, the environmentalist collective filed a suit in Atlanta’s federal district court 
against EPA, charging that the agency illegally extended the state’s compliance deadline 
and approved a plan based on potentially flawed motor vehicle emissions data.69  
In June, GRTA approved the plan, but in July the court granted a stay, preventing 
USDOT and EPA from giving final approval to the plan until the full case against the 
agencies could be heard.70 The controversy over the injunction necessitated a quick 
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response from the state.  In the early fall, Governor Barnes stepped into the fray after the 
environmental group indicated it would accept an out-of-court settlement rather than take 
the case all the way through the court.  By late December, an agreement had been crafted 
and signed onto by both parties.  In many respects, the agreement mirrored the one 
agreed upon the year before (prior to the lawsuit).  It required the state to speed up 
construction of HOV lanes on area interstate highways, complete a major study of the 
health effects of air pollution on the region’s residents, strive for reductions in ground-
level ozone, and put more emphasis on the transportation needs of the regions’ low-
income, transit-dependent population.  With the settlement, the environmental group 
dropped its suit.71   
In January 2001, not even a month into the settlement, the state backed away from 
the table and the agreement collapsed, largely because of a dispute over how the 
agreement would be enforced and who would be responsible for monitoring its progress.  
Then, defying the good faith displayed in the agreement, the ARC and the state 
immediately went ahead with their request for the immediate release of federal 
transportation funds based on the transportation plan tentatively approved by EPA the 
previous summer, thereby rejecting the terms of the out of court settlement.  In an effort 
to prevent the funds from being released, the environmentalists filed a second lawsuit in 
late January charging that EPA had broken the law by failing to reclassify metro 
Atlanta’s air pollution, from the serious to the severe category, when the state missed the 
original 1999 deadline to demonstrate its SIP would lead to compliance.  In February, the 
group filed a separate suit, this time naming ARC, GDOT, USDOT, EPA, and 
FHWA/FTA as defendants, alleging that the regional transportation plan submitted to 
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USDOT in support of releasing funds was based on bad data and misleading assumptions.  
And to allow sufficient time for those suits to move forward, the environmentalists 
requested an injunction in April to immediately stop construction on any projects 
included in the contested transportation plan.   
The flurry of lawsuits seemed to suggest that ARC’s transportation planning 
program was bound for a major transformation.  The promise using the revised Clean Air 
Act as a planning tool looked to be on the cusp of being fulfilled.  But in June of 2001, 
the tide began to turn, or at least move in a different direction.  A federal district court 
judge in Atlanta denied the injunction request, allowing the process of programming 
construction schedules to continue, and signaling the possibility that the eventual ruling 
would be in favor of the defendants.  This was a major blow to the plaintiffs.  And around 
the same moment, amid the cacophony of back and forth arguments about the legality of 
ARC’s transportation planning process, Barnes unveiled the outline of a five-year, $8.3 
billion transportation plan for the state that would dramatically accelerate the completion 
of a number of projects in long-term transportation plans.  Designed to be a largely state-
funded initiative to speed up the regular regional transportation planning process, the 
legislation necessary to the funding mechanisms of the plan was set to be introduced into 
the 2002 session of the General Assembly.  By prioritizing air-quality friendly 
transportation projects, the plan would hopefully meet quick EPA/USDOT approval and 
convince interested parties of the state’s seriousness about addressing the complaint that 
it had failed to comprehend the detrimental environmental side effects of the existing 
transportation planning process.  Barnes’ plan introduced a new source of state financing 
that could be used to fund an array of big-ticket transportation projects.  Among the 
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projects included in the plan were new high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes for Atlanta’s 
Interstate highway segments, new light rail lines, a commuter rail system, improvements 
to a number of overburdened intersections, and a region-wide express bus system.72 But 
the one project in the plan that received the most attention was the anticipated allocation 
of enough money to begin building the Northern Arc. 
Though the inclusion of the Northern Arc in the Governor’s proposal appeared to 
surprise many of the parties looking in, and certainly was the detail that garnered the 
strongest reaction, Barnes’ decision to include the road as part of his transportation plan 
was not exactly unexpected.  Interest in some version of the Northern Arc was long-
standing.  It had been studied, put into transportation plans, and taken out of 
transportation plans, enough to have become a near constant background project in the 
Governor’s Road Improvement Program (GRIP) and a periodic topic reported in the 
Journal-Constitution.  And big road projects were an old interest of many of the rural 
legislators with whom Barnes had alliances and connections.   
In most respects, this was just another big road, basically the same version of the 
Northern Arc that had been debated before, spanning the distance between I-75, I-85, and 
Georgia 316, only with one important change.  Long considered the most critical (and 
controversial) stretch of the original Outer Perimeter, Barnes attempted to minimize the 
physical and emotional impact of the road by proposing turning the Northern Arc into a 
toll road, with a limited number of interchanges, and a permanent, undeveloped green 
buffer along both sides.73 Yet in spite of the changes to the road’s design and the 
inclusion of so many air-friendly transit projects, an inescapable issue (one that 
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intensified the sense of urgency) was that the Governor’s transportation plan would also 
accelerate considerably the start of the road’s construction.   
The creative twist to funding so many huge construction projects during such a 
short period lay with the Georgia Road and Tollway Authority.  An agency originally 
established in 1953 to oversee any future toll roads constructed in the state (the only toll 
road in the state is a section of Georgia 400 between I85 and I285), the Road and Tollway 
Authority was substantially renovated in a bill passed by the General Assembly during 
the 2001 session (Barnes lobbied hard for the bill).74 The bill broadened the scope of the 
Authority, permitting it to raise money for transportation projects and move that money 
to projects around the state.  In its revised form, the Road and Tollway Authority could 
raise money for transportation projects by selling state bonds that would be backed both 
by anticipated annual federal transportation allocations (determined by Congress on a 
year-by-year basis) and by reallocating funds collected from the state’s two toll roads.75 
After the initial shock and the dimensions of the financial obligations the plan 
entailed began to sink in, the details of its funding arrangements created almost as much 
controversy as the Northern Arc.  The bonds to be used as the primary funding source for 
the plan, Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEE), allowed the state to assume 
significant bond debt that would be guaranteed by anticipated federal transportation 
allocations, even though there was no assurance that future revenues would be sufficient 
to cover the cost of that debt, since Georgia’s allocation of federal transportation funds 
for capital projects is subject to the winds of politics and can shift from year to year.  
Moreover, after the new transit systems were up and running, the state would have to 
assume responsibility for their continuing operation, a prospect that was almost certain to 
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provoke backlash once local governments were asked to shoulder their share of this 
burden. Nevertheless, the economy was good and bond markets were forecasted to be 
strong and most bond analysts expected Georgia to be able to successfully manage the 
debt it would take on.76   
But by the middle of the summer, serious questions had begun to dog Barnes’s 
plan beyond the bond problems, perhaps foreshadowing its ultimate fate.77 The 
environmental collective that had sued ARC and the state in previous months raised new 
questions about the plan’s ability to improve accessibility for the low-income, transit 
depend population, and reiterated their concerns about the willingness of ARC to follow 
through with a plan that would improve air quality.78 An emerging voice in the 
wilderness, a small but vocal chorus of homeowners near the path the Northern Arc 
would cut worried about the fate of their homes and subdivisions and whether the road 
would alleviate traffic congestion.79 And while all the projects the Governor had 
proposed were already in the regional plan, control over when individual projects would 
be pushed into the design and construction phase remained with ARC, which because of 
its obligations to federal regulations had the final word on the timing of the release of 
funds.  Finally, comments by a few members of the ARC board suggested that some of 
the Governor’s favored projects might be held up in retaliation for his not taking their 
concerns into account during the development of his plan.80  
Yet it turned out to be the looming prospect of the Northern Arc that shut down 
Barnes’s immediate transportation plan, as well as the longer-term prospect of pushing 
forward another expansion of state control over land development.  Arguments for and 
against the inclusion of the road in regional transportation plans centered on its perceived 
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ability to relieve congestion, potential to push the urban fringe further into the 
countryside, and whether such a large investment in a single project created an unfair 
balance in transportation spending within the region.  Despite ARC analyses that 
indicated that the road would likely do very little to reduce congestion on the existing 
perimeter highway and even less to improve the region’s air quality, the absence of any 
reliable funding source, and pressure from the local media, the road survived a number of 
close ARC board votes, any of which could have killed the project.  Though barely 
hanging on to life, the bits of money that had been allocated to the Northern Arc through 
the GRIP program provided just enough for GDOT to undertake preliminary engineering 
studies and to maintain a slow paced property acquisition scheme for the road right-of-
way.  Thus even while the fight over Atlanta’s transportation planning crisis was 
unfolding, a portion of the preparation work was already underway.81  
The bond issue, the transit-dependent, the suburban homeowners, and the 
Northern Arc all became fodder in a larger battle between the Governor, ARC, and the 
environmentalists over control of the regional planning process, a battle that rattled the 
regional planning community.  The apparent suddenness of Barnes’ plan, and its 
complexity, quickly carved the regional leadership up, but not necessarily into cleanly 
separated groups.  Among Barnes’ supporters, which included many of his core 
constituents, feelings about the plan, and the road, were divided.  Even members of 
GRTA’s board, individuals appointed by the Governor himself, split in their opinions 
about the feasibility of the plan overall, and especially the potential long-term impact of 
the Northern Arc on the region.  The ARC board reacted similarly.  Though the agency 
had provided much of the background study of and debate about the road over the years, 
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members were nevertheless torn over the Governor’s plan and the effect the Northern Arc 
would have on the shape of the region.82 Accusations of ethical violations among certain 
members of the boards of ARC, GRTA, and GDOT, a few of who owned potentially 
valuable land near the route of the proposed road, further complicated the picture.  In 
addition to its dubious environmental impact, by late 2001 the Northern Arc was 
beginning to look more like the Governor’s pet political project, rife with corruption.83  
 The problem of maintaining Atlanta’s regional growth trajectory was growing 
ever more complex as the troubles over transportation and land use patterns intensified 
during late 2001.  Lawsuits and settlements added to the milieu of confusion, and the 
sheer scope and appeal of the Governor’s plan and funding package further complicated 
the picture.  So much of what was being offered had been on various wish lists for years, 
and the prospect of seeing those projects on a fast track to completion proved terribly 
enticing.  At minimum, the plan offered a bold, if flawed, pathway out of the impasse.  
And the prospects for the plan’s success got a boost in January 2002, when a federal 
judge ruled that the transportation plan the region was operating under, and the process 
behind it, was in fact legal.  Planning for construction projects would be allowed to 
proceed unfettered, at least while the environmental groups decided whether to appeal the 
decision.84 
In a milieu of uncertainty over the region’s future direction, the Northern Arc 
turned into a spark that exploded Barnes’ plan in three somewhat separate moments.  The 
plan that could have signaled a new era of cooperation turned into a major setback.  The 
inclusion of the road in metro Atlanta’s long-term transportation plan created a complex 
set of battle lines that broke across traditional political boundaries, creating perhaps 
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unexpected alliances.  Though arriving at this point from different directions, the groups 
involved found in each other a shared enemy (the Governor).  Among the different sides 
in the battle was a coalition of liberal, central-city environmental organizations who had 
been working for several years to push the ARC and GDOT toward more balanced 
transportation planning that took better account of environmental effects, travel mode, 
and accessibility.  There was a vocal group of affluent homeowners in parts of the fast 
growing, Republican-dominated suburban counties north of the city, driven by the 
annoyance of increasing traffic, who gathered under a banner of stopping the road from 
tearing up the lives they had the good fortune to build.  Another side was the Governor 
himself, the state agencies under his authority (GRTA and GDOT), and a number of land 
developers, long-time associates, and other sympathizers, all of whom openly supported 
the construction of the road for one reason or another.  And a fourth side included ARC, 
the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, and the Georgia Conservancy, 
organizations that represented the core regional planning coalition and were perhaps the 
longest term players in the region’s planning and development.  This group had worked 
with the Governor to confront the air quality crisis and had supported many of his efforts 
to move the state’s interest in regional planning forward, in a more balanced direction.  
But more recently these organizations occupied a limbo, mostly opposing the road but 
also reticent to scrap the Governor’s proposal simply to kill the Northern Arc.85 With 
lines drawn in the red clay, the sides came to a standstill as challenges to the legality of 
ARC’s plan to comply with air quality regulations were decided in the federal district 
court in downtown Atlanta.  Meanwhile, the Georgia Road and Tollway Authority quietly 
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got on with the business of pre-qualifying engineering and construction firms interested 
in building the first phase of the Northern Arc and other projects.86 
 
Barnes Loses 
On July 5, 2002, the first break in the standoff came when Barnes, finally 
realizing the damage the battle over the road could cause his political career, requested 
ARC to set aside the Northern Arc, effectively removing it from the regional 
transportation plan, until a stronger conflict of interest law could be passed in the next 
session of the General Assembly.87 More evidence had emerged that a number of donors 
to Barnes’ re-election campaign owned land near the route of the proposed road, causing 
quite a stir.  A number of members of the boards of GDOT and ARC also were involved 
in decisions that would potentially benefit them, creating an apparent conflict of interest.  
Several ARC and GDOT board members resigned in the wake of the revelations.  As this 
was happening, the Governor claimed his decision to suspend any further consideration 
of the road would clear up intimations of unethical behavior and would only delay the 
start of construction by several months.88 
In late August, the second break in the standoff came when the suburban 
homeowners and urban social and environmental activists united in their opposition to the 
Northern Arc, creating a new organization called the Northern Arc Task Force.  This 
diverse anti-road coalition of upper-middle-class homeowners and experienced social 
activists was able to muster significant resources (financial and organizational) in their 
fight against the governor’s transportation plan.89 The group hired the state’s former 
attorney general to represent them and filed their own lawsuit in the Fulton County 
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Superior Court against Barnes, the Road and Tollway Authority, and GRTA, alleging that 
the bond and toll program targeted as the funding vehicle for the Governor’s 
transportation proposal violated Georgia’s state constitution.  Because the controversial 
bond program also was designed to fund almost all of the accelerated transportation 
projects in Barnes’ plan, the lawsuit threatened commuter bus service, arterial road 
improvements, and transit expansion as well.  In mid-September, a superior court judge 
ruled that the plan for selling bonds was not unconstitutional as it stood, but left open the 
possibility for an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, which the Task Force did almost 
immediately.90 
In the meantime, the Task Force’s effort was bolstered by events outside their 
control.  While the battle over the Northern Arc unfolded, new residential developments 
continued to sprout along the proposed road corridor on parcels GDOT did not own.  
Though the location of these subdivisions was not planned to thwart efforts to build the 
road, that is precisely the effect they had.  With each new house in or near the corridor, 
the price of the Northern Arc inched up just a little bit, and the legal difficulty of 
acquiring property got a little bit thornier.  Added up over time, several hundred high-
priced houses could make a significant difference in GDOT’s ability to buy land for a 
road right of way.  With Barnes up for reelection, the Republican contenders had seized 
on the transportation plan controversy, turning it into a major campaign issue.  They all 
claimed to object to using GARVEE bonds to fund transportation infrastructure and 
promised to kill the Northern Arc, the transportation plan, and the funding program if 
elected.91 
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The November general election brought the third and decisive break in the 
standoff when Roy Barnes was narrowly defeated in his re-election bid by the 
comparatively obscure Republican candidate, Sonny Perdue, effectively ending the battle 
over the use of bonds to pay for the transportation plan and likely the plan itself (Perdue 
promised during his campaign to let the plan die).  Discussions about the fate of the road 
continued among opposition groups, but the momentum behind the Northern Arc, and 
most of the other ideas in Barnes’s proposed plan, had clearly faded.  Indeed, even before 
Barnes attempted to pull the plug on the road, there were signs that ARC was prepared to 
turn back any additional requests to allocate more money to fund acquisition of land for 
right of way.92 Growing opposition to the road among members of the Commission had 
imperiled other parts of the plan to the point that the entire program was in jeopardy, 
separate from the wider political fallout.  Nevertheless, by early May of 2003, Governor 
Perdue had made it abundantly clear that he had no intention of implementing any of the 
projects or policies in Barnes’s plan.  Finally, in July 2003, six months after Barnes had 
left office and Perdue had publicly scrapped the plan, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled 
that the former Governor’s funding proposal had in fact been constitutionally 
permissible.93 
The alliances that formed across political lines to defeat the Northern Arc ended 
in a Pyrrhic victory, winning the immediate battle but mortally wounding the potential of 
longer-term gains in state support for regional (and local) planning.  The surprisingly 
spirited Northern Arc Task Force ended up fracturing Barnes’s efforts to further 
institutionalize regional planning within the state government, while also failing to 
present a viable alternative.  The actions of the Task Force and their allies ended not only 
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in the defeat of the road and a radical regional transportation plan (though ironically not 
its innovative source of funding), but along with several other events spelled the effective 
end of the political career of the governor.  Beneath the particular politics of the road 
fight lay a set of even more fundamental issues.  As suburban homeowners allied with 
urban environmentalists to contest the Governor, the state, and the federal government, 
the battle turned into something more than just a fight over transportation infrastructure.   
Barnes’s defeat at the ballot box also ended the uninterrupted 130-year 
Democratic control of the state government, and drew to a close a line of progressive 
Governors in Georgia that could be dated back to Carl Sanders in the late 1960s.  The 
battle of the Northern Arc challenged the viability of regional planning agencies, the right 
to control development policies, and the role of infrastructure projects in the politics of 
planning.  But the Northern Arc also revealed much about how the Atlanta Regional 
Commission worked to maintain its role managing the planning process in the face of 
challenges to its authority.  In the general context of the ongoing expansion of a vast, 
low-density Sunbelt metropolis, the fight over transportation planning spoke to visions of 
the future of the region, as newcomers in the suburbs finally realized enough power to 
begin the process of molding metropolitan politics in their image, which on the surface 
matched well with many of the issues of environmental activists. 
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What Role ARC? 
 Three major questions drove this project.  How have public regional planning 
agencies supported and extended the process of metropolitan decentralization?  When 
does regional coordination happen?  What role have regional agencies played in the 
expansion of federal and state power over land development?  By looking across several 
decades of regional planning and through a series of major planning events in Atlanta, 
and specifically at the role played by the Atlanta Regional Commission during this 
period, I have hopefully offered a few answers, or at least the outlines of answers.  
Though complex and often overlapping, together the answers reflect the way that 
regional planning has functioned in Atlanta.  All are ultimately tied together by the larger 
context of change that washed over American cities in the fifty-year period between the 
end of the Second World War and the end of the 20th century. 
Four key issues help explain how the Atlanta Regional Commission worked to 
shape Atlanta’s physical development, particularly during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s: 
administration, coordination, legacy, and the state.  There are also several background 
issues, issues that help contextualize metropolitan Atlanta and that should not escape 
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mention: the relationship of water supply to land development, and the relationship of 
transportation planning to air quality. 
First is the administrative role ARC played, a result of federal regulations that 
compelled the state legislature to establish the Commission, but also a result of state and 
local leadership, as well as the internal leadership of the Commission, pursuing a more 
active role for the Commission in the regional planning and development conversation 
than was otherwise required.  By virtue of these circumstances, ARC quickly emerged as 
a key actor in structuring many of the major development plans and policies that allowed 
Atlanta to grow in its remarkably decentralized fashion.  Whether amid crisis or conflict, 
central to ARC’s ability to sustain itself was its intimate involvement in the complex 
network of regulations and politics that shaped development in the region, part of the 
larger processes that structure the metropolis and color the political battles that ensue.  
While the commission could not control the details of every development decision within 
the region, it did manage to both create and manipulate a variety of levers of power that 
affected those decisions.  Most of the time, ARC operated outside of public view, and to 
some extent, even behind the view of the politicians who were supposed to be responsible 
for official decisions.  ARC quietly maintained its administrative power by managing the 
pace of the planning process and by virtue of its status as the central forum for regional 
discourse.  Serving as an information sorting facility for how control over the landscape 
would be divided between stakeholders was critical to the ability of the commission to 
maintain loose regional coordination.  Controlling the process internalized divisions over 
the direction the region should take and turned back outside challenges to the existing 
planning agenda.  In other words, ARC became a key part of a regional planning 
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apparatus that normalized certain planning and development patterns, creating a received 
wisdom that could support outward conflict and inward consensus without breaking.1  
 The second issue pertains to how regional coordination in a place like 
metropolitan Atlanta should be understood.  For a variety of reasons, development has 
been both better coordinated than usually recognized and political fragmentation (among 
different levels of government and among neighboring jurisdictions) has been less 
pronounced than often suggested.  Though the context in which regional planning 
agencies operate is complex, subject to an impressive array of participants, agreement 
among parties within metro Atlanta remained fairly consistent across time.  Connections 
and overlaps between members of ARC and the state legislature, the presence of a small 
bureaucratic corps, a group of local politicians deeply interested in the fate of the region, 
and comparatively large local jurisdictions made cross-border relationships easy to create 
and maintain.  The agreements that ARC brokered helped manage the complicated 
character of regional planning, but also controlled bottom-up attempts (like the Northern 
Arc) to reform the regional planning process.  As the long-term effects of sprawling 
development patterns have become more pronounced, the relationship of cities, suburbs, 
and exurbs has been transformed, bolstered by economic growth and a shifting 
population. The wider distribution of population necessitated the maintenance of political 
and economic relationships across political boundaries.  Surface squabbles between 
suburbs and the central city shrouded a level of cooperation and consensus, in effect 
supporting expectations about how development would proceed.  In each case highlighted 
here, broad consensus among participants was the norm rather than the exception. 
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 Third is the weight of the legacy of regional planning in Atlanta, embodied in the 
uninterrupted line of successive regional agencies.  Five decades of publicly supported 
regional planning lent stability to ARC, in terms of political acceptance, but five decades 
also revealed a slow process.  The period over which regional planning unfolds raises 
questions about how and when regional plans should be evaluated.  In the case of Atlanta, 
the process overwhelmed the plans, which meant that ideas often emerged and re-
emerged several times before being implemented.  Plans took years to develop and years 
to implement.  Hence the moment that a plan is evaluated would directly influence 
whether it could deemed a success or failure (or somewhere in between). 
Fourth is the curious condition of state and local politics, Atlanta and Georgia 
emerging as places with surprisingly strong support of regional planning, albeit toward 
ends that do not necessarily correspond to widely held notions of good (or progressive) 
planning.  ARC’s wide involvement in different development issues over the years 
demonstrated how closely regional planning can become intertwined with state politics, 
even if the effect of the relationship is rapid, sprawling growth.  This raises questions 
about how the models of regional planning that have become common parlance among 
planners, Portland and Minneapolis, have been developed and deployed.  More often than 
not, the regional planning agencies and processes in these places have been identified as 
standards against which other places are gauged.  Analysts identify details of the regional 
planning agendas in Portland and Minneapolis, then proceed to look for evidence of those 
details in other places.  When they find nothing similar, they conclude that regional 
planning must not exist.   
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The case of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta presents a stark contrast to this 
method: planning appears as a long-term process of accumulation and accommodation.  
Jimmy Carter’s single term as Governor helped put into place an appreciation of the roles 
natural resource management and administrative reform could and should play in 
planning and growth management.  When Joe Frank Harris assumed the governorship, he 
reinvigorated Carter’s initiatives and added to them, leveraging water resource 
management as a key to making local and regional planning mandatory across the state.  
The controversial gubernatorial term of Roy Barnes highlighted the region’s chronic 
transportation problems, but also pushed transportation to the forefront of the regional 
conversation and helped realize air quality as a regional development tool.  Each of these 
alignments held important repercussions for regional planning, and how the influence of 
ARC’s regional agenda has influenced political success or failure.  The inescapable 
suggestion is not that Atlanta stands apart as a singular case, but rather that Atlanta 
presents a different kind of model of regional planning, one in which intergovernmental 
coordination and a consolidated regional leadership worked closely to support, extend, 
intellectualize, the production of a vastly sprawling urban landscape.   
In many ways, each of the planning events highlighted here was part of the 
culmination of five decades of uninterrupted population and economic growth, which 
helped bring about a steady transfer of political control from rural areas to an amorphous 
urban district.  All of this added up to the transformation of Atlanta, from a bounded city 
to an unbound metropolitan region.2 As the years rolled by metro Atlanta grew 
consistently, both in terms of population and jobs, and the kinds of economic activities 
clustering in the region were less constrained by traditional locational anchors.  Changes 
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in the national and global economy helped turn Atlanta into an important center of 
corporate headquarters and advanced business support activities, economic sectors that 
relied more on intellectual resources than proximity to raw materials.  This helped change 
the kinds of in-migrants the region attracted, their origins, and in turn the kinds of 
secondary or non-base economy activities in demand (and the locations of those 
activities).  As the central city became less dominant, the Atlanta region, like other urban 
places, was transformed into a complex web of residential and commercial space that 
rolled across the land.3 
 Beyond the substantive insights related to the work of ARC, two other storylines 
characterize the dominant ideology of planning and development in metropolitan Atlanta 
during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and might also characterize what happened 
throughout the country: one is a realization of a new environmental consciousness and 
the other is a reappraisal of the transportation planning process.  Both storylines emerge 
from a tangle of state and federal policies that tended to alternate between concert and 
conflict.  And both faced political conflict during long and convoluted episodes of 
implementation.  Yet both also influenced the Atlanta Regional Commission, the 
processes of regional planning, and the state as a whole.  The two ideologies traded off 
influence over time, but by the mid 1990s had begun to merge.  Federal air and water 
quality legislation passed during the 1970s and 1980s provided a powerful new policy 
foundation for organizations interested in contesting planning and development practices, 
while the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) and 1991 Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficient Act (ISTEA) made combating declining air quality a high profile 
national environmental issue with serious implications for transportation planning.   
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 Environmental issues, particularly the preservation of water quality, riding a surge 
of popularity and federal interest in the early 1970s, formed a critical element of the 
nonconsecutive terms of Governors Jimmy Carter and Joe Frank Harris, who were both 
instrumental in turning natural resource protection into a potent political issue and in 
pushing comprehensive planning practices fomented in metro Atlanta out to the rest of 
the state.  With the passage of the CAA amendments in 1990 of ISTEA in 1991, 
transportation re-emerged as the dominant concern in the region and state, and a 
particularly significant part of Roy Barnes’ single term as Governor.  Attempting to 
capitalize on the issue, Barnes tried to modernize Atlanta’s transportation infrastructure 
and turn Atlanta’s style of regional planning into a more prominent statewide issue. 
Finally, two other concrete issues related to transportation and the environment 
(both related to infrastructure) form a backdrop against which planning in metro Atlanta 
happened, and both helped give the region its current shape.  The first is that a single 
transport mode, the private automobile, held a position as the dominant design vehicle for 
transportation infrastructure.4 The second is the vast amount of money available to fund 
the expansion of water resource infrastructure effectively decoupled water supply from 
the pressure of population growth.  Together, these conditions meant that the physical 
extent of urbanized areas was able to grow much faster than the population and, 
subsequently, the built environment sprawled outward at an incredible rate.  
Among the things that the planning episodes presented here reveals is how the 
many masters (rules, regulations, people, organizations, governments) of regional 
planning each play a distinct role in the formation of the patterns of place, i.e. how and 
where people end up living.  Only on a few occasions did observers of ARC and the 
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regional planning program in Atlanta grasp this.5 Yet the places that the planning process 
helps carve into the space of the metropolis provide a basic set of parameters, paths, and 
routes through which urban life courses.6 The bureaucratic and legal machinations around 
the creation of ARC, the 1975 Regional Development Plan, the Metropolitan Atlanta 
Water Resources Study, the Georgia Planning Act, and the air quality crisis/Northern Arc 
demonstrated how regional planning as practiced in Atlanta, filtered through 
environmental regulations and transportation policy, owes its origins to the intersection of 
federal, state, and regional institutions and interactions with local politics, all of which 
happens within typical everyday decisions about land use and development.7 Periodic 
opposition to the various plans and solutions proposed to deal with the region’s problems 
can be read as both challenges to the existing balance of power that defines this 
interaction as well as confirmations of the ability of that balance to sustain itself in the 
face of conflict.  The durability and potency of this balance of power suggests that public 
regional planning institutions represent something more than just a simple meeting 
among local governments to discuss the allocation of resources across urban space, that 
they are significant factors in the great network of intergovernmental relationships that 
help shape urban development. 
 As it has continued to grow, Metropolitan Atlanta has come to represent a future 
form of urban spatial development, in which a diffuse network of suburban/exurban 
relationships has replaced the familiar city-suburb dichotomy.  Examining the details of 
the work of ARC and the state in this broader context will aid planners and local policy 
makers in their ability to understand the complex relationship between transportation, the 
environment, and land use, its function and role in the lives of individuals and in the 
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political struggles that structure the metropolis.  Regional planning is an important 
component of the politics and policies driving metropolitan growth and change, but a part 
that has been mostly overlooked when researchers have sought explanations for how and 
why change happens.  The combination of these factors portends an uncertain future for 
changing the way regions grow, particularly in sprawling Sunbelt cities.  Given the 
mounting problems associated with sprawl, understanding how regional development 
actually functions is a subject of intense scholarly and practical interest. 
 
Decentralization and Growth 
 During the last twenty years, beginning around the publication of Kenneth 
Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier and Robert Fishman’s Bourgeois Utopias, a growing 
collection of metropolitan scholars have argued that in the second half of the 20th century 
a close relationship between the federal government and key industrial sectors lured a 
wide swath of households to the urban fringe, a movement that simultaneously forced 
many older central cities into a state of decline.  The commingling of inexpensive land, a 
preference for single-family dwellings in a pastoral setting, racism, and global economic 
restructuring speeded the process along.8  
Supporting this era of intensive suburban-ward population movement was the 
changing geographic focus of the federal government’s expenditures.  Beginning during 
the Second World War, and intensifying in the years immediately afterward, the 
government directed a series of major defense related investments in infrastructure 
toward Sunbelt states.9 Expanded military installations (e.g. North Island, Eglin, 
Dobbins), research and development labs (e.g. Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, CDC), and 
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related support facilities (e.g. NASA) were scattered across the southern half of the U.S., 
with particular concentrations in California, Texas, Georgia, and Florida.  These 
investments kick-started local Sunbelt economies, spawned an array of start-up firms, 
laid the groundwork for a new professional workforce, and attracted a large number of 
domestic migrants.10 The combination of federal dollars, cheap labor, and opportunities 
for expanding into new markets attracted branches of manufacturing firms based in the 
Northeast and Midwest, and much later the corporate headquarters themselves.11 The 
confluence of these two sets of distinct but related processes created a national pattern of 
decentralization of people, housing, and jobs, from small lots and small houses in dense 
Northern cities to large lots and large houses in sprawling Southern suburbs.  This 
marked the beginning of the relocation of the nation’s political heart from the big cities of 
the North to the broad suburban metropolitan areas of the South.  
The role of ARC and its predecessors as key institutional supports for regional 
planning in many ways exemplifies how broader socio-economic processes converged in 
metropolitan Atlanta and has had important implications for the development of its built 
environment.  Beginning in the 1940s, Atlanta started down a long trajectory of growth.12 
Fueled by a robust local economy and mild climate, the region sustained a long-term, 
low-level development explosion.  During this period, metro Atlanta grew from 1.5 
million residents spread over 15 counties in 1970 to 4.1 million people in 2000 in 28 
counties.13 Yet unlike urbanization in the decades before the Second World War, the 
central city captured very little of the influx.  Most newcomers moved directly to the 
suburbs.  Migrants who originated in smaller towns in the South and metropolitan 
counties in the Northeast and Midwest drove the early years of growth, but since the late 
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1980s the volume of international immigrants has increased as thousands of newcomers 
have begun arriving from Latin America and South and East Asia.14 
Over the same period, the role of both roads and the natural environment in the 
social and economic life of the country changed considerably.  Roads were transformed 
from chaotic public spaces for communal life to engines of economic development to 
vast movement spaces reserved for the sole purpose of getting as much motor traffic as 
possible toward its destination.15 The environment went from a wild expanse for human 
exploitation to a collection of places that should be understood for their inherent value 
and indefinitely protected to part of a complex ecological space that humans have a 
responsibility to sustain.  As roads became single-purpose facilities devoted exclusively 
to motorized vehicles, detached dwellings with yards gathered many of the old public 
functions of city streets into the private confines of the domestic sphere.  And as the 
natural environment was visibly impacted by the proliferation of single-family houses 
and private yards, a reaction arose that questioned the processes that had lead to the 
suburban landscape in the first place.  This reaction would later be understood as the first 
sign of an impending shift in toward a more positive valuation of development planning. 
That Atlanta’s growth occurred almost completely in the unincorporated sections 
of a vast suburban/exurban fringe, particularly in the counties north of the city, made for 
a challenging governing environment.16 In a region with only a handful of small cities 
and no townships, the county governments were responsible for providing a full array of 
urban services to very large areas, which often proved difficult.  The resulting style of 
governance could be described as necessarily loose.  This was both advantageous and 
detrimental to ARC’s efforts.  While the number of governments under its jurisdiction 
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was limited, making coordination among neighbors easier, those governments often used 
a very light touch when it came to interfering with or restricting land development within 
their own boundaries.   
 Yet such development was supported by substantial public investments in road 
and water infrastructure, orchestrated by the federal government, ARC and the state, but 
implemented by county governments.  With a permanent funding source written into the 
constitution, road building, a result of the combined efforts ARC, the state legislature, the 
Governor, and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), has consumed a 
significant portion of total state expenditures over the last thirty years.  In line with many 
other Southern states, road building in Georgia, including Metro Atlanta, has been 
pursued under the auspices of general economic development, whereby roads are built or 
expanded with the express purpose of attracting investment.17 After the 1972 Clean 
Water Act, a significant expansion of the region’s wastewater treatment and surface 
water extraction capacity opened the way for more intensive residential and commercial 
development.  The result is an great collection of roadways, sewers, and water lines that 
knit together an amorphous expanse of private, single-use, excessively manicured 
development pockets, a pastiche of low-density residential subdivisions and retail power 
centers.  The speed with which this landscape has grown puts Atlanta at the leading edge 
of U.S. development patterns, emblematic of sprawl and automobility.18 
As the low-density, auto-centered landscape became ubiquitous, and even worked 
to retrofit existing central cities, an extended discussion emerged about its problems.  The 
perceived failure of planning and development regulations put in place in the 1970s and 
1980s (intended to deal with the damage created by the processes that created this 
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landscape), bolstered by mounting evidence of ecological damage, along with increased 
congestion brought by population and job growth, sparked an elevation in the discussion 
of the spatial, and implicitly political, future of the region.  Lead by an increasingly 
diverse group of actors, the forces that drove metropolitan growth over the last three 
decades have been contested in a variety of arenas.19 Critical to understanding how these 
efforts unfolded are the political attitudes that have grown up in the midst of so much 
metropolitan change.  Though many businesses, households, and individuals benefited 
enormously from federal, state, and regional policies that encouraged and supported 
urban decentralization, everyone, in some way or another, has come to see the procession 
of the sprawling landscape as problematic.20 Homeowners, environmentalists, and other 
social activists have become preoccupied with the environmental problems created by an 
urban fringe that seems to continually expand deeper into the countryside.  Many of the 
same homeowners (or their neighbors), joined by politicians and land interests, have also 
been preoccupied with the growing congestion on urban roads and a perceived 
transportation crisis.21 Business interests have struggled to reconcile themselves to one 
side or the other, while confronting a new social and economic complexity that has 
undercut their ability to influence the direction the region should take.  Planners and other 
members of the public bureaucracy, ostensibly neutral players, occupy a crucial central 
role in the process because of their role as knowledge and information brokers. Though 
the varying and often changing positions these groups took made the process of creating 
the metropolitan landscape the appearance of being uncoordinated, it was just as much an 
orchestrated effort that reflected a more-or-less agreed upon vision of urban 
development.22 
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 The heart of both the consensus and conflict over planning the development of 
metropolitan Atlanta has involved a seemingly mundane and incremental tangle of issues 
related to the constantly shifting point of confluence between transportation and 
environmental planning regulations.23 Deciding where to build roads or where trains 
should run and negotiating how natural resources should be used (or protected) are 
among the most important and politically charged moments in the development process.  
These decisions result from the interaction and conflict of a huge array of different 
stakeholders, and together comprise the very concrete practice and politics of urban 
planning.   
 
 
Triumph of the GOP 
The defeat of Roy Barnes and the state’s Democratic leadership in the autumn of 
2002 signaled perhaps more than a simple election loss: it was also the end of a 
governing coalition that had held sway over state politics for almost thirty years.  Barnes’ 
loss ended the rise of a state politician who not only understood the details of regional 
planning, but also put efforts to transform it at the center of his public persona.  With 
Barnes being booted from office, was the possibility of another transformation of the 
state of regional planning in metropolitan Atlanta pushed back underground, and along 
with it an urgent public discourse about the future of the region?  In other words, was 
2002 a watershed year for regional planning in Atlanta?  On the surface, the regional 
planning situation in metropolitan Atlanta changed in the aftermath of the 2002 
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Gubernatorial election.  The GOP assumed the reins of power in the state, taking over not 
only the Governor’s Mansion but both of branches of the General Assembly as well. 
 The new Republican Governor, Sonny Perdue, took an initial stance toward the 
array of organizations and stakeholders that had proposed measures to put the brakes on 
sprawl that pushed them off center stage.  Tightening development regulations, changing 
the terms of coordination among local governments, creating a different role for regional 
planning, and providing desperately needed investments in transportation infrastructure 
(especially mass transit) were, at least temporarily, removed from the front burner.  The 
Republican leadership acted quickly to stamp out the smoldering remains of the state’s 
last Democratic administration, putting a halt to all immediate plans for building major 
new transportation infrastructure and deeming the GARVEE bonding plan outside the 
bounds of further consideration.  Early in his term, Perdue replaced the GRTA board with 
his own supporters (including one of the suburban leaders of the Northern Arc Task 
Force), effectively squelching the agency’s remaining authority.  Change in the 
Presidential administration in 2000 had brought an expected relaxation of EPA’s air 
quality rules, which took some of the pressure off ARC to immediately deal with the 
region’s lingering air quality issues.  With the shelving of the GARVEE bond program, 
the commitment of the state’s principle leadership to pushing any of the major 
transportation projects Barnes had proposed was clearly waning.  While the new power 
balance tilted more politically conservative than the one it replaced, and though at times 
it appears divorced from urban issues, deep connections among the region’s political 
jurisdictions meant that concern over controlling the regional planning and development 
agenda would not soon wane, even if party affiliations changed.24  
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Hence in other respects, the planning situation stayed the same.  The lawsuits 
filed against ARC and the state had largely been settled or dismissed, meaning ARC 
could continue with the regional transportation planning program that it had already put 
into place.  And the full effects of ISTEA and subsequent federal transportation bills, 
TEA-21 and SAFETEA, provided critical financial and administrative support to ARC as 
it went about its work.  Thus as a result of its own resources and bureaucratic inertia, the 
commission continued to go about the regular business of regional planning, just outside 
the state’s changing political leadership.  Yet congestion on the region’s roads continued 
to build, and federal money for capacity adding projects remained scarce.  Both 
conditions were likely to continue for the foreseeable future). 
 These factors helped provide footing for ARC to introduce a new program in 
Atlanta in 2000 designed to support targeted densification nodes around the region, a 
program that ended up producing several resounding success stories.  The plan worked by 
building on the pre-existing infrastructure contained within the constellation of small 
town centers and mass transit stations that had been absorbed into the urban fold as the 
metropolitan area had expanded.  Providing substantial initial funds for planning 
activities, and then follow up funds to pay for infrastructure that would support 
realization of the objectives of the plans, the Livable Centers Initiative (LCI) provided a 
glimmer of possible changes within the region’s massive sprawl.  Efforts in suburbs far 
from the central city to induce the mixing of land uses, denser residential development, 
and build pedestrian-oriented infrastructure, issues that had never really been prioritized 
before, began to spread.  In 2000, the LCI program was authorized for $5 million for five 
years to support the development of plans and another $350 million for construction 
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funds, no small achievement and one that garnered national attention.  As a result of the 
program’s popularity and success, in 2005 another $5 million in planning funds and $150 
million for construction were set aside.  By 2003, $132 million of the construction funds 
had been programmed for LCI related projects.25 
 And in spite of the hiccup created by the abandonment of Barnes’ transportation 
proposals, a new effort emerged, after Perdue had settled into office, to find another way 
to fund some of the key, long-term elements most observers and many leaders still 
believed were desperately needed.  The ideas of building a new commuter rail system and 
expanding the existing mass transit system remained potent, and continued to garner 
relatively high levels of support among the chamber of commerce crowd, planners, a 
number of Atlanta legislators, as well as the public.  With the state and federal 
government unable or unwilling to put up the money needed to pay for so much new 
infrastructure, a plan for allowing groups of counties to band together for the purposes of 
creating special local taxes for infrastructure development was introduced in the General 
Assembly in 2008.  While the measure failed to pass, supporters have gone back to the 
drawing board with plans to reintroduce a modified version of the legislation in 2009.26 
 In the mean time, the Atlanta MSA has continued to expand, both in breadth and 
in numbers.  By early 2006, the Census Bureau estimated the region’s population at just 
over five million, a substantial (25%) increase since 2000.  In the same year, ARC’s in 
house estimate put the population of its ten-county planning area at just over four million.  
While most of this growth, as in the previous forty years, landed in unincorporated 
suburbs, four things are worth pointing out about the characteristics of the new comers 
and the collective effect those changes were having.  One, the city of Atlanta saw a 
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dramatic turn around beginning in the mid-1990s, as the city began to net population for 
the first time since the 1950s.  The majority of these newcomers were white and highly 
educated, signaling what could become a major shift in the city’s politics sometime 
during the next decade.  Two, suburban growth was beginning to be spread more evenly 
around the region, with counties to the south of the city showing surges in population.  
Three, the relative diversity of the newcomers had changed substantially.  While blacks 
and whites still comprised the majority of in-migrants, the number of non-US born 
immigrants increased manifold.  By the end of 2005, there were nearly 500,000 Latinos 
in the region, a seven-fold increase from 1990, and just over 200,000 Asians, a four-fold 
increase.  Almost all of these immigrants landed in the suburbs, often far from the central 
city.  Four, the overall concentration of the region’s population in the core urban counties 
remained strong, though what would be considered the central urbanized area had 
expanded considerably.  The total population in Cobb, Gwinnett, Dekalb, Clayton, and 
Fulton counties comprised 65% of the population of the entire MSA, while the ten 
counties within ARC’s jurisdiction held over 75% of the MSA population.  Most new 
growth has continued to locate in unincorporated parts of those counties.27  
 At some moments, the region looks poised for another major burst of 
infrastructure building and another expansion of development regulations.  If the regional 
economy is to continue to grow, or at least prosper, the problems of water and 
transportation simply cannot go unaddressed.  While the GOP leadership initially punted 
on its responsibility, the urgency of the situation will not wait for political squabbles to be 
settled.  More than ever, the fate of the state’s economy depends on metropolitan Atlanta. 
In the absence of a change in federal policy, a commitment by the state to significant 
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investment in new transit infrastructure could help alleviate congestion and improve air 
quality, as well as support a shift in both settlement and movement patterns within the 
region.  Adopting a more aggressive regional water management program could prevent 
another episode of the summer drought of 2007, when prevailing weather conditions (i.e. 
lack of rain) nearly ran the region’s water supply systems dry. With what appears to be a 
resurgence of the central city population already underway, the intended effect of such 
policy changes, a denser population and smaller regional footprint, may happen sooner 
than expected.  Yet the problems of a sprawling region are in the process of being 
compounded by factors outside local or state (or even national) control.  The rising cost 
of petroleum coupled with an automobile-dependent metropolis could translate into 
serious hardship for a majority of Atlanta’s inhabitants.  Without concerted effort, this 
could mean a downturn in quality of life and economic vitality.  What comes about will 
depend on the ability of every level of government and every organization with a stake in 
the region to learn to cooperate better. 
 
This raises important questions about the nature of urban counties as governing 
bodies, the motivation for state support, and the influence of the planning bureaucracy.  
The relative power of Georgia’s urban counties, coupled with their size, made them both 
difficult to govern and particularly vulnerable to the influence of special interests 
(especially land developers).  This is something no one really talks about, yet the 
organization of local government maintains a close relationship to the built environment.  
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